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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2021

What’s Hot in Workers’ Compensation, Vol. 24, No. 12, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    The Commonwealth Court holds that if the 120th day for notice of a work injury falls on a weekend or holiday, notice is extended to the next business day, pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act. 
Holy Redeemer Health Systems v. WCAB (Figueroa), 245 A.3d 355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)

The Statutory Construction Act provided that the 120-day notice period for a workers’ compensation claimant to report her work injury to her employer did not end on a Sunday. Thus, the claimant’s report came within the notice period of the Workers’ Compensation Act, in the employer’s appeal from adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board awarding benefits, even though the claimant’s report was made on the 121st day and would otherwise be one day late. Although the claimant’s employer was open for business on Sunday, the legislature did not include language in the Workers’ Compensation Act to make calculation of the notice period dependent on whether an employer operates over the weekend.

2.    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that under § 306 (a.1) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer is not entitled to reimbursement of benefits paid to a claimant during a pre-conviction incarceration. 
Carl Sadler v. WCAB (Philadelphia Coca-Cola Company), 244 A.3d 1208 (Pa. 2021)

Because the claimant was not incarcerated during any period of time after his conviction, no basis existed for termination of his benefits as a result of his incarceration.  The clear language of §306(a.1) of the Act authorizes the suspension of benefit payments only during periods of incarceration served after a conviction and makes no provision for suspending benefits during periods of incarceration served prior to a conviction. 

3.    Commonwealth Court addresses the retroactivity of the Supreme Court’s decision in Whitmoyer, holding an employer is required to reimburse medical payments as of the date Whitmoyer was decided, not as of the date of a signed third party settlement agreement.
Beaver Valley Slag Inc. v. Jason Marchionda (WCAB) and Jamie Young, Guardian v. Beaver Valley Slag, Inc. (WCAB), 247 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

According to the Court, the Supreme Court's Whitmoyer ruling, which held that § 319 of the Act precluded employers from subrogating future medical benefits after a Third Party Settlement Agreement (TPSA) was executed, did not apply retroactively to the date of the 2014 execution of the TPSA, but applied as of the date of the Whitmoyer decision.

4.    A judge’s determination that claimant sustained a disabling, work-related injury was not based on impermissible speculation as the judge believed the claimant and found sufficient corroborative evidence in the record to support her testimony. 
West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. and BrickStreet v. WCAB (Cochenour), 251 A.3d 467 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

Injuries sustained by the claimant from a ride on the employer’s shuttle bus are found compensable, even though no injury was shown on video of shuttle bus, which was pulled by the employer based on the claimant’s description of driver. The employer was entitled to a credit for the gross pre-tax amount of the claimant’s short-term disability payments, rather than the judge’s award for the amount the claimant received.

5.    Commonwealth Court holds that Act 111 applies to injuries that occurred prior to its enactment and that the employer is credited for payment of pre-Act 111 temporary total disability benefits and partial disability benefits relative to their obligations under Act 111 for IREs.
Johnny Pierson, Jr. v. WCAB (Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company LLC), 250 A.3d 547 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

Revision of the Workers’ Compensation Act to include a provision requiring the claimant to submit to an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) after receiving total disability compensation for a period of 104 weeks did not constitute unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

6.    Primarily because of the employer’s ownership and control of the availability and use of its trucks, the decedent driver of a tow truck was an employee at the time of his work-related fatality. 
Berkebile Towing and Recovery v. WCAB (Harr, State Workers’ Insurance Fund and Uninsured Employer’s Guaranty Fund), 254 A.3d 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

An employer-employee relationship existed between the tow truck driver and the towing business, as required for an award of fatal claim benefits under Workers’ Compensation Act to the driver’s surviving minor children following his work-related death. While there was a written agreement between the business and the driver stating no employment relationship existed, the driver had the ability to decline jobs, was paid per job, was responsible for his own income taxes, and the business had the ability to exercise significant control over the driver’s work. The business owned the truck bearing its name and the information the driver needed to do his job, the driver was not allowed to use or lend the truck for work not with the business, the business set rates and collection of payment for jobs performed, the driver was on call on “24/7” basis, and the business could stop assigning the driver calls and reclaim its truck at any time.

7.    Commonwealth Court holds that a suicide was not intentional and, therefore, the fatal claim was compensable. 
South Eastern Transportation Authority (SEPTA) v. WCAB (Hansell), 255 A.3d 689 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) 

The employee’s lower back injury directly caused the employee to become dominated by a disturbance of the mind so severe it overrode normal rational judgment and culminated in the employee’s suicide.

8.    Injury sustained by claimant as a result of a fall from a shuttle after it arrived at a building where claimant was reporting for work was compensable.
Maurice Stewart v. WCAB (Bravo Group Services, Inc.), 258 A.3d 584 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

The claimant was entitled to compensation benefits for an injury sustained upon his arrival at the front entrance of the employer’s building when he slipped and fell off of a shuttle. At time of his injury, the claimant had already arrived at the building where he worked. The shuttle took the claimant to the front entrance, where it stopped a few feet from the revolving doors of building. The claimant slipped and fell a few feet from the front entrance, a place where the employer’s business or affairs were being carried on. The claimant’s presence was required by the nature of his employment. The front entrance was a reasonable means to access the premises. The claimant’s injury occurred 28 minutes before start of his shift, and the ground where he landed was a condition of the premises that contributed to his injuries. 

9.    The Commonwealth Court upholds a judge’s decision to enforce a prior judicially approved C&R Agreement wherein claimant agreed to cooperate with the signing of Medicare Set Aside paperwork and later refused. 
Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc. v. WCAB (Bosco), __ A.3d __, 2021 WL 4304915 

The claimant failed to demonstrate fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake caused by an opposing party’s fault to negate a compromise and release agreement settling claims with the employer, although a change in the law made medical marijuana available following execution of the agreement. An agreement upon the terms existed at the time the parties entered into the agreement and it was approved. Medical marijuana was not contemplated at the time the agreement was approved, and the claimant never appealed the approval of the agreement. The claimant accepted the monetary settlement to resolve the indemnity portion of his claim and agreed to cooperate with the employer’s effort to secure a Medicare set aside arrangement, which would not have funded medical marijuana.

10.    Commonwealth Court holds filing a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable paying indemnity benefits and filing a Medical-Only Notice of Compensation Payable to stop payment does not obligate employer to also file a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation Payable and a Notice of Compensation Denial. 
Raymour & Flanigan v. WCAB (Obeid), __ A.3d __, 2021 WL 3610114 

The employer, which had filed a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable paying indemnity benefits to claimant, was not required to file a Notice of Compensation Denial in addition to the Medical-only Notice of Compensation Payable it sent the claimant in order to stop paying indemnity benefits. The Department of Labor & Industry, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s regulation required the employer, when it sought to cease paying indemnity benefits, to either file a Notice of Compensation Payable, of which a medical-only notice was one variety, or a notice advising a claimant that the payment of temporary compensation did not constitute an admission and that the claimant must file a claim to establish liability of the employer. 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.