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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2021

What’s Hot in Workers’ Compensation, Vol. 24, No. 12, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    The Commonwealth Court holds that if the 120th day for notice of a work injury falls on a weekend or holiday, notice is extended to the next business day, pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act. 
Holy Redeemer Health Systems v. WCAB (Figueroa), 245 A.3d 355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020)

The Statutory Construction Act provided that the 120-day notice period for a workers’ compensation claimant to report her work injury to her employer did not end on a Sunday. Thus, the claimant’s report came within the notice period of the Workers’ Compensation Act, in the employer’s appeal from adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board awarding benefits, even though the claimant’s report was made on the 121st day and would otherwise be one day late. Although the claimant’s employer was open for business on Sunday, the legislature did not include language in the Workers’ Compensation Act to make calculation of the notice period dependent on whether an employer operates over the weekend.

2.    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that under § 306 (a.1) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer is not entitled to reimbursement of benefits paid to a claimant during a pre-conviction incarceration. 
Carl Sadler v. WCAB (Philadelphia Coca-Cola Company), 244 A.3d 1208 (Pa. 2021)

Because the claimant was not incarcerated during any period of time after his conviction, no basis existed for termination of his benefits as a result of his incarceration.  The clear language of §306(a.1) of the Act authorizes the suspension of benefit payments only during periods of incarceration served after a conviction and makes no provision for suspending benefits during periods of incarceration served prior to a conviction. 

3.    Commonwealth Court addresses the retroactivity of the Supreme Court’s decision in Whitmoyer, holding an employer is required to reimburse medical payments as of the date Whitmoyer was decided, not as of the date of a signed third party settlement agreement.
Beaver Valley Slag Inc. v. Jason Marchionda (WCAB) and Jamie Young, Guardian v. Beaver Valley Slag, Inc. (WCAB), 247 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

According to the Court, the Supreme Court's Whitmoyer ruling, which held that § 319 of the Act precluded employers from subrogating future medical benefits after a Third Party Settlement Agreement (TPSA) was executed, did not apply retroactively to the date of the 2014 execution of the TPSA, but applied as of the date of the Whitmoyer decision.

4.    A judge’s determination that claimant sustained a disabling, work-related injury was not based on impermissible speculation as the judge believed the claimant and found sufficient corroborative evidence in the record to support her testimony. 
West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc. and BrickStreet v. WCAB (Cochenour), 251 A.3d 467 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

Injuries sustained by the claimant from a ride on the employer’s shuttle bus are found compensable, even though no injury was shown on video of shuttle bus, which was pulled by the employer based on the claimant’s description of driver. The employer was entitled to a credit for the gross pre-tax amount of the claimant’s short-term disability payments, rather than the judge’s award for the amount the claimant received.

5.    Commonwealth Court holds that Act 111 applies to injuries that occurred prior to its enactment and that the employer is credited for payment of pre-Act 111 temporary total disability benefits and partial disability benefits relative to their obligations under Act 111 for IREs.
Johnny Pierson, Jr. v. WCAB (Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company LLC), 250 A.3d 547 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

Revision of the Workers’ Compensation Act to include a provision requiring the claimant to submit to an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) after receiving total disability compensation for a period of 104 weeks did not constitute unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

6.    Primarily because of the employer’s ownership and control of the availability and use of its trucks, the decedent driver of a tow truck was an employee at the time of his work-related fatality. 
Berkebile Towing and Recovery v. WCAB (Harr, State Workers’ Insurance Fund and Uninsured Employer’s Guaranty Fund), 254 A.3d 783 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

An employer-employee relationship existed between the tow truck driver and the towing business, as required for an award of fatal claim benefits under Workers’ Compensation Act to the driver’s surviving minor children following his work-related death. While there was a written agreement between the business and the driver stating no employment relationship existed, the driver had the ability to decline jobs, was paid per job, was responsible for his own income taxes, and the business had the ability to exercise significant control over the driver’s work. The business owned the truck bearing its name and the information the driver needed to do his job, the driver was not allowed to use or lend the truck for work not with the business, the business set rates and collection of payment for jobs performed, the driver was on call on “24/7” basis, and the business could stop assigning the driver calls and reclaim its truck at any time.

7.    Commonwealth Court holds that a suicide was not intentional and, therefore, the fatal claim was compensable. 
South Eastern Transportation Authority (SEPTA) v. WCAB (Hansell), 255 A.3d 689 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) 

The employee’s lower back injury directly caused the employee to become dominated by a disturbance of the mind so severe it overrode normal rational judgment and culminated in the employee’s suicide.

8.    Injury sustained by claimant as a result of a fall from a shuttle after it arrived at a building where claimant was reporting for work was compensable.
Maurice Stewart v. WCAB (Bravo Group Services, Inc.), 258 A.3d 584 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

The claimant was entitled to compensation benefits for an injury sustained upon his arrival at the front entrance of the employer’s building when he slipped and fell off of a shuttle. At time of his injury, the claimant had already arrived at the building where he worked. The shuttle took the claimant to the front entrance, where it stopped a few feet from the revolving doors of building. The claimant slipped and fell a few feet from the front entrance, a place where the employer’s business or affairs were being carried on. The claimant’s presence was required by the nature of his employment. The front entrance was a reasonable means to access the premises. The claimant’s injury occurred 28 minutes before start of his shift, and the ground where he landed was a condition of the premises that contributed to his injuries. 

9.    The Commonwealth Court upholds a judge’s decision to enforce a prior judicially approved C&R Agreement wherein claimant agreed to cooperate with the signing of Medicare Set Aside paperwork and later refused. 
Lehigh Specialty Melting, Inc. v. WCAB (Bosco), __ A.3d __, 2021 WL 4304915 

The claimant failed to demonstrate fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake, or unilateral mistake caused by an opposing party’s fault to negate a compromise and release agreement settling claims with the employer, although a change in the law made medical marijuana available following execution of the agreement. An agreement upon the terms existed at the time the parties entered into the agreement and it was approved. Medical marijuana was not contemplated at the time the agreement was approved, and the claimant never appealed the approval of the agreement. The claimant accepted the monetary settlement to resolve the indemnity portion of his claim and agreed to cooperate with the employer’s effort to secure a Medicare set aside arrangement, which would not have funded medical marijuana.

10.    Commonwealth Court holds filing a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable paying indemnity benefits and filing a Medical-Only Notice of Compensation Payable to stop payment does not obligate employer to also file a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation Payable and a Notice of Compensation Denial. 
Raymour & Flanigan v. WCAB (Obeid), __ A.3d __, 2021 WL 3610114 

The employer, which had filed a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable paying indemnity benefits to claimant, was not required to file a Notice of Compensation Denial in addition to the Medical-only Notice of Compensation Payable it sent the claimant in order to stop paying indemnity benefits. The Department of Labor & Industry, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s regulation required the employer, when it sought to cease paying indemnity benefits, to either file a Notice of Compensation Payable, of which a medical-only notice was one variety, or a notice advising a claimant that the payment of temporary compensation did not constitute an admission and that the claimant must file a claim to establish liability of the employer. 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.