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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN FLORIDA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2021

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 25, No. 12, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Linda Wagner Farrell

1.    Prior final compensation order did not predict that permanent total disability benefits would flow from the award as the claimant intended, but did not, undergo a surgery to alleviate the work-related injury.
PraXair, Inc. and Broadspire Services, Inc. v. Celentano, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D20-927, Decision date Nov. 16, 2020 

The claimant argued that the PTD benefits flowed from her attorney successfully defeating a prior misrepresentation defense to temporary disability benefits. The First District Court of Appeals agreed with the judge and found that the prior Final Compensation Order did not predict that PTD benefits would flow from the award and, therefore, there was no entitlement to penalties, interest, fees or costs.

2.    No competent or substantial evidence to support that employer/carrier only accepted the aggravation; thus, they waived the ability to deny compensability. Hence, the apportionment defense also fails, and full permanent impairment benefits are owed.
Joe Sullivan v. NuC02, LLC/Broadspire, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D19-3275, Decision date Dec. 9, 2020

The First District Court of Appeals reversed the judge’s finding that the employer/carrier had only accepted an aggravation, which meant that they had waived the ability to deny compensability and assert an apportionment defense. The court further held that the employer/carrier acquiesced to 18% PIR by listing same on the Pre-Trial Stipulation. Also, the employer/carrier’s unilateral de-authorization of the treating provider, due to opinion that no further care was related, did not bar the judge from awarding continued care when the causation defense failed.

3.    The court finds that the judge erred by not ruling based on the notice that should have been provided within 52 weeks of the qualifying event versus when the symptoms manifested.
Palm Beach County Fire Rescue and Preferred Governmental Claims Solutions v. Andrew Wilkes, First District Court of Appeals, No. 20-1615, Decision date Dec. 14, 2020

The Judge of Compensation Claims held that a first responder’s PTSD (due to a drowning event) was compensable when analyzed from the date of its manifestation versus the date of the event. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals held that the judge erred by not ruling based on the notice that should have been provided within 52 weeks of the qualifying event, rather than when the symptoms manifested. The case was reversed and denied due to untimely notice.

4.    Cancellation of the workers’ compensation insurance policy was not valid because a condition precedent had not been met. Promissory estoppel applied because the employer relied on the certificate of insurance.
Scott v. Jones Construction Co. v. Central Florida Siding Pros, NorGuard Ins. Co., Southeast Personnel Leasing, Inc. Lion Insurance Co., Packard Claims, Nobles American Services, LLC, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D20–689, Decision date Mar. 16, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals rejected the arguments contending that the workers’ compensation insurance policy cancellation was not valid because a condition precedent had not been met and that promissory estoppel applied because Jones, the general contractor, had relied on the certificate of insurance produced by Central Florida Siding Pros.

5.    Applying the 1989 version of the workers’ compensation statute of limitations law for the right to remedial care relating to insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device.
DECA Manufacturing and Southern Owners Ins./Auto-owners v. Faye O. Beckett, First District Court of Appeals, No. 19-3441, Decision date Apr. 8, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals held that, although continued use of a prosthetic would toll the current version of the statute of limitations, it does not toll the 1989 version given its inapplicability to remedial treatment “relating to” the prosthesis. Here the claimant had screws and rods in her cervical spine but requested pain management and a mechanical bed. The First District Court of Appeals pointed out that the fact that she may have a prosthetic device is not, standing alone, sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from accruing. The claimant failed to prove that either request had anything to do with the screws and rod in her spine. They also agreed with the lower court judge that mistaken payments do not toll the statute of limitations. 

6.    Medical marijuana still illegal and not reimbursable under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.
Patrick Shawn Jones v. Grace Healthcare, First District Court of Appeals, No. 19-1684, Decision date Jun. 30, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals noted that under Florida law, marijuana is not reimbursable under the workers’ compensation statute. Moreover, federal law—which they pointed out they are “oath-bound” to follow—characterizes marijuana as having no accepted medical use and makes all possession and use of it illegal throughout the United States. They went on to say that a referral to a physician authorized to prescribe medical marijuana, including even just an evaluation of whether the employee is a good candidate for marijuana treatment, could not be, under any circumstances, “medically necessary” as defined and used in section 440.13, Florida Statutes.

7.    Since unemployment compensation is primary, therefore, it is not technically an “offset” to temporary partial disability benefits.
N. Hannoush Jewelers, Inc. and Massachusetts Bay Ins. c/o Hanover Ins. Group v. Patrick Bly, First District Court of Appeals, No. 20-2439, Decision date Jun. 30, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals only wrote to address the effect of the claimant’s receipt of unemployment compensation benefits on the amount of temporary partial disability benefits awarded. The employer/carrier then asserted that the claimant’s unemployment compensation benefits had to be offset and asked the judge to credit same against any TPD due. The claimant replied that any offset argument would be an affirmative defense and was not pled in the pre-trial stipulation; therefore, the employer/carrier had waived that defense. The court held that unemployment compensation is primary and, therefore, not technically an “offset” to TPD benefits.

8.    Because claimant’s mental injury manifested itself within six months of reaching physical maximum medical improvement and she was not receiving impairment benefits for the physical injury after reaching that point, the statutory cap in Section 440.093(3) does not apply.
Le’tavia Jones v. State of Florida, Department of Corrections/Division of Risk Management, First District Court of Appeals, No. 20-1741, Decision date Jul. 29, 2021

At issue in this case was whether the claimant was entitled to more than six months of temporary benefits while treating for psychiatric injury. The First District Court of Appeals reversed the judge who denied indemnity past six calendar months from the date of physical maximum medical improvement. They held that the six-month limit did not apply in this case because the claimant had not received any impairment benefits. Pointing to W.G. Roe & Sons v. Razo-Guevara, 999 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), which held the statutory cap in section 440.093(3) does not apply to a claimant not being paid impairment benefits. 

9.    Judge erred in not considering employer/carrier’s request for expert medical adviser once claimant’s one-time change choice of physician was decreed an authorized treating provider, thereby creating a conflict with the prior physician.
ABM Industries, Inc. and ACE/ESIS v. Maritza Valencia, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D20-2027, Decision date Sep. 29, 2021

The Judge of Compensation Claims erred in not considering the employer/carrier’s request for an expert medical adviser (EMA) once the claimant’s one-time change choice of physician was rendered an authorized treating provider, thereby creating a conflict with the prior physician. The judge’s order was reversed with regard to the portion awarding indemnity and medical benefits and remanded for the appointment of an EMA and further proceedings.

10.    In other news…
For those wondering what the impact of COVID-19 was on Florida workers’ compensation, from March 2020 to July 2021, there were 46,505 claims and $114 million in benefits paid. 

Good news for 2022…
NCCI has proposed a 4.9% workers’ compensation premium decreased, which if approved would have an effective date of January 1, 2022. NCCI also proposed establishing a workers’ compensation insurance catastrophe fund that would provide for an assessment on employers’ premiums. The assessment would generate revenue to cover workers’ compensation costs in the event of a catastrophic event (like another pandemic). Overall, Florida’s workers’ compensation is performing well as a result of   better risk management practices and safer workplaces. 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.