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Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Overrules Specific Loss Precedent, Grants Benefits to Estate of Deceased Worker

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

by Michael J. McMaster

Key Points:

  • Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the estate of a claimant is entitled to the payment of specific loss benefits because the claimant died from a work-related injury.
  • Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act states that an estate is entitled to payment of benefits when a claimant dies before the final adjudication of a claim and when there are no dependents. 
  • This decision affects the settlement analysis of claims that include a specific loss and has greatly increased the potential exposure of such cases where the liability for payment of the specific loss benefits does not extinguish with the death of the claimant due to the work-related injury. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expanded the scope of recoverable workers’ compensation benefits by holding that specific loss benefits may survive a claimant’s work-related death and be payable to the estate when no dependents exist. In overruling longstanding precedent, the court clarified that Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides a distinct pathway for such recovery, significantly impacting how catastrophic injury claims are valued and resolved.

Facts
In Steets v. Celebration Fireworks (WCAB), 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. 2025), the claimant, Christina Steets, was working for Celebration Fireworks Inc., the employer, when she sustained a serious injury following a firework explosion. The employer accepted liability for the injury in a Notice of Compensation Payable and paid the claimant temporary total disability benefits. The accepted injury was described as the amputation of multiple body parts. 

The claimant’s condition deteriorated, and she filed Claim and Review Petitions, seeking to add a number of additional injuries, including loss of use of both arms. The workers’ compensation judge granted the Review Petition and awarded specific loss benefits. Thus, the claimant would be entitled to 840 weeks of specific loss benefits following the expiration of her total disability benefits. 

The employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision. The employer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which ultimately affirmed the rulings below.

During the pendency of the employer’s appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant died from a complication of her work-related injury. Following her death, her estate filed Claim, Review, and Penalty Petitions, seeking payment of funeral expenses, specific loss benefits, and a penalty based upon the employer’s alleged failure to pay previously awarded specific loss benefits. The estate was comprised solely of the claimant’s non-dependent sister. 

The workers’ compensation judge granted the petition for funeral expenses as the death was work-related. However, denied were the Review and Penalty Petitions regarding the payment of specific loss benefits. The Appeal Board affirmed the decision, and the estate appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court issued a split decision in which it affirmed the judge’s ruling that the specific loss benefits were not payable. 

The estate appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It requested that the court overrule Estate of Harris, 845 A.2d 239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), where the Commonwealth Court had held that Section 306(g) of the Act was the exclusive means by which specific loss benefits survive the death of the worker. 

Result
There were essentially two distinct questions in the Estate of Steets case: (1) do specific loss benefits survive following the claimant’s death caused by the work-related injuries; and (2) if the specific loss benefits survive, can they be paid to the estate of the claimant? The Supreme Court held that the Act does not categorically bar recovery of specific loss benefits when a worker dies from their work-related injuries. In reaching this decision, the court focused on Sections 306, 307, and 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

First, the court acknowledged that Sections 306 and 307 limit the survivability of specific loss benefits to situations where the claimant died from causes unrelated to the work injury. 

However, the court stated that Section 410 provides a distinct form of relief when the claimant dies prior to the final adjudication of their claim from a work-related injury or cause. The plain language of Section 410 states that specific loss benefits may be paid to the estate of the claimant where there are no dependents to inherit. Therefore, the estate is entitled to the payment of the specific loss benefits. 

This case explicitly overrules the holding in Estate of Harris and opens the door to a broader application of the specific loss provisions in the Act. 

Impact
Estate of Steets expands the ability of a claimant’s beneficiaries to receive specific loss benefits following the death of the claimant, regardless of whether the death was caused by the work-related injury or an unrelated cause. This will affect the value of specific loss cases moving forward and will alter settlement strategy and claim handling. 

In the event of a serious injury with the potential for, or realization of, a specific loss benefit, it is no longer the case that the right to the specific loss would extinguish should the claimant die from the work-related injury. Instead, the specific loss benefit will have to be calculated and considered as a part of the case when discussing the potential outcome or settlement of the case. 

While this decision represents a shift in workers’ compensation precedent in Pennsylvania, it certainly is not a “sky-is-falling” scenario. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on Section 410 and the fact that the claimant died prior to the final adjudication of her claim. Therefore, this decision does not stand for the unequivocal statement that when a claimant dies from work-related injuries and is entitled to specific loss benefits, their estate is entitled to payment of specific loss benefits. 

Mike is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department and can be reached at (215) 575-2859 or MJMcMaster@mdwcg.com. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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