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Michael J. McMaster

Portrait of Michael J. McMaster

Michael is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department, working closely with Pennsylvania employers, insurers, and third-party administrators to navigate claims efficiently and cost-effectively. He provides guidance throughout the life of a claim, from investigating compensability issues and managing litigation strategy to preparing for hearings, depositions, and settlement negotiations. Michael is committed to delivering practical solutions that help mitigate risk, control claim costs and promote favorable results.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Michael clerked for the Honorable Charles J. Cunningham III of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas here in Philadelphia. During his clerkship, Michael assisted Judge Cunningham in ruling on pretrial motions, drafting opinions, and overall management of the courtroom.

Michael graduated from Drexel University Kline School of Law in 2021. While attending law school, Michael had the opportunity to participate in the Federal Litigation and Appeals Clinic where he represented clients from Liberia, Angola, and Ghana seeking asylum due to the persecution they each faced in their native countries. Michael also participated in several pro bono projects including immigration related projects organized by the Brehon Law Society and HIAS, as well as expungement clinics organized by the Legal Aid Society of Southeastern Pennsylvania. 

When Michael is outside of work, he enjoys reading non-fiction, watching sports, listening to podcasts, photography, and hanging out with his dog Babe.

    • Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law (J.D., 2021)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section
    • State Civil Inn of Court at Drexel Law School
  • Successfully defended a Claim Petition involving a claimant that suffered a leg injury that later required an amputation. The claimant alleged both physical and severe psychological injuries. The claimant was the sole owner of the company, and when he purchased workers’ compensation insurance, he signed an acknowledgement that as the owner he would not be considered an “employee” under the Act. At the first hearing, we moved to bifurcate the matter for a decision on whether the claimant was covered under the Act. The workers’ compensation judge granted this motion. At the next hearing, we argued that the claimant was not an employee under the Act and, therefore, not entitled to receive any benefits, based on the insurance policy that claimant had previously agreed to not be considered an employee. The workers' compensation judge agreed and dismissed the petition.

    • Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Overview, client webinar, February 25, 2026
    • A Few Good Lawyers: How Does Litigating in Philadelphia Compare to Military Court, State Civil Inn of Court at Drexel Law School, February 10, 2026
    • PA Workers’ Compensation Law: How to Produce the Best IME Reports, webinar, November 6, 2025
    • Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, April 2025
    • “Pennsylvania Supreme Court Overrules Specific Loss Precedent, Grants Benefits to Estate of Deceased Worker,” Defense Digest, 2025-09-01, Vol. 31, No. 3
    • "AI in Workers' Compensation: Are We There Yet?"The Legal Intelligencer, August 9, 2024

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Overrules Specific Loss Precedent, Grants Benefits to Estate of Deceased Worker

September 1, 2025

Key Points: Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the estate of a claimant is entitled to the payment of specific loss benefits because the claimant died from a work-related injury. Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act states that an estate is entitled to payment of benefits when a claimant dies before the final adjudication of a claim and when there are no dependents.  This decision affects the settlement analysis of claims that include a specific loss and has greatly increased the potential exposure of such cases where the liability for payment of the specific loss benefits does not extinguish with the death of the claimant due to the work-related injury.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expanded the scope of recoverable workers’ compensation benefits by holding that specific loss benefits may survive a claimant’s work-related death and be payable to the estate when no dependents exist. In overruling longstanding precedent, the court clarified that Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides a distinct pathway for such recovery, significantly impacting how catastrophic injury claims are valued and resolved. Facts In Steets v. Celebration Fireworks (WCAB), 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. 2025), the claimant, Christina Steets, was working for Celebration Fireworks Inc., the employer, when she sustained a serious injury following a firework explosion. The employer accepted liability for the injury in a Notice of Compensation Payable and paid the claimant temporary total disability benefits. The accepted injury was described as the amputation of multiple body parts.  The claimant’s condition deteriorated, and she filed Claim and Review Petitions, seeking to add a number of additional injuries, including loss of use of both arms. The workers’ compensation judge granted the Review Petition and awarded specific loss benefits. Thus, the claimant would be entitled to 840 weeks of specific loss benefits following the expiration of her total disability benefits.  The employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision. The employer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which ultimately affirmed the rulings below. During the pendency of the employer’s appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant died from a complication of her work-related injury. Following her death, her estate filed Claim, Review, and Penalty Petitions, seeking payment of funeral expenses, specific loss benefits, and a penalty based upon the employer’s alleged failure to pay previously awarded specific loss benefits. The estate was comprised solely of the claimant’s non-dependent sister.  The workers’ compensation judge granted the petition for funeral expenses as the death was work-related. However, denied were the Review and Penalty Petitions regarding the payment of specific loss benefits. The Appeal Board affirmed the decision, and the estate appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court issued a split decision in which it affirmed the judge’s ruling that the specific loss benefits were not payable.  The estate appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It requested that the court overrule Estate of Harris, 845 A.2d 239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), where the Commonwealth Court had held that Section 306(g) of the Act was the exclusive means by which specific loss benefits survive the death of the worker.  Result There were essentially two distinct questions in the Estate of Steets case: (1) do specific loss benefits survive following the claimant’s death caused by the work-related injuries; and (2) if the specific loss benefits survive, can they be paid to the estate of the claimant? The Supreme Court held that the Act does not categorically bar recovery of specific loss benefits when a worker dies from their work-related injuries. In reaching this decision, the court focused on Sections 306, 307, and 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  First, the court acknowledged that Sections 306 and 307 limit the survivability of specific loss benefits to situations where the claimant died from causes unrelated to the work injury.  However, the court stated that Section 410 provides a distinct form of relief when the claimant dies prior to the final adjudication of their claim from a work-related injury or cause. The plain language of Section 410 states that specific loss benefits may be paid to the estate of the claimant where there are no dependents to inherit. Therefore, the estate is entitled to the payment of the specific loss benefits.  This case explicitly overrules the holding in Estate of Harris and opens the door to a broader application of the specific loss provisions in the Act.  Impact Estate of Steets expands the ability of a claimant’s beneficiaries to receive specific loss benefits following the death of the claimant, regardless of whether the death was caused by the work-related injury or an unrelated cause. This will affect the value of specific loss cases moving forward and will alter settlement strategy and claim handling.  In the event of a serious injury with the potential for, or realization of, a specific loss benefit, it is no longer the case that the right to the specific loss would extinguish should the claimant die from the work-related injury. Instead, the specific loss benefit will have to be calculated and considered as a part of the case when discussing the potential outcome or settlement of the case.  While this decision represents a shift in workers’ compensation precedent in Pennsylvania, it certainly is not a “sky-is-falling” scenario. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on Section 410 and the fact that the claimant died prior to the final adjudication of her claim. Therefore, this decision does not stand for the unequivocal statement that when a claimant dies from work-related injuries and is entitled to specific loss benefits, their estate is entitled to payment of specific loss benefits.  Mike is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department and can be reached at (215) 575-2859 or MJMcMaster@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

AI in Workers' Compensation: Are We There Yet?

August 9, 2024

Workers’ compensation is a field of law that is particularly suited to the application of artificial intelligence, especially in the processing and analyzing of data.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.