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Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Co‑Worker Immunity Applies Only When Both Employees Are Acting in the Course of Employment At The Time of Injury

John Brown v. George Gaydos ; No. 22 WAP 2024; decided February 18, 2026; by Justice Mundy.

March 1, 2026

by Francis X. Wickersham

In this case, Brown, an employee, was injured on the job with American Concrete Solutions (ACS) while attempting to enter a skid loader when a hydraulic arm caught his body, crushing him between the top of the cab and the arm of the bucket, causing numerous severe injuries. ACS was owned by Gaydos and his cousin, pursuant to a partnership agreement. Previously, Gaydos operated as a sole proprietorship under the name Gaydos Construction, and acquired various construction equipment, including the skid loader in question. After forming ACS, Gaydos continued to own and insure the skid loader. He and his cousin agreed to provide individually owned equipment as needed, and ACS would not own or pay for the use of the equipment. Gaydos was present at the ACS jobsite the day of the work injury, but left before it occurred.

Following the accident, Brown filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against ACS, which he received. Later, Brown filed a civil action against Gaydos for negligence in maintaining the skid loader and failing to train and supervise ACS employees operating it. Gaydos filed a motion for summary judgment asserting immunity under the Act, as either the employer, or co-employee. A cross-motion for summary judgment was filed by Brown, arguing Gaydos was not his employer. Ultimately, the trial court granted Gaydos’ motion and found that he was immune under the Act as an owner of ACS, Brown’s employer, and alternately, Brown’s co-employee. Brown then appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the Act provides immunity from civil liability to a co-employee whose negligent actions caused the claimant’s injuries, so long as, at the time of injury, the co-employee was in the scope of employment with the injured party. Gaydos filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted. The court considered the issue of whether a co-employee was entitled to immunity under the Act if the co-employee was not acting in the course of employment at the time of injury. Gaydos argued that the Act provides immunity to co-employees who are “in the same employ” as the injured worker, which does not require a co-employee to be acting in the course and scope of their employment with the injured worker to apply.

The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding immunity only applies when the parties are in the “same employ,” which requires the parties to be acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the incident. The court rejected Gaydos’ interpretation of co-employee immunity, which was that all co-workers are entitled to immunity for incidents that occur on a work site, as long as the injured worker and the person claiming immunity had the same employer. According to the court, this ignored the requirement that the negligent act or omission occurred while the party invoking immunity and the injured worker were both in the scope of employment at the time of injury. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.