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Florida Court Strikes Proposed Workers’ Compensation Rules That Allow Physicians to Dispense Medications

Publix Super Markets, Inc., et.al. v. Dept. of Financial Services, et. al., ---So.3d---(Fla. 1st DCA 2026)

March 2, 2026

by Blake J. Hood

The First District Court of Appeal issued a blockbuster opinion on February 25, 2026, in the case of Publix Super Markets, Inc., et.al. v. Dept. of Financial Services, et. al., ---So.3d---(Fla. 1st DCA 2026). The court held that, while injured workers have an absolute right to choose their own “pharmacy or pharmacist,” physicians may not dispense medications directly to their patients under Chapter 440. This marks a significant development in the often contentious relationship between insurance carriers and dispensing physicians. Those opposing the dispensing practice claim that it has resulted in practitioners charging more for medications, and that ending the practice could save insurance carriers millions of dollars.

For many years, the Department of Financial Services (DFS) interpreted the “free, full, and absolute choice in the selection of the pharmacy or pharmacist” language of section 440.13(3)(j) to exclude dispensing physicians. Thus, insurers could deny reimbursement when physicians dispensed medications to injured workers. In 2020, however, DFS reversed course and issued an Informational Bulletin stating that dispensing practitioners were considered pharmacists under the absolute choice provision. Then in 2023, DFS proposed two administrative rules confirming that “physicians (including oral surgeons), physician assistants, ARNPs, and any other recognized practitioners registered to dispense medications pursuant to section 465.0276, F.S., may dispense medications” to injured workers. The rules were challenged by Publix and various insurance companies. After a final hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a final order upholding the proposed rules.

The First DCA disagreed with the ALJ’s final order and set it aside. The court held that the proposed rules were invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority because they enlarged, modified, or contravened the plain language of the “absolute choice” provision in section 440.13(3)(j). It explained that a “pharmacist” is someone licensed to practice pharmacy by obtaining a degree from a pharmacy school, completing a board-certified internship program, and passing a pharmacy exam. The statutes governing and regulating pharmacists under Chapter 465 of the Florida Statutes do allow for certain non-pharmacists, defined as “dispensing practitioners,” to distribute medications. The crux of the First DCA’s opinion is its holding that the plain language of the absolute choice section 440.13(3)(j) of Chapter 440 only applies to pharmacists and does not encompass dispensing practitioners.

The issue, however, may not be permanently resolved, as an appeal to the Supreme Court could follow. The court also implied that an opposite result would have been reached if section 440.13(3)(j) expressly included dispensing practitioners or if the statute used a broader term like “health care provider.” In effect, the opinion provided a potential roadmap for groups to lobby for statutory amendments that could survive judicial review.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.