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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

First District Court of Appeal Reverses Attendant Care Award Recommended in Independent Medical Evaluation Report

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 2026

April 1, 2026

by Blake J. Hood

Tri City Elec. Contractors Inc. v. Gondek, No. 1D2024-2352, 2026 WL 513579 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 25, 2026)

The First District Court of Appeal set aside an award of attendant care that was discussed in an independent medical evaluation (IME) report based on the “narrow role” of IME physicians as well as the nature of the IME report itself.

Pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 440.13(2)(b)1, attendant care must be 1) performed at the direction and control of a physician and be medically necessary; 2) the physician must prescribe such care in writing; 3) the prescription must be provided to the employer/carrier; 4) the prescription must give sufficient detail about the required care; and 5) the prescription must not be retroactive.

In this case, the claimant filed a petition for benefits requesting various benefits, including attendant care benefits paid to his wife. The employer/carrier denied the attendant care claim on the grounds that no authorized treating provider wrote a prescription for the same. The claimant obtained an IME, whose report discussed the claimant’s difficulty sleeping, getting dressed, bathing, and other limitations on his activities of daily living. The report concluded that the claimant’s wife should be in attendance 24 hours per day, seven days per week, to provide the claimant with nonskilled care.

The Judge of Compensation Claims ruled that the IME report constituted a prescription for the attendant care benefits sought and awarded the same. However, the district court stated that under the Florida Statutes, IME physicians have a “limited job of supplying ‘an objective evaluation of the injured employee's medical condition ... at the request of a party, a [JCC], or the department to assist in the resolution of a dispute arising under this chapter.’” Therefore, the court did not consider the IME report to exercise direction and control over the claimant's care.

Moreover, the court discussed what constitutes a “prescription” for attendant care, noting the definition of the same elsewhere in Florida Statutes and common dictionary usage to be an order to dispense necessary drugs, supplies, or medical treatment. Here, the court held that the IME report did not order any treatment or care that a “typical, ordinary prescription” would so order. Consequently, the court reversed the attendant care award.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.