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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

District Court Holds that Average Weekly Wage Should Be Calculated at Time of Last Injurious Exposure in Occupational Injury Cases

Guglielmo v. State of Florida, Fla. 1st DCA, No. 1D2022-3942, July 30, 2025

September 1, 2025

by Blake J. Hood

The First District Court of Appeal reversed a compensation judge’s denial of indemnity benefits to a former employee who developed atrial fibrillation months after resigning from his job. The appellate court emphasized that in occupational disease claims, “time of injury” and “disablement”—not the technical “date of accident”—control the calculation of average weekly wage (AWW). Because the claimant’s last injurious exposure occurred during his employment, the correct AWW was based on his final 13 weeks of wages.

For 23 years the claimant worked as a police officer. He retired and later returned to work with the Department of Corrections. Ultimately, he voluntarily resigned in March of 2021 because of health concerns; complaints of stress due to his job with the Department of Corrections and exhaustion due to the long working hours because of alleged understaffing. The parties agreed that when he resigned, he was making $673.20 per week. 

On July 16, 2021—after his March 2021 resignation—the claimant experienced heart palpitations. He sought medical treatment at the emergency room and was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation. He reported his heart condition to the employer/carrier and asserted an accident date July 16, 2021, the day he experienced cardiac issues. The employer/carrier accepted compensability of the atrial fibrillation and authorized medical care.

In April and June of 2022, the claimant filed petitions for benefits, requesting medical and indemnity benefits and medical care. Pay records revealed that the claimant did not work in the thirteen weeks leading up to July 16, 2021, the claimed date of accident. The employer/carrier argued that no indemnity benefits were due because the claimant’s AWW on the “date of accident” was $0.00, that the claimant “was not an employee” on that day because he was not working for the employer, and that he had no earnings in the thirteen weeks immediately preceding the accident date.

The claimant argued that, because the employer accepted the July 16, 2021, date of accident and atrial fibrillation as compensable, it conceded that he was an “employee” of the employer with an AWW corresponding to that employment.

The judge of compensation claims ultimately denied entitlement to indemnity benefits because he found that the claimant’s AWW was $0.00. The judge reasoned, because there was no “contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident,” there were no “wages.” The judge stated, “[a]s the claimant’s accident date occurred 119 days (17 weeks) after leaving his employment, he was not an employee in the 13 weeks preceding his accident.”

The First District Court of Appeal reversed. It highlighted one of the distinguishing factors of occupational disease claims—”disability.” It also explained the relationship of the terms “disability,” “disablement,” “date of accident” and “injury” for purposes of determining an AWW. 

Under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act, ”’disability’ means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphasis added). The plain language of the definition unambiguously focuses on the wages the employee was receiving at the time of the injury. “Disablement” also determines the “date of accident.” See § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The disablement of an employee resulting from an occupational disease shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident so long as the disease “resulted from the nature of the employment.” Id. (emphasis added). The time of injury means the period or periods of exposure. 

The definition of “disability” deliberately uses the term “injury” and “time of injury” as the critical time focus. It does not use the term “accident.” See § 440.02(13), Fla. Stat. (2021). Furthermore, the definition of “wages” pinpoints those earnings at the “time of injury,” which in occupational disease cases relates to the period of exposure. See § 440.02(28), Fla. Stat. (2021).

The relevant “wages” for purposes of calculation are those paid to the claimant, in this case, for his services at the “time of injury.” And as the parties stipulated, there existed 13 weeks of wages preceding the last injurious exposure—the claimant’s last day of work—which provided an AWW of $673.20.

Thus, in an occupational disease context, the time of injury—when last injurious exposure occurred—is the period of relevant wages. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 9, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.