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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

A Dispenser of Durable Medical Equipment is Not a Health Care Provider Under Section 109 of the Act and Therefore May Not Seek Recourse Through the Medical Fee Review Process

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 2026

April 1, 2026

by Francis X. Wickersham

Scomed Supply v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. and Sedgwick Claims Management Services (Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office); No. 79 C.D. 2025; filed April 16, 2026; by Judge Wolf.

Scomed, a retail seller of medical supplies, dispensed electrodes, batteries, lead wires, moisturizer, and alcohol wipes necessary for use of a TENS unit prescribed to the claimant for a work injury. Scomed billed Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. for the goods on ten occasions.  The insurer paid for less than the full amount billed, and Scomed filed five applications for fee review. The Medical Fee Review Section found that no further payment was due and Scomed filed hearing requests thereafter.

The matters were assigned to a Fee Review Hearing Officer, who held an initial hearing where the insurer argued that because Scomed was not a health care provider, the fee review matters should be dismissed. At a second hearing, the insurer expanded on their motion to dismiss citing the Commonwealth Court’s prior decision in Harburg Medical Sales Company v. PMA Management Corporation (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 635 C.D. 2020; filed August 30, 2021(unreported)), wherein the court held that a medical supplies distributor was not a health care provider under the Act because it did not provide health care services. At a third hearing, the insurer submitted documents showing the distinction between a health care provider and a medical supplier.

The hearing officer found that Scomed was not a health care provider as defined by Section 109 of the Act, and denied the hearing requests. Scomed appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the Hearing Officer. The court rejected Scomed’s argument that the Act defines health care providers broadly, and should be construed to include durable medical equipment.  The court noted that Section 109 of the Act, and the Medical Cost Containment Regulations, describe entities that are licensed by the Commonwealth to provide health care services, and that Scomed primarily sells or distributes medical goods, not services. According to the court, Scomed has nothing to do with treatment, and simply dispenses a product.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.