.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 5, May 2026

May 1, 2026

RESULTS*

Tony Natale (King of Prussia) successfully obtained a full defense verdict in a workers’ compensation matter in Philadelphia. The claimant sustained a work-related abdominal hernia while working for the employer dismantling a stage. Five months later, while undergoing physical therapy, he alleged new injuries to his neck and back related to the PT. He filed a review/claim petition, where claimant testimony and orthopedic experts from both sides were presented. On cross-examination of the claimant, he admitted that no pain was felt during therapy to his neck or back, he did not remember injuring his neck or back during therapy, and did not experience any neck and back pain until later in the evening. The court ruled that there was no evidence of any neck or back injury, denying and dismissing the petition.

Tony Natale (King of Prussia) had a claim petition dismissed before the Venango County, PA Workers’ Compensation Bureau. The claimant alleged a stretching injury to his lower back while working on a circuit board for an electronics company, claiming he was debilitated to the point that he could not walk. During a crucial cross-examination, the claimant’s orthopedic surgeon admitted that he had the wrong date of injury, the wrong mechanism of injury, and the diagnostic MRI and EMG refuted every work-related diagnosis in his chart. The court returned a complete defense verdict, denying and dismissing the claim petition.

Tony Natale (King of Prussia) successfully had a workers’ compensation claim petition denied and dismissed. The claimant filed a claim petition alleging a foot injury with specific loss while working with a mushroom dispensary. The petition was filed within days of the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. The claimant failed to provide discovery, appear for an independent medical exam, or appear for a defense scheduled deposition. During the hearing, an explosive oral argument was made in support of a motion to dismiss the claim. The claimant’s attorney argued that the “humanitarian nature” of the Act allowed the case to move forward. A resounding rattling of Supreme Court case law put that argument to rest. The claim petition was dismissed and a full defense verdict was awarded, despite the humanitarian nature of the Act.

Andrew Maffett (Harrisburg) successfully had a claim petition dismissed in a workers’ compensation matter, awarding $0.00 in benefits to the claimant. The claimant filed a petition, alleging a work injury on April 15, 2025. We filed a motion to dismiss, which the judge granted, concluding that an employee/employer relationship was not established after February 20, 2025, because the claimant unilaterally misrepresented her identity to obtain continued employment.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia) and Alana Staniszewski (Pittsburgh) successfully had a termination petition granted in a Pennsylvania workers’ compensation case. The claimant suffered a minor head injury, with some features consistent with a minor concussion. The claimant was a Marine who served in the Iraq war from 2003 to 2005, during which he suffered a head injury. Additionally, the claimant had a history of headaches and psychogenic non-epileptic seizures dating back to his childhood. We secured the pre-existing medical records, which supported the significant pre-existing history leading up to the minor head injury. We presented a Board-certified neurologist who testified that there was no evidence of any ongoing neurological deficits based on a review of medical records and diagnostic film studies. Additionally, surveillance evidence covering multiple months demonstrated the claimant being active and unimpaired. The judge found that the claimant’s pre-existing conditions accounted for his ongoing complaints. This decision will result in a substantial recoupment of payments of indemnity benefits and medical paid throughout the course of the litigation via Supersedeas Fund recovery.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome


NEWS

A. Judd Woytek, Shareholder in the Workers’ Compensation Department in Marshall Dennehey’s King of Prussia office, has been named a Fellow of the College of Workers’ Compensation Lawyers. He was inducted into the College at a celebratory event held at the Loews Ventana Canyon Resort in Tucson, Arizona on April 18, 2026.

The College was established to honor attorneys who have distinguished themselves in the practice of workers' compensation law. Woytek is among a select group of attorneys in Pennsylvania, and across the country, who have earned this prestigious honor.

“Judd has long been a pillar of excellence in our department,” said Michele R. Punturi, Director of Marshall Dennehey’s Workers’ Compensation Department. “His induction into the College of Workers’ Compensation Lawyers is a well‑earned recognition of his integrity, skill, and commitment to our clients in the Lehigh Valley and beyond. We are proud of his efforts and celebrate this milestone with him.”

Woytek has dedicated his 30-year career to defending employers and litigating workers’ compensation cases across eastern Pennsylvania. He is named among the Best Lawyers in America® for Workers’ Compensation Law, and was recognized by The Morning Call in 2025 as one of the Top Lawyers of the Lehigh Valley for Workers' Compensation. He is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Committee of the Bar Association of Lehigh County, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and the Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM).

A graduate of Ursinus College, Woytek received his juris doctor from Widener University School of Law. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.