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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2024

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    Commonwealth Court holds that an employer’s failure to reimburse a claimant for out-of-pocket payments for CBD oil is in violation of the Act.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, Pa. C. (WCAB), 305 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The employer violated the Act for failing to reimburse the pro-se claimant for out-of-pocket expenses used to purchase CBD oil for treatment of his low back injury. The workers’ compensation judge properly found that CBD oil is a medical supply the employer was obligated to pay for under the Act, that the claimant properly submitted receipts to the employer for reimbursement and that the employer did not pay for medical treatment as obligated to under the Act. In April, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the employer’s appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision. The court will consider the issues of whether CBD oil and other products that may be purchased without a prescription from a health care provider are “medical services” and/or “medicines and supplies” under Section 306 (f.1) of the Act, whether the cost containment regulations of the Act apply to CBD oil, and whether Section 306(f.1) of the Act requires direct reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for “medical services” and “medicines and supplies.” If so, are claimants required to submit supporting documentation (medical records, prescriptions, HCFAs) for reimbursement?

2.    Commonwealth Court holds that the claimant, a truck driver, was not subjected to abnormal working conditions from a minor truck fire which was extinguished in two minutes and without physical injury occurring to anyone.
Premium Transportation Staffing, Inc. v. Welker (WCAB), 305 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The claimant was trained to anticipate and respond to fires, had a fire extinguisher on the truck, was not trapped in the cab during the fire, and was able to leave the cab and retreat safely. The fire also lasted two to three minutes and was put out with assistance from another driver.

3.    Although a claimant may not have been at work with a concurrent employer on the date of a work injury with another employer, her relationship with the concurrent employer was sufficiently intact; thus, concurrent wages must be included in calculating her average weekly wage.
Resources for Human Development, Inc. and Gallagher Bassett Services v. Sherry Dixon (WCAB), 306 A.3d 1019 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

The claimant’s concurrent employment was sufficiently intact at the time of the work injury because she continued to work as a home health aide for the concurrent employer after her injury with the employer, as well as after her last day of employment with the employer. 

4.    Injuries sustained by a claimant while commuting are not compensable under the Act as the claimant was not a traveling employee with no fixed place of work.
Jorge Martinez v. Lewis Tree Service (WCAB), 310 A.3d 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

The claimant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while commuting home from his work as a tree trimmer, was not a traveling employee without a fixed place of employment for purposes of an exception to the “coming and going” rule. The claimant drove his personal vehicle to and from his home, his workday started at the employer’s yard where their trucks were parked, he drove the trucks to job sites and returned to the yard at the end of the workday. Additionally, the claimant was not reimbursed for travel expenses, did not store equipment at his home and was not furthering the employer’s business while commuting home in his personal vehicle. A change of work location during the day, or from day to day, does not make a claimant a traveling employee. 

5.    The Bureau is directed to identify and publish in the Pennsylvania Bulletin a different, nationally recognized schedule for valuing pharmaceuticals.
Federated Insurance Company v. Summit Pharmacy (Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office), 308 A.3d 329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

The use of a private publisher’s schedule of pharmaceutical prices in determining average wholesale prices (AWP) to resolve payment disputes for pharmaceuticals was found inconsistent with AWP as used in the Act governing prescription reimbursement in worker’s compensation cases. Furthermore, reliance on private schedule values of AWP to calculate the amount the insurer is to reimburse a pharmacy was inappropriate. 

6.    Exclusion of counsel fees from payment of future medical benefits on the basis that claimant’s future medical expenses are speculative was contrary to Section 306(f.1)(7) of the Act, which prohibits providers from billing a claimant for any costs relating to care under the Act.
Patrice Williams v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB), 312 A.3d 976 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Although the claimant’s future medical expenses were undetermined, such that the amount of counsel fees based on medical expenses could not yet be determined, there was no requirement that the fee agreement could only apply to past or fixed medical expenses. Moreover, the Act’s prohibition on a medical provider billing a claimant for any costs related to medical care for a compensable injury applies to amounts deducted from the medical provider’s bills for counsel fees. 

7.    Under Section 440 of the Act, an unreasonable contest will always result in an award of attorney’s fees and a reasonable contest may result in an attorney’s fee award.
Glenny Torres v. Amazon.com Services LLC (WCAB), 313 A.3d 486 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

An award of attorney’s fees is mandatory when a workers’ compensation judge resolves a contest in favor of the claimant and finds the basis of the employer’s contest was unreasonable. An employer is not automatically absolved from exposure to attorney’s fees whenever its contest is deemed reasonable in a workers’ compensation matter; instead, a workers’ compensation judge has discretion to either award or exclude attorney’s fees if the workers’ compensation judge determines the contest is reasonable.

8.    A pharmacy staffed by a pharmacist supplied by an employee leasing agency is a provider as defined by Section 109 of the Act. When a physician has ownership interest in said pharmacy, a referral to the pharmacy violates the Act’s self-referral prohibition.
700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office & SWIF, 315 A.3d 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Drugs and pharmaceutical services fall within “goods and services” as governed by the anti-referral provision of the Act. Thus, Fee Review applications associated with prescriptions filled for a claimant initiated by a pharmacist were properly denied for originating from a prohibited self-referral. The pharmacy did not dispute that the prescribing physician had a financial interest in the pharmacy.

9.    Commonwealth Court holds that a claimant who was the sole proprietor is required to provide notice of a work-related injury to the workers’ compensation insurance carrier within 120 days of occurrence of the injury. 
Erie Insurance Property & Casualty Company v. David Heater (WCAB), 316 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

Where a claimant is both the injured employee and the sole proprietor/employer, the “employer” to whom the claimant must notify of a work-related injury under the Act is the insurer that bears the ultimate liability for the claim. This allows the insurer to ensure that the prompt and complete investigation into the claimed injury, which would normally be performed by a disinterested employer, can be performed to protect against stale claims. Failure of the sole proprietor/claimant to give notice to his workers’ compensation insurer within 21 days of his injury, as required, precluded his Claim Petition. On December 17, 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the claimant’s appeal of the Commonwealth Court’s decision. They will consider the issue of whether the 21-day notice requirement of Section 311 of the Act is satisfied when the claimant gives notice solely to the employer.

10.    Acts 121 and Act 126 signed into law by Governor Shapiro.

On October 30, 2024, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro signed into law two significant workers’ compensation bills that were recently passed by the State Legislature. Act 126 establishes direct deposit for the payment of wage benefits to claimants. Act 121 relates to first responders and post-traumatic stress injuries (PTSI). First responder claimants will no longer have to prove that a psychiatric injury was caused by abnormal working conditions. The law applies to specified categories of public employees, stipulates that PTSI must result from an individual undergoing a qualifying traumatic event and limits benefits to 104 weeks. A diagnosis to be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist is required, and claims must be filed within three years of a diagnosis. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.