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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2022

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    House Bill 1837 Becomes Law 

On December 22, 2021, Governor Tom Wolf signed into law House Bill 1837, which moderately reformed Sections 413(c) and (d) and Section 449(c) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. The law eliminated the requirement of two witness signatures or a notarized signature on the Compromise & Release Agreement, provided a claimant gives sworn testimony that the full legal significance of the agreement is understood. The law also eliminated the requirement of a notarized affidavit with the Notification of Suspension or Modification form, provided the insurer properly verifies that compensation is being suspended because the claimant has returned to work at prior or increased earnings. The law went into effect in February 2022. 

2.    Supreme Court holds that non-treating medical providers do not have a constitutional right to receive notice and to intervene in Utilization Review proceedings.
Keystone RX, LLC v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (Compservices/AmeriHealth Casualty Services), 265 A.3d 322 (Pa. 2021)

In affirming the dismissal of a pharmacy’s Fee Review application, the Commonwealth Court prospectively held that non-treating health care providers, such as pharmacies, must be given notice and the opportunity to intervene in Utilization Review (UR) proceedings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth Court was wrong to conclude that prohibiting providers from participating in the UR process, but treating UR Determinations as binding on subsequent Fee Review Determinations, would threaten providers' due process rights to payment. The court found that when an employer or insurer successfully challenges a treatment, non-treating providers do not have a constitutional entitlement to payment under the Act, simply an expectation of payment in the normal course and, thus, no viable due process claim. 

3.    Supreme Court holds that under Section 440(a) of the Act, a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees shall be awarded when a contested case is resolved in favor of the claimant.
Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), 266 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2021)

This case involved litigation of a termination petition for a no-lost-time work injury that was acknowledged by a Medical Only Notice of Compensation Payable where the claimant requested payment of attorney’s fees under Section 440 of the Act. In dismissing the petition, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found there was a reasonable contest and denied an award of Section 440 counsel fees (while awarding fees under Section 442 for a lesser amount). Although the Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court both affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 440(a), when a contested case is resolved in favor of the claimant, a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees shall be awarded but may be excluded where a reasonable basis for the contest has been established. 

4.    Supreme Court holds that claimant did not cease to be in the course and scope of employment once he drove past his home to attend a voluntary happy hour sponsored by the employer. 
Jonathan Peters v. WCAB (Cintas Corporation), 263 A.3d 375 (Pa. 2021)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the claimant, a traveling sales representative who sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident on the way home from a non-mandatory but employer-sponsored work event, was in the course and scope of employment throughout the time of the event.

5.    Injury sustained by the claimant on his way to take a cigarette break and get a sandwich was compensable under the “personal comfort” doctrine.
Stanley Henderson v. WP Ventures, Inc. (WCAB), 269 A.3d 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)

A claimant's head injury from falling in a park during a smoke break was compensable pursuant to the personal comfort doctrine. According to the court, the claimant’s time away from work was informal in nature, purely devoted to a personal comfort of a physical nature and brief enough that the course of employment was not broken. 

6.    Absent fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake or unilateral mistake caused by the opposing party, a Compromise and Release Agreement cannot be set aside. 
James Hymms v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (WCAB), 281 A.3d 375 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)

The Commonwealth Court rejected the claimant’s argument that there was a mistake of fact relative to the settlement amount of his hearing loss claim since it was not based on the actual value of the percentage of his hearing loss, which was higher than the court-approved settlement the claimant agreed to accept. 

7.    Failure by a claimant to complete and return a required Wage and Benefit Reporting Form (LIBC-760) is not proper grounds for an employer to withhold payment of benefits ordered by a Workers’ Compensation Judge. 
Essix Holdings LLC v. Michael Dengel (WCAB), 276 A.3d 830 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) 

The employer’s refusal to pay benefits to the claimant following a Workers’ Compensation Judge’s decision approving a stipulation for a claim petition, on the basis that the claimant had not returned form LIBC-760, was a violation of the Act, and penalties were warranted. 

8.    A claimant cannot rely on prior Utilization Review Determinations, which established prescription medications were reasonable and necessary, in order to show in a later penalty petition that these medications were causally related to injury and payable. 
Theresa Skay v. Borjeson & Maizel, LLC (WCAB), 280 A3d. 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). 

Although the medications at issue were previously found to be reasonable and necessary via the Utilization Review process, the employer’s subsequent denial of payment for them on the basis they were unrelated to the work injury did not violate the Act, as the claimant had the burden of proving causal relationship. 

9.    Commonwealth Court holds that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board exceeded its statutory authority in ordering an employer to contribute to the cost of a new home purchased by the claimant. 
Ralph Martin Construction and Lackawanna American Insurance Company v. Castaneda-Escobar, 280 A.3d 1089 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)

The Commonwealth Court held that, although a one-time modification to a claimant’s home following a catastrophic injury was compensable under Section 306 of the Act, the purchase of a new home extends the phrase “orthopedic appliances” in Section 306 of the Act beyond a reasonable construction. 

10.    Where employer issues a Medical Only NCP after a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable, the issuance of a Notice of Denial and Notice of Stopping Temporary Compensation is not required and employer is not prevented from seeking a termination of benefits as of a date that precedes the date the Medical Only NCP was issued. 
Wolfe v. Martellas Pharmacy (WCAB), 281 A.3d 1129, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) 

The Medical Only NCP issued by the employer to recognize that an injury occurred, described the injury and indicated that medical treatment for the injury would be paid. The Medical Only NCP did not admit that the Claimant remained disabled as of the date it was issued and thus the opinion of full recovery was not inconsistent with it. 
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.