.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN FLORIDA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2022

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Linda Wagner Farrell

1.    Rita Noa v. City of Aventura and Florida League of Cities, DCA#: 21-0549; Decision date: January 26, 2022 

The claimant argued that an annual merit bonus should be included in her average weekly wage. The First District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the lower court opinion denying inclusion. The court held that the claimant’s merit bonus was analogous to profits or commissions at issue in prior cases and indicated it should be treated in a like manner. They held that the claimant’s average weekly wage should include a pro rata share of her annual performance bonus.

2.    Silberberg v. Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Bd., (47 Fla. L. Weekly D461); February 2022
 
A companion opinion to the Soya case below, the First District Court of Appeal attempted to clarify compensability in trip and fall cases following the 2019 Valcourt-Williams decision, which they described as “a narrow, trip and fall/comfort break accident case.” The court noted in Silberberg that compensability always turns on whether the employment led to the risk of the injury. If an accident occurs and does not involve a comfort break, only the presence of an idiopathic condition would trigger the “increased hazard” test.

3.    Soya v. Health First, Inc., (47 Fla. L. Weekly D 489); February 2022

In this compassion case to Silberberg, the court clarified that in cases where the claimant is injured while engaged in work activities and there are no pre-existing conditions, or competing causes of an injury, then work is the major contributing cause of the injury. Under the premises rule, injuries at the workplace are compensable if the injury occurred while performing activities, incidental to their job, such as going into work, or leaving work.

4.    Kelly Air Systems, LLC, Amtrust North America and Technology Ins. Co. v. Dorinda Kohlun, as claimant for Aaron Kohlun, Injured Employee, DCA# 21-0976; Decision date: March 16, 2022

This case involved the going and coming rule. The First District Court of Appeal felt that this case presented an opportunity to analyze the application of the statutory language as prior decisions did not offer substantive guidance on the definition or interpretation of “exclusive personal use.” An employee is not in travel status when he is traveling to or from work, which means that an injury suffered while traveling to and from work, even where the employee regularly works in a travel status, are not compensable. The claimant in this case was traveling in an employer-provided vehicle available for his exclusive personal use for travel to and from work, and he was not compensated for his travel. Therefore, the injury was not compensable.

5.    Joseph Guerrera v. Becton Dickinson & Co. and Sedgwick CMS, DCA#: 21-1788; Decision date: May 4, 2022

The First District Court of Appeal overruled the lower court judge and held that the average weekly wage can be increased even if the resulting compensation rate remains at the maximum. They also found that fee entitlement was still owed even though the increase in the average weekly wage was less than what the claimant had requested. The law does not require an exact match between the claim and the award. They disagreed with the judge who ruled that “no actual real benefit was secured.”

6.    LFI Ft. Pierce and ESIS WC Claims v. Dewayne Holmes, Blue Goose Growers LLC/FFVA Mutual Insurance Company, DCA#: No. 1D18-5243; Decision date: May 6, 2022

The claimant chose to ride home with a co-worker, who fainted at the wheel, causing a serious motor vehicle accident. Both employees were leased employees. The client company asserted immunity and the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule in a civil action. The leasing company was dismissed from that claim. In the worker’s compensation claim, the leasing company argued there was no exception and that the claim was barred by the going and coming rule. The Judge of Compensation Claims ruled that the leasing company was estopped from asserting their arguments because the client company had argued to the contrary in the circuit court matter. The judge also said that the leasing company benefited from the client company’s argument by being dismissed and held that two employers shared a special relationship. The judge further found that the going and coming rule did not apply because the co-worker’s fainting was a “special hazard.” The judge also held that the fainting experienced by the co-worker arose directly out of the employment. The leasing company challenged all of the judge’s rationales and holdings, and the First District Court of Appeal found merit in all. 

The appellate court held that neither estoppel, nor the special hazard doctrine, applied because the claimant did not establish the required elements. Further, estoppel did not apply because the two employers have adverse interests in a workers’ compensation setting. Further, an injury might be compensable when the employer sets its cause in motion, within the course and scope of employment, of the injured worker. That may apply to the co-worker who fainted, but it does not extend to the claimant because it was not foreseeable. The claimant’s decision to ride with a co-worker does not result in finding that the accident arose out of the course and scope of his employment.

7.    Sophia Sandifort v. Akers Custom Homes, Inc. and Amerisure Insurance, DCA#: 20-1892; Decision date: July 13, 2022

This case involved a minor who died on his first day of his very first job. The mother sought death benefits. The employer accepted compensability of the workplace death and paid medical and funeral costs but denied death benefits. The employer asserted that the mother and her other children were not dependent on her son. The mother had been supporting herself and her children with SSI benefits her deceased son received because of a learning disability. The First District Court of Appeal held that SSI benefits did not constitute dependency for the purpose of death benefits.

8.    Kelly Girardin v. AN Fort Myers Imports, LLC d/b/a AutoNation Toyota Fort Myers/Gallagher Bassett, No. 1D21-3405; Decision date: August 10, 2022    

This case involved yet another issue of attendant care where a judge and carrier attempted to adhere to the strict language of the statute. The First District Court of Appeal held that the statute requires a written prescription with certain information, but said that same does not relieve an employer/carrier of its obligation to “monitor a claimant’s injuries and provide needed benefits“ or excuse any “attempt to hide behind a wall of Will for willful ignorance.“

9.    Ismael Tiburcio v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office/Commercial Risk Management, No. 1D21-1330; Decision date: August 17, 2022

This case involved the heart/lung presumption. The employer/carrier argued that the officer departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of his personal physician. Because the claimant was seeking compensability for heart disease and his alleged noncompliance with his personal physician’s recommendations were for conditions other than heart disease, the First District Court of Appeal held that the judge erred by applying the reverse presumption provision and the case was remanded and reversed.

10.    Eddy Junior Bonhomme v. Staff Team Hotels, Corp. and Frank Winston Crum Insurance, Inc., No. 1D21-881; Decision date: October 12, 2022

This case involved a claimant working as a laundry attendant at a hotel and was very factually intensive. The claimant testified about a very specific incident that occurred on May 22, 2019. He did not report the injury and treated at the emergency room on June 3, June 9, and June 25. When he returned for treatment on July 17, that was the first mention of any neck or back pain. He then filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Judge of Compensation Claims held that the claimant did not know about his injury until July 17, when the diagnosis was first mentioned in the medical records. The First District Court of Appeal disagreed and held the diagnosis from the emergency room does not necessarily start the clock and pointed out that the claimant was very clear that he knew at the moment in May that his pain began and never went away.

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.