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Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Overrules Specific Loss Precedent, Grants Benefits to Estate of Deceased Worker

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

by Michael J. McMaster

Key Points:

  • Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the estate of a claimant is entitled to the payment of specific loss benefits because the claimant died from a work-related injury.
  • Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act states that an estate is entitled to payment of benefits when a claimant dies before the final adjudication of a claim and when there are no dependents. 
  • This decision affects the settlement analysis of claims that include a specific loss and has greatly increased the potential exposure of such cases where the liability for payment of the specific loss benefits does not extinguish with the death of the claimant due to the work-related injury. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expanded the scope of recoverable workers’ compensation benefits by holding that specific loss benefits may survive a claimant’s work-related death and be payable to the estate when no dependents exist. In overruling longstanding precedent, the court clarified that Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides a distinct pathway for such recovery, significantly impacting how catastrophic injury claims are valued and resolved.

Facts
In Steets v. Celebration Fireworks (WCAB), 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. 2025), the claimant, Christina Steets, was working for Celebration Fireworks Inc., the employer, when she sustained a serious injury following a firework explosion. The employer accepted liability for the injury in a Notice of Compensation Payable and paid the claimant temporary total disability benefits. The accepted injury was described as the amputation of multiple body parts. 

The claimant’s condition deteriorated, and she filed Claim and Review Petitions, seeking to add a number of additional injuries, including loss of use of both arms. The workers’ compensation judge granted the Review Petition and awarded specific loss benefits. Thus, the claimant would be entitled to 840 weeks of specific loss benefits following the expiration of her total disability benefits. 

The employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision. The employer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which ultimately affirmed the rulings below.

During the pendency of the employer’s appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant died from a complication of her work-related injury. Following her death, her estate filed Claim, Review, and Penalty Petitions, seeking payment of funeral expenses, specific loss benefits, and a penalty based upon the employer’s alleged failure to pay previously awarded specific loss benefits. The estate was comprised solely of the claimant’s non-dependent sister. 

The workers’ compensation judge granted the petition for funeral expenses as the death was work-related. However, denied were the Review and Penalty Petitions regarding the payment of specific loss benefits. The Appeal Board affirmed the decision, and the estate appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court issued a split decision in which it affirmed the judge’s ruling that the specific loss benefits were not payable. 

The estate appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It requested that the court overrule Estate of Harris, 845 A.2d 239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), where the Commonwealth Court had held that Section 306(g) of the Act was the exclusive means by which specific loss benefits survive the death of the worker. 

Result
There were essentially two distinct questions in the Estate of Steets case: (1) do specific loss benefits survive following the claimant’s death caused by the work-related injuries; and (2) if the specific loss benefits survive, can they be paid to the estate of the claimant? The Supreme Court held that the Act does not categorically bar recovery of specific loss benefits when a worker dies from their work-related injuries. In reaching this decision, the court focused on Sections 306, 307, and 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

First, the court acknowledged that Sections 306 and 307 limit the survivability of specific loss benefits to situations where the claimant died from causes unrelated to the work injury. 

However, the court stated that Section 410 provides a distinct form of relief when the claimant dies prior to the final adjudication of their claim from a work-related injury or cause. The plain language of Section 410 states that specific loss benefits may be paid to the estate of the claimant where there are no dependents to inherit. Therefore, the estate is entitled to the payment of the specific loss benefits. 

This case explicitly overrules the holding in Estate of Harris and opens the door to a broader application of the specific loss provisions in the Act. 

Impact
Estate of Steets expands the ability of a claimant’s beneficiaries to receive specific loss benefits following the death of the claimant, regardless of whether the death was caused by the work-related injury or an unrelated cause. This will affect the value of specific loss cases moving forward and will alter settlement strategy and claim handling. 

In the event of a serious injury with the potential for, or realization of, a specific loss benefit, it is no longer the case that the right to the specific loss would extinguish should the claimant die from the work-related injury. Instead, the specific loss benefit will have to be calculated and considered as a part of the case when discussing the potential outcome or settlement of the case. 

While this decision represents a shift in workers’ compensation precedent in Pennsylvania, it certainly is not a “sky-is-falling” scenario. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on Section 410 and the fact that the claimant died prior to the final adjudication of her claim. Therefore, this decision does not stand for the unequivocal statement that when a claimant dies from work-related injuries and is entitled to specific loss benefits, their estate is entitled to payment of specific loss benefits. 

Mike is a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department and can be reached at (215) 575-2859 or MJMcMaster@mdwcg.com. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.