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Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of William J. McPartland

Results

  • Dismissal Affirmed by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

    We successfully convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to affirm the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County’s grant of our preliminary objections and dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint in mandamus. In its complaint in mandamus to the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff argued that our client’s letter denying its plan and application for the development of solar panels was insufficient under the Municipalities Planning Code, thus entitling it to a deemed approval of its plan. We had successfully filed preliminary objections to the complaint on the grounds that the Township’s letter, which identified the plan’s defects with specific reference to provisions of the Municipal Planning Code that had not been satisfied, was sufficient under Section 508 of the Municipal Planning Code. This section requires that, when a municipality denies an application for approval of a development plan, “the decision shall specify the defects found in the application and describe the requirements which have not been met and shall, in each case, cite to the provisions of the statute or ordinance relied upon.” 53 P.S. Section 10508(2). The plaintiff appealed the decision, and we attended oral argument before the Commonwealth Court, following which the court affirmed the decision of the lower court on the same grounds.

  • Summary Judgment Obtained in Complicated Case Brought Against Two Pennsylvania School Districts

    We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two school districts in a matter brought by various plaintiffs against the Career and Technology Center of Lackawanna County (CTC) and four of its sending school districts. The plaintiffs had asserted claims under Title IX, the 14th Amendment, and Section 8542(b)(9) of the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act based on their sexual abuse by an automotive technology instructor at CTC. While permitting some claims to proceed against CTC, the court dismissed all claims against the sending school districts on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any individual at any of the defendant-school districts had actual knowledge of the automotive technology instructor’s conduct, and the instructor was not an employee, independent contractor or ostensible agent of any school district by virtue of his employment by CTC.

  • Summary Judgment Secured in First Amendment Retaliation Case

    We obtained summary judgment in a First Amendment retaliation claim where the plaintiff, an employee of the Borough, alleged that she was terminated by the president because of her affiliation with the minority of the supervisors. In granting summary judgment, the court found that the statements of one council member cannot constitute a policy of the council, unless she is delegated authority by the entire board. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the individual board member, as she did not have the authority to fire the plaintiff without approval from the majority of the board.

  • Unanimous Defense Verdict in Excessive Force Jury Trial

    We achieved a defense jury verdict in a 4th Amendment civil rights trial in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that two officers of our Northeastern Pennsylvania Police Department client used excessive force to transfer him from the police station’s processing room to a holding cell. We argued that the officers’ actions were reasonable under the circumstances because they were brief in duration, used techniques within the officers’ training, caused no injury to the plaintiff, and only occurred after the plaintiff repeatedly refused to walk to the holding cell on his own power. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in our client’s favor after approximately an hour of deliberation. 

  • Federal Rehabilitation Act Suit Against a School District Dismissed

    The plaintiffs filed a complaint stemming from the school district’s alleged violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Defense counsel prepared a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs’ pleadings were insufficient to show that the student was disabled under the Act, that the district did not discriminate against the student, and that an isolated incident or comment from one teacher does not impart liability in violation of Section 504. The motion was first evaluated by a U.S. Magistrate Judge who issued a report and recommendation that the motion be granted and the plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed. The plaintiffs objected, and the defendants briefed the district’s position that the report and recommendation should be adopted. Thereafter, a U.S. District Judge held that the report and recommendation contained no clear errors or manifest injustice, and that “plaintiffs’ objections merely express disagreement with the Judge’s analysis and attempt to rehash or restate arguments already considered and rejected by the Judge in the thorough report and recommendation.” As a result, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted and the plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.