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Wendy H. Smith

Portrait of Wendy  H.  Smith

Wendy has practiced in the area of construction defect/architects and engineers litigation for more than 30 years, representing general contractors, subcontractors and design professionals. She is an experienced litigator who has tried matters in state and federal courts and has handled innumerable mediation and arbitration proceedings. Wendy has also handled numerous multi-party construction defect/architects and engineers and complex product liability actions, including class actions.

In 1978 Wendy graduated from Smith College with an A.B. in economics and received her juris doctor from Boston University School of Law in 1981. She served as law secretary to the Honorable Charles R. DiGisi, J.S.C., during the 1981-1982 court term.

Wendy was admitted to New Jersey and the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in 1981 and was admitted to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court in 1985. She is a member of the Bergen County, Essex County, New Jersey and American Bar Associations.

    • Boston University School of Law (J.D., 1981)
    • Smith College (A.B., 1978)
    • New Jersey, 1981
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1981
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1985
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 1985
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer (2006-2009, 2018; Top 50 Female Lawyers, 2006-2007 )
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Top Rated Lawyer (2012-2013 )
    • New Jersey's Women Leaders in the Law (2013 )
    • American Bar Association
    • Bergen County Bar Association
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • New Jersey Defense Association
    • Obtained a directed verdict on behalf of my client, an engineering firm in a breach of contract action. Plaintiff, a construction company, sought damages for additional unit price work performed during the construction of an airport parking apron. The project was 95% funded by a grant from the New Jersey DOT. Plaintiff performed the additional work without submitting written requests for Change Orders and without receiving written authorization to proceed. Plaintiff contended that the engineer verbally authorized them to proceed with the additional work and that they relied upon that authorization to their detriment. The airport contended that it relied upon the engineer to determine that the work was done properly. The Judge denied Motions for Summary Judgment. At trial, I established that the terms of the Contract required the Plaintiff to submit a written request for a Change Order prior to performing unit price work that would increase the contract price; that Plaintiff's failure to submit the written request for a Change Order prior to doing the work deprived the airport and the DOT of the opportunity to decrease the scope of the project; and that as a result the Plaintiff's failure to comply with the terms of its contract, the DOT denied the request for additional funding. At the end of Plaintiff's case, the Judge granted the motion for a directed verdict dismissing all claims with prejudice.
    • Successfully represented an engineering firm in defense of a suit alleging improper design/construction of improvements to a town park resulting in flooding of plaintiffs' commercial property. I tendered the defense to the contractor; their carrier assumed the defense of my client and resolved the matter, reimbursing my client's costs and counsel fees.
    • Successfully represented a manufacturer of a truss system in defense of a suit alleging multiple construction defects. The matter resolved with no payment by my client.
    • Successfully represented a commercial property owner in a complex construction/fire loss matter in which claimants contended that improper design of a standpipe and a failure to test the standpipe following repairs by my client's contractor, resulted in the loss of two yachts. The matter resolved with no payment by my client.
    • Achieved a defense verdict in a wrongful death case. Plaintiffs' decedent committed suicide by jumping off of the roof of Rahway Hospital. Plaintiffs' claims included negligent security against our client, the contracted security company, along with psychiatric and nursing malpractice. Plaintiff appealed; the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Trial Court verdict; plaintiff then filed a Petition for Certification. The Supreme Court granted certification. Following briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court agreed that Certification had been improvidently granted and dismissed the appeal, which resulted in affirmance of the Trial Court victory.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment on behalf of an Engineering Firm dismissing a wrongful death claim based upon the plaintiffs' failure to provide an Affidavit of Merit.
    • Successfully resolved, through mediation, a complex products liability/construction defect claim in which plaintiffs sought $13.5 million in damages following an explosion of a large, commercial boiler during the commissioning process. I was able to persuade the parties and the court to permit limited, sharply focused discovery, providing enough information for the parties to intelligently participate in mediation, and avoiding the potential for hundreds of days of depositions. As a result, I was able to achieve a global resolution of the case for less than a third of plaintiffs' alleged damages and to significantly limit my client's contribution.
    • Successfully handled a class action construction defect/architectural malpractice claim on behalf of an architectural firm, obtaining a dismissal of all claims against them with no payment.
    • Successfully resolved, during trial, a construction defect claim against the general contractor, architect and engineer arising out of the design of a funeral home. The architect and engineer settled before trial. Plaintiff demanded approximately $1 million in damages from my client. I defended on the grounds that the contractor was justified in relying upon the signed and sealed plans of the licensed architect and engineer. At the close of plaintiffs' case, plaintiff accepted $75,000 in settlement.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment in a case involving a construction worksite accident. The general contractor sued my client, the plaintiff's employer, seeking defense, indemnification and additional insured status pursuant to a contract between the parties. I successfully argued that the plaintiff's claims against the general contractor arose out of the general contractor's active fault and not out of any vicarious liability on the part of my client. I successfully defeated the general contractor's motion for leave to appeal.
    • Achieved a defense verdict following a six-month trial in a $65 million construction case by establishing that the cause of water infiltration was differential movement, not client's work. In the same action, successfully defeated the developer/general contractor's post-trial motion for contractual defense and indemnity.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment in a construction/product liability case in which the demand was in excess of $10 million by establishing that the design of the system was doomed to failure prior to construction; therefore, any deficiency in the ductwork was not a proximate cause of the HVAC system's failure to meet specifications.
    • Successfully resolved through mediation, on behalf of the initial developer/project sponsor of a condominium project, a construction defect claim where the demand was in excess of $23 million by joining appropriate subcontractors, tendering client's defense to and demanding additional insured status from multiple subcontractors/carriers and retaining the appropriate engineering and architectural experts. As a result of these efforts, able to resolve plaintiff's claims for $7.8 million, limit client's contribution to $1.8 million, and obtain contribution in excess of 75% from the subsequent developer/project sponsor, architect and various subcontractors.
    • Obtained a $30,000 verdict following trial of a personal injury matter in which a young, diabetic woman claimed to have tripped and fallen on a defectively designed staircase, sustaining a trimalleolar fracture requiring open reduction with internal fixation. Plaintiff claimed to have sustained post-traumatic arthritis. Her expert testified that she would require subsequent surgery, most likely ankle fusion. Her pre-trial demand had been $1 million.
    • Obtained Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint against client, a product supplier, in a product liability case in which the demand was in excess of $1 million based upon the Statute of Limitations. In the same action, obtained Summary Judgment dismissing the purchaser's cross claims for defense and indemnification based upon their failure to perfect their cross claims and upon the fact that once plaintiff's claims were dismissed, any verdict against them would be as a result of their active fault. I successfully defeated the purchaser's appeal of the Order granting Summary Judgment as to the cross claims.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.