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Defense Digest

Novel Insurance Coverage Issue? File a Declaratory Judgment Action in Federal Court, Right? Well…

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by Vincent E. Cononico

Key Points:

  • Federal courts are reluctant to consider novel insurance coverage issues.
  • A decision to deny jurisdiction in an insurance coverage action is likely to be affirmed.

The story usually unfolds like this: the facts of the loss suggest that a policyholder may not be entitled to indemnity or a defense under the terms of the insurance policy. However, the law on the particular issue is not well settled in the jurisdiction. Therefore, the prudent decision is to file a declaratory judgment action. The state court venue is not seen as desirable, so the option of filing the case in federal court is suggested. There is diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy is sufficient for federal jurisdiction, so there should be no obstacle to filing the action in federal court, right? Well, before charging forward in federal court and incurring the associated expenses, we should take a closer look. 

A scenario similar to the one outlined above was recently considered in Admiral Insurance Co. v. Fire-Dex, LLC, 2023 WL3963623 (6th Cir. June 13, 2023). Fire-Dex is a manufacturer of firefighting products, including clothing worn by firefighters. Many of its materials contain the chemical polyfluoroalkyl, also known as PFAS. There is some evidence suggesting that PFAS causes cancer. A number of lawsuits have been filed against Fire-Dex and similar companies by the end-users of clothing containing PFAS. Fire-Dex turned to its liability insurer, Admiral Insurance, for defense and indemnity. Admiral believed that coverage did not apply under the terms of the policy and filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 

Specifically, Admiral argued the federal court should declare that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Fire-Dex because the alleged injuries fell under the policy’s “occupational disease” exclusion. That exclusion states that there is no coverage for a “…disease arising out of any insured’s operation, completed operation or products.” Rather than addressing this issue, the federal district court dismissed the action, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the case. Believing that was an error, Admiral filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining that, even when a litigant has satisfied all of the traditional elements establishing federal jurisdiction, a district court’s decision to accept a declaratory judgment action is still discretionary. District courts in the Sixth Circuit are required to apply the factors set forth in Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984) when deciding whether to keep a declaratory judgment action. These factors are whether:

  • the declaration will settle the controversy;
  • the declaration will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue;
  • the declaration will be used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing”;
  • the declaration will improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; or
  • there is a better alternative remedy.

The parties to the Fire-Dex case agreed that most of these factors were satisfied. The declaratory judgment action would settle the controversy and would be useful in clarifying the legal relations. There was no evidence that the action was filed for an improper motive, or “procedural fencing.” In addition, a declaration of Fire-Dex’s rights under the policy seemed to be the best remedy. 

However, the parties could not agree on the fourth factor, which formed the basis for dismissal by the district court. Specifically, the lower court concluded that retaining the declaratory judgment action would encroach on the jurisdiction of the state courts, because the specific coverage issue had not been decided by the state courts previously. Admiral disagreed and challenged the district court’s ruling on appeal, arguing that similar insurance policy exclusions had been applied in the workers’ compensation setting and that those decisions provided the federal courts with the necessary guidance on state law.

The Sixth Circuit did not find Admiral’s argument persuasive and explained that “states…are the masters of their own law, subject to certain federal constitutional and statutory restraints.” The court also stated, “[b]y and large, insurance rules and regulation are reserved to the states for crafting.” Because there are no Ohio state court decisions applying this specific policy exclusion to the same or similar facts, it was concluded that the district court was correct in declining to exercise jurisdiction. The court further explained that it was reluctant to reverse the lower court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. The court explained, “It is enough that the district court has ‘taken a good look at the issue and engaged in a reasoned analysis of whether issuing a declaration would be useful and fair.’” 

At first glance, the decision in Fire-Dex might seem counterintuitive. After all, in the context of insurance coverage, litigants file declaratory judgment actions for the purpose of seeking clarification of novel coverage questions. If the coverage decision is clear, there is no need to file a declaratory judgment suit. However, the lesson to be taken from Fire-Dex is that if the issue at hand is truly, or even arguably, one of first impression in the state, the federal courts will probably not welcome the case. Further, if the federal court denies jurisdiction, that decision is very likely to be affirmed on appeal. Therefore, litigants should proceed cautiously when considering filing a declaratory judgment action in federal court that involves a novel insurance coverage question.

*Vincent is a shareholder in our Cleveland, Ohio, office. He can be reached at 216.912.3821 or vecononico@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Thought Leadership

Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (RELRA or Act). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the Act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the Act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the Act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620. Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the Act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the Act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010). In defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important Act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, it is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Confirms RESDL Claims Are Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Repose

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that claims under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”) are subject to a two-year statute of repose running from the settlement date. This decision will further assist defending errors and omission claims against real estate agents as it bars any RESDL action commenced more than two years after the settlement date regardless of when the defect was discovered.  In Hollinger v. Deitrich, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 328 (June 23, 2026), the buyers entered into an agreement of sale in April of 2017 to purchase a residential property. The settlement occurred in June of 2017. The buyers reviewed the seller disclosures that revealed the property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit. The disclosures further noted no water infiltration into the basement, but disclosed rehab, an addition to the property and prior sewage backup.  Shortly after the settlement and closing, the buyers experienced flooding in their basement. In March of 2020, the buyers filed suit against the seller, the buyers’ real estate agent and broker and the seller’s real estate agent and broker alleging various causes of action including a violation of RESDL. The buyers alleged that they sought assurances from the agent defendants that no water infiltration occurred on the property. They further alleged that both agents lived in the area and should have known about the neighborhood water infiltration issues. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller and the seller’s agents and dismissed the RESDL violation.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 345 A.3d 629 (Pa. 2025), the court explained that a statute of limitation begins to run from the time of the injurious occurrence or a discovery of the same. However, a statute of repose runs for a statutorily determined period after a definitively established event. Notably, a statute of repose eliminates a cause of action regardless of when the claim accrues. Because of this, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations.  RESDL requires that an action for damages, as a result of a violation of this chapter, must be commenced within two years after the date of final settlement. The court found that Section 7311(b) was clear and unambiguous that an action for damages pursuant to this chapter must be commenced within a certain time after a definitely established event that is independent of any injury or discovery of any injury. Since the buyers sued over two years after closing on the property, their statutory claims were time-barred. The court explained that the seller disclosure statement could not support common law or consumer protection claims, as using it would improperly expand remedies beyond the statute’s terms. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that the buyers’ claims under RESDL were barred by the statute of repose.  Accordingly, defense counsel should scrutinize complaints involving RESDL claims to ensure that such claims have been timely brought within two-years of the settlement date. A plaintiff will no longer be able to invoke the discovery roll to expand the time frame.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Supreme Court Strengthens the Ongoing Storm Rule in Gallardo v. Walmart

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently expanded the protection afforded by the ongoing storm rule, under which commercial property owners generally have no duty to remove snow or ice while precipitation is actively falling absent unusual circumstances or a preexisting hazardous condition. In Gallardo v. Walmart, No. A-65-24 (N.J. July 30, 2026), the court significantly narrowed a common avenue plaintiffs have used to avoid summary judgment, holding that “ordinary efforts” to address winter conditions during an ongoing storm do not become actionable merely because an expert later claims those efforts made the conditions more dangerous. The case arose from a typical winter slip and fall. Mixed precipitation began around 11:30 a.m. Walmart's snow-removal contractor arrived about an hour later and salted the parking lot and walkways. Because accumulation was minimal, ranging from trace to 1/10th of an inch, the contractor did not plow. The plaintiff fell approximately 15 minutes after the salting was completed. The plaintiff did not contend that Walmart failed to respond to the storm. Instead, she argued that Walmart responded improperly. Her expert opined that salting without pretreating the lot caused melting and refreezing that resulted in black ice. That theory survived two summary judgment motions and ultimately persuaded a jury, which returned a verdict of approximately $1.33 million. The Appellate Division vacated the verdict because the jury had not been properly instructed on the ongoing storm rule, but remanded the matter for a new trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision and directed entry of summary judgment for Walmart. Applying Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021), the Court concluded that Walmart's conduct fell within the protections of the ongoing storm rule. Salting a trace accumulation during an active storm was ordinary remediation, not the type of unusual circumstance that could give rise to a duty. The court further held that expert criticism of those efforts was insufficient to change that result. Following Pareja, plaintiffs frequently argued that a property owner forfeited the protection of the ongoing storm rule whenever an expert could identify some alleged flaw in the owner's response to the storm. Gallardo rejects that premise. The decision recognizes that imposing liability based solely on expert criticism of ordinary snow removal efforts would discourage property owners from taking any action during a storm and would undermine the very purpose of the doctrine. The ruling warrants a fresh look at pending winter premises liability cases involving active precipitation, minimal accumulations, mid-storm salting, alleged failures to pretreat, or expert opinions premised on melting-and-refreezing theories. Cases previously viewed as presenting substantial trial exposure may now be stronger candidates for summary judgment. At the same time, Gallardo does not eliminate all potential liability during an ongoing storm. A preexisting hazardous condition or genuinely unusual affirmative conduct may still support the imposition of a duty. Plaintiffs will also likely attempt to distinguish Gallardo based on the nature of the remediation efforts at issue and the specific facts of a case. The bottom line is that Gallardo strengthens the ongoing storm rule by restoring it as a meaningful summary judgment defense. Now, “ordinary” efforts to address winter conditions during an active storm do not become "unusual circumstances" simply because a plaintiff retains an expert to say they could have been done differently