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Defense Digest

Proposed Expert’s Qualification to Proffer Standard of Care Opinions Must Be Evaluated Under the Entirety of Section 512 of the MCARE Act

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Tyler R. Price

Key Points:

  • Standard of Care: Patient assessment and discussion of procedures to be performed to evaluate the patient prior to surgery fall under the purview of the standard of care, not informed consent. 
  • Expert Qualifications: Proper analysis of an expert’s qualifications encompasses more than the expert’s board certification, as directed by the MCARE Act.
  • Superior Court remanded to trial court with instructions to revisit its decision regarding the gastroenterologist’s qualifications to offer standard of care opinions against a colorectal surgeon.

An alleged failure to assess a patient via non-surgical interventions prior to performing a surgical procedure may result in a breach of the standard of care. A recent trial court opinion addressed the proper analysis of an expert’s qualification to proffer standard of care opinions as instructed by the MCARE Act. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in McAleer v. Geisinger Medical Center, 332 A.3d 38 (Pa. Super. 2025), reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the health care defendants. The Superior Court directed the lower court to revisit the standard of care expert’s qualifications to determine if he is qualified to offer such testimony. 

Facts
A colonoscopy revealed the patient had a large polyp that was unable to be completely removed due to its size and the patient’s anatomy. The patient was referred by the primary care physician to a colorectal surgeon for evaluation of either a possible partial colectomy or a repeat colonoscopy under full anesthesia.

At the initial evaluation with the colorectal surgeon, the surgeon discussed laparoscopic, possible open right hemicolectomy, possible ostomy, and the risks of each procedure. Of note, these were all surgical interventions, and the assessment prior to surgery—a colonoscopy—was never discussed. The colorectal surgeon performed a laparoscopic right hemicolectomy, and the patient was discharged two days later.

Six days after surgery, the patient presented to the emergency department with abdominal complaints. Post-surgical complications, including a blood clot and tissue death, resulted in the patient undergoing several surgical procedures to remove the damaged tissue. 

The patient filed a lawsuit alleging negligence and claiming the colorectal surgeon recommended and performed a procedure that was counter-indicated for the patient’s condition.

Standard of Care Includes Proper Assessment and Discussions of Assessment Procedures Prior to Surgery 
In order to set forth a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff is required to plead sufficient facts which would establish that: (1) the doctor owed them a duty of care; (2) the doctor breached that duty; (3) the patient was injured; and (4) the injuries were proximately caused by the doctor’s breach of duty. 

Here, the patient claimed the colorectal surgeon recommended and performed the wrong procedure without properly assessing the patient prior to performing the surgery to remove the polyp. The patient’s experts opined: the colorectal surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to properly assess the patient; had the colorectal surgeon properly assessed the patient, then a colonoscopy would have been performed; and, consequently, the patient would not have suffered post-surgical complications. Further, the court noted there was no evidence that the patient would have refused the colonoscopy under general anesthesia or an endoscopic procedure. Both procedures are non-surgical assessments performed prior to surgery. 

The court concluded that the patient was not given any option within the standard of care. Thus, the patient did not have the opportunity to even choose or reject an assessment option within the standard of care. 

Qualifications to Offer Expert Testimony Requires Analysis Beyond Proposed Expert’s Board Certification 
Through discovery, the patient submitted the expert report of a physician who was board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. The gastroenterologist concluded that the colorectal surgeon failed to fully assess the patient prior to surgical intervention, violating the standard of care. The trial court disqualified the gastroenterologist from offering standard of care opinions of a colorectal surgeon based solely on his curriculum vitae and for failing to practice in the same subspecialty as the colorectal surgeon. The appellate court disagreed. 

The Superior Court recognized that the trial court failed to consider expert qualifications under the MCARE Act as a whole. Specifically, the trial court made no determination of whether the gastroenterologist and the colorectal surgeon had substantially similar standards of care for the specific care at issue. Furthermore, the trial court made no determination as to whether the gastroenterologist possessed sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide testimony as a result of his involvement in a related field of medicine. 

In reversing the judgment and remanding for a new trial, the Superior Court held that it was improper to disqualify the gastroenterologist’s opinions based solely on his certification and curriculum vitae. 

Implications and Conclusions
The Superior Court’s decision in this case highlights the critical balance between the standard of care at every step in patient care and when experts may be qualified to offer opinions as to each standard of care. This case highlights the importance of physicians consistently advocating for their patients throughout every stage of care and ensuring that all alternatives to surgical intervention are thoroughly explained, in alignment with the appropriate standard of care.

The Superior Court’s ruling emphasizes the need to analyze an expert’s qualifications to render standard of care opinion beyond the same specialty analysis and said expert’s curriculum vitae. The court’s decision reminds us that we must expand our analysis of an expert’s qualifications to consider the MCARE Act entirely, including whether a proposed expert possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide testimony as a result of involvement in a related field of medicine.

This case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to revisit its decision regarding the gastroenterologist’s qualifications to offer standard of care opinions against a colorectal surgeon. 

*Tyler is a member of our Health Care Department and works in our Philadelphia, PA office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.