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Defense Digest

Proposed Expert’s Qualification to Proffer Standard of Care Opinions Must Be Evaluated Under the Entirety of Section 512 of the MCARE Act

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Tyler R. Price

Key Points:

  • Standard of Care: Patient assessment and discussion of procedures to be performed to evaluate the patient prior to surgery fall under the purview of the standard of care, not informed consent. 
  • Expert Qualifications: Proper analysis of an expert’s qualifications encompasses more than the expert’s board certification, as directed by the MCARE Act.
  • Superior Court remanded to trial court with instructions to revisit its decision regarding the gastroenterologist’s qualifications to offer standard of care opinions against a colorectal surgeon.

An alleged failure to assess a patient via non-surgical interventions prior to performing a surgical procedure may result in a breach of the standard of care. A recent trial court opinion addressed the proper analysis of an expert’s qualification to proffer standard of care opinions as instructed by the MCARE Act. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in McAleer v. Geisinger Medical Center, 332 A.3d 38 (Pa. Super. 2025), reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the health care defendants. The Superior Court directed the lower court to revisit the standard of care expert’s qualifications to determine if he is qualified to offer such testimony. 

Facts
A colonoscopy revealed the patient had a large polyp that was unable to be completely removed due to its size and the patient’s anatomy. The patient was referred by the primary care physician to a colorectal surgeon for evaluation of either a possible partial colectomy or a repeat colonoscopy under full anesthesia.

At the initial evaluation with the colorectal surgeon, the surgeon discussed laparoscopic, possible open right hemicolectomy, possible ostomy, and the risks of each procedure. Of note, these were all surgical interventions, and the assessment prior to surgery—a colonoscopy—was never discussed. The colorectal surgeon performed a laparoscopic right hemicolectomy, and the patient was discharged two days later.

Six days after surgery, the patient presented to the emergency department with abdominal complaints. Post-surgical complications, including a blood clot and tissue death, resulted in the patient undergoing several surgical procedures to remove the damaged tissue. 

The patient filed a lawsuit alleging negligence and claiming the colorectal surgeon recommended and performed a procedure that was counter-indicated for the patient’s condition.

Standard of Care Includes Proper Assessment and Discussions of Assessment Procedures Prior to Surgery 
In order to set forth a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff is required to plead sufficient facts which would establish that: (1) the doctor owed them a duty of care; (2) the doctor breached that duty; (3) the patient was injured; and (4) the injuries were proximately caused by the doctor’s breach of duty. 

Here, the patient claimed the colorectal surgeon recommended and performed the wrong procedure without properly assessing the patient prior to performing the surgery to remove the polyp. The patient’s experts opined: the colorectal surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to properly assess the patient; had the colorectal surgeon properly assessed the patient, then a colonoscopy would have been performed; and, consequently, the patient would not have suffered post-surgical complications. Further, the court noted there was no evidence that the patient would have refused the colonoscopy under general anesthesia or an endoscopic procedure. Both procedures are non-surgical assessments performed prior to surgery. 

The court concluded that the patient was not given any option within the standard of care. Thus, the patient did not have the opportunity to even choose or reject an assessment option within the standard of care. 

Qualifications to Offer Expert Testimony Requires Analysis Beyond Proposed Expert’s Board Certification 
Through discovery, the patient submitted the expert report of a physician who was board certified in internal medicine and gastroenterology. The gastroenterologist concluded that the colorectal surgeon failed to fully assess the patient prior to surgical intervention, violating the standard of care. The trial court disqualified the gastroenterologist from offering standard of care opinions of a colorectal surgeon based solely on his curriculum vitae and for failing to practice in the same subspecialty as the colorectal surgeon. The appellate court disagreed. 

The Superior Court recognized that the trial court failed to consider expert qualifications under the MCARE Act as a whole. Specifically, the trial court made no determination of whether the gastroenterologist and the colorectal surgeon had substantially similar standards of care for the specific care at issue. Furthermore, the trial court made no determination as to whether the gastroenterologist possessed sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide testimony as a result of his involvement in a related field of medicine. 

In reversing the judgment and remanding for a new trial, the Superior Court held that it was improper to disqualify the gastroenterologist’s opinions based solely on his certification and curriculum vitae. 

Implications and Conclusions
The Superior Court’s decision in this case highlights the critical balance between the standard of care at every step in patient care and when experts may be qualified to offer opinions as to each standard of care. This case highlights the importance of physicians consistently advocating for their patients throughout every stage of care and ensuring that all alternatives to surgical intervention are thoroughly explained, in alignment with the appropriate standard of care.

The Superior Court’s ruling emphasizes the need to analyze an expert’s qualifications to render standard of care opinion beyond the same specialty analysis and said expert’s curriculum vitae. The court’s decision reminds us that we must expand our analysis of an expert’s qualifications to consider the MCARE Act entirely, including whether a proposed expert possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide testimony as a result of involvement in a related field of medicine.

This case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to revisit its decision regarding the gastroenterologist’s qualifications to offer standard of care opinions against a colorectal surgeon. 

*Tyler is a member of our Health Care Department and works in our Philadelphia, PA office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.