.

Defense Digest

Your Residence Is Not Necessarily Where You Live

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Christopher W. Woodward

Key Points:

  • Determining residency in the context of an insurance policy, while reliant on facts, can be resolved as a matter of law.
  • Dual residency can be extended beyond the typical factual situations to homes, even if the insured is not actively living in the home, so long as they can prove “regular and habitual” ties.

In Isenberg v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2022 WL 1720334 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2022) (Schwab, J.), a fire destroyed the plaintiff’s recently-purchased home. The defendant insurance carrier investigated her claim and ultimately rescinded the homeowner’s policy it had issued to her for the home. During its investigation, the defendant concluded that Isenberg had not been using the insured home as a “residence” because, from the date of her purchase of the home to the time of the fire, she continued to live in a separate apartment with her children.

Litigation ensued, and after the close of fact discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that, since Isenberg was not using the insured home as a “residence,” she was not entitled to coverage under the homeowners’ policy. The defendant cited, among other facts, that Isenberg’s children attended the school district associated with the apartment rather than the school district associated with the home.

Isenberg admitted she was living in the apartment but argued she had “daily contact” with the home as she was in the process of renovating the home for her family. She also argued that she ate some meals there, stored personal possessions there and slept there from time to time.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania interpreted the defendant’s argument as limiting a person to only one residence. The court interpreted Isenberg’s argument as positing that a person many have more than one residence. The court observed that Pennsylvania and federal courts within the Third Circuit “have agreed or at least assumed” that a person is not limited to one residence.

The court looked to previous decisions from the District Courts of the Third Circuit and noted that the term “residence,” when used in homeowners’ insurance policies, has been determined to be unambiguous even if undefined by the policy. Case law provides that “residence” refers to factual place of abode evidenced by a person’s physical presence in a particular place which requires, at minimum, some measure of permanency or habitual repetition. Residence is a question of “physical fact,” and the intentions of the purported resident are not relevant.

The court ultimately determined that the facts before it supported a finding that Isenberg resided at the home (and, therefore, was entitled to coverage under the homeowner’s policy for the fire claim). The court pointed to the fact that Isenberg was physically present in the home almost daily while rehabbing it for her family. The court found it significant that Isenberg ate some meals at the home, occasionally slept at the home, and that she and her children had a significant number of personal possessions at the home. Thus, the court determined that Isenberg had “regular and habitual” ties to the home such that it qualified as one of her residences under the terms of the homeowner’s policy.

Determinations relating to whether an insured has more than one residence for the purposes of an insurance policy typically arise in the context of minor children with divorced parents (residence at both parental households) or adult children attending college (despite living at college, they can remain residents of the parental household). The Isenberg case is unique because the court found that the home was one of (adult) Isenberg’s residences, despite her admission that she had never lived at the home, despite her sending her children to the school district associated with the apartment where they were actually living and not the school district associated with the home, despite her only having “some” meals at the home, and despite her and her family storing “numerous”—but not all—personal possessions at the home.

Ultimately, in cases such as these, it’s not necessarily where you actually live that may be considered your residence. A person is not limited to one residence.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.