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Case Law Alerts

Work Product Doctrine Does Not Apply to Claims Materials, Even if Received After Demand Letter Threatening Litigation

Long v. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co., 2024 WL 5082323 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2024)

January 1, 2025

by Christopher W. Woodward

Ms. Long made a claim for Underinsured Motorist benefits under a policy of auto insurance that the insurer had issued to her. Her lawyer sent a demand letter to the insurer, demanding UIM policy limits to avoid litigation. Three days later, the insurer completed its evaluation of her UIM claim. During the course of the subsequent litigation—where Long asserted causes of action for breach of contract and statutory insurance bad faith—the insurer produced its claim notes from its evaluation of Long’s UIM claim. Certain portions of its overall valuation and analysis of specific elements of Long’s claim were redacted based upon the work product doctrine. Long filed a discovery motion seeking to have those portions unredacted, and Judge Wolson reviewed the redacted material in camera.

Judge Wolson ultimately determined the insurer failed to carry its burden in showing that the redacted material was created in anticipation of litigation. The court noted the insurer had an obligation to investigate, evaluate and decide the claim presented by Long independent of the threat of litigation. The court further pointed to the fact that the demand letter “did not demand more than the insurer had offered, it did not demand more than the policy limits or threaten a bad faith claim, and the insurer had not yet hired outside counsel.”

The court distinguished this case from other cases cited by the insurer where the work product doctrine was determined to apply to the claim notes. In the other cases, the insurers had evaluated the claims and communicated their positions to the insureds before the demand letters were sent. In those situations, the insurers had already fulfilled their duties as insurers. Further, “revisitation of the claim analysis” following receipt of the demand letter “ties more to the litigation demand than a business need.”

The court further dismissed the insurer’s argument that, since it created the documents after the demand letter threatening litigation was received, the documents were necessarily created in anticipation of litigation. The court dismissed this per se argument, stating: “[a] demand letter, even one with a high settlement demand, does not absolve an insurance company of the duty to evaluate a claim.”

Insurers are, therefore, warned that the work product doctrine will not apply merely because claims notes and materials were generated after receipt of a demand threatening litigation without further evidence that such notes and materials were generated in anticipation of litigation. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.