.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Under Section 440 of the Act, an unreasonable contest will always result in an award of attorney’s fees and a reasonable contest may result in an attorney’s fee award.

Glenny Torres v. Amazon.com Services LLC (WCAB); No. 1398 C.D. 2022; filed Apr. 9, 2024; Judge Wallace

May 1, 2024

by Francis X. Wickersham

In this case, a workers’ compensation judge granted a Claim Petition and ordered payment of benefits for a September 17, 2020, work injury, but only through June 24, 2021, at which time, the judge found that the claimant had fully recovered from the injury. The judge also awarded Section 440 attorney’s fees on the basis that the employer did not present a reasonable contest until the time of the June 24, 2021, IME. The judge, therefore, limited the attorney’s fee award through June 24, 2021. 

The employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, arguing that the award of Section 440 fees was improper because its contest throughout the litigation was entirely reasonable. The Board agreed with the judge’s limitation of counsel fees, but modified the amount. The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The Commonwealth Court noted that in the case of Lorino v. WCAB, 266 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2021), the Supreme court held that under Section 440 of the Act, when a contested case is resolved in favor of an employee, a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the claimant and such an award is mandatory. However, where the employer has established a reasonable basis for the contest, the judge is permitted, but not required, to exclude an award of attorney’s fees.

According to the Commonwealth Court, Section 440 of the Act gives a judge discretion to either award or exclude attorney’s fees. The court held that an unreasonable contest will always result in an award of Section 440 attorney’s fees and a reasonable contest may result in such an award. The court reversed the Board’s order to the extent that it automatically foreclosed the imposition of attorney’s fees against the employer after its contest became reasonable, contrary to the plain language of Section 440(a) of the Act and the Supreme court’s decision in Lorino. 

The court remanded the matter with instructions for the judge to grant attorney’s fees for the period during which the employer’s contest was unreasonable and then to determine, in his or her discretion, whether to also award attorney’s fees for the period after the employer’s contest became reasonable. The court emphasized that, even if the judge had determined that the employer’s contest was reasonable throughout the pendency of litigation, still under these circumstances, Section 440 attorney’s fees could have been awarded. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 5, May 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.