.

Defense Digest

Undefined Parties and the Statutory Employer Defense

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Osama Samad

Key Points: 

  • A recent Pennsylvania Superior Court decision highlights the importance of clarity in contracts for employers asserting a statutory employer defense. 
  • Employers will not be able to successfully assert the statutory employer defense when there is ambiguity about contracting parties.
  • Contractors should ensure they are contracted with the owner of the property to protect against liability from a workplace accident.

In litigation involving workplace accidents, a common defense raised by a contractor is the statutory employer defense under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The Act requires an employer to pay workers’ compensation benefits to employees injured in the course of their employment regardless of the employer’s own negligence. In return for assuming secondary liability for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits, a statutory employer is immune from suit brought by an employee for a work-related injury. 

A recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case highlights issues that may arise when a subcontractor’s agreement for a construction project is not properly executed. In Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P., 2024 WL 4156993 (Pa. Super. Sept. 12, 2024), the Superior Court agreed with the trial court’s decision that a contractor could not avoid liability using the statutory employer defense when it is unclear who the contracting parties are in a subcontracting agreement.

In this case the plaintiff, Brian Feldman, suffered grievous injuries from a workplace electrocution accident during a tree removal project during the construction of an apartment building. Cross Properties engaged Altino Concrete Construction as a contractor to build an apartment building on a property they had recently acquired. Near the end of construction on this project, Cross Properties reached out to Vito Braccia, the owner of Altino Concrete Solutions and Braccia Construction, LLC (VBC), to remove trees on an adjacent property owned by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). Mr. Braccia then subcontracted with Colonial Tree Service, Inc., for the tree removal project.

Mr. Braccia did not carry out any safety planning before the tree removal project, even though he was aware of a high-voltage power line on SEPTA’s property. Additionally, he failed to reach out to SEPTA for permission to enter the property or to have the power lines de-energized during the tree removal project. On the day of the project, Mr. Feldman was electrocuted when a current arced from the power line and through a crane hoist. As a result, Mr. Feldman suffered extensive and severe burns, and spent the next six weeks recovering in a hospital burn unit. Mr. Feldman filed and prevailed in a personal injury suit against the general contractor, developer, and related entities. 

VBC, the contractor for the tree removal, appealed the trial court’s decision in favor of Mr. Feldman. One argument raised by VBC on appeal was that, as the plaintiff’s statutory employer under section 302(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, they were immune from a personal injury suit brought by Mr. Feldman. 

The longstanding test to determine whether a person or entity qualifies as a statutory employer under this section was set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The McDonald test requires an employer satisfy each of the following elements to be considered a statutory employer under section 302(b):

  1. an employer who is under contract with an owner or one in the position of an owner;
  2. the premises occupied by or under the control of such employer; 
  3. a subcontract made by such employer; 
  4. part of the employer’s regular business entrusted [sic] to such subcontractor; and 
  5. an employee of such subcontractor.

It was undisputed that VBC was the contractor for the tree removal project. However, the respective representatives from Cross Properties and Colonial testified at trial that they believed they had an oral agreement with Altino Concrete Construction for the tree removal project, not VBC. As a result, the court determined there was no mutual understanding between the parties regarding who they were contracting with, which is essential for any contract. Therefore, the court held that VBC could not meet the first element of the McDonald test.

The court went further and noted that, even if a valid contract existed between Cross Properties and VBC, it would not help their case. They would still be unable to prove they had a contract with the property owner or someone in a similar position. This is because SEPTA was the actual owner of the property in question, not Cross Properties. As VBC never attempted to reach an agreement with SEPTA for the tree removal, they could not establish they were a statutory employer under Section 302(b). 

In conclusion, Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P. underscores the importance of clearly defining contractual relationships in construction projects. The court’s ruling emphasizes that a lack of mutual understanding among contracting parties prevents the successful use of the statutory employer defense under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Contractors should ensure that subcontracting agreements clearly identify all parties involved and confirm ownership of the work site. By doing so, they can better protect themselves against liability in workplace accidents and minimize potential legal disputes.

*Osama is an associate and a member of our Casualty Department. He works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.