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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2022

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    House Bill 1837 Becomes Law 

On December 22, 2021, Governor Tom Wolf signed into law House Bill 1837, which moderately reformed Sections 413(c) and (d) and Section 449(c) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. The law eliminated the requirement of two witness signatures or a notarized signature on the Compromise & Release Agreement, provided a claimant gives sworn testimony that the full legal significance of the agreement is understood. The law also eliminated the requirement of a notarized affidavit with the Notification of Suspension or Modification form, provided the insurer properly verifies that compensation is being suspended because the claimant has returned to work at prior or increased earnings. The law went into effect in February 2022. 

2.    Supreme Court holds that non-treating medical providers do not have a constitutional right to receive notice and to intervene in Utilization Review proceedings.
Keystone RX, LLC v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (Compservices/AmeriHealth Casualty Services), 265 A.3d 322 (Pa. 2021)

In affirming the dismissal of a pharmacy’s Fee Review application, the Commonwealth Court prospectively held that non-treating health care providers, such as pharmacies, must be given notice and the opportunity to intervene in Utilization Review (UR) proceedings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commonwealth Court was wrong to conclude that prohibiting providers from participating in the UR process, but treating UR Determinations as binding on subsequent Fee Review Determinations, would threaten providers' due process rights to payment. The court found that when an employer or insurer successfully challenges a treatment, non-treating providers do not have a constitutional entitlement to payment under the Act, simply an expectation of payment in the normal course and, thus, no viable due process claim. 

3.    Supreme Court holds that under Section 440(a) of the Act, a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees shall be awarded when a contested case is resolved in favor of the claimant.
Lorino v. WCAB (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania), 266 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2021)

This case involved litigation of a termination petition for a no-lost-time work injury that was acknowledged by a Medical Only Notice of Compensation Payable where the claimant requested payment of attorney’s fees under Section 440 of the Act. In dismissing the petition, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found there was a reasonable contest and denied an award of Section 440 counsel fees (while awarding fees under Section 442 for a lesser amount). Although the Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court both affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 440(a), when a contested case is resolved in favor of the claimant, a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees shall be awarded but may be excluded where a reasonable basis for the contest has been established. 

4.    Supreme Court holds that claimant did not cease to be in the course and scope of employment once he drove past his home to attend a voluntary happy hour sponsored by the employer. 
Jonathan Peters v. WCAB (Cintas Corporation), 263 A.3d 375 (Pa. 2021)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the claimant, a traveling sales representative who sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident on the way home from a non-mandatory but employer-sponsored work event, was in the course and scope of employment throughout the time of the event.

5.    Injury sustained by the claimant on his way to take a cigarette break and get a sandwich was compensable under the “personal comfort” doctrine.
Stanley Henderson v. WP Ventures, Inc. (WCAB), 269 A.3d 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)

A claimant's head injury from falling in a park during a smoke break was compensable pursuant to the personal comfort doctrine. According to the court, the claimant’s time away from work was informal in nature, purely devoted to a personal comfort of a physical nature and brief enough that the course of employment was not broken. 

6.    Absent fraud, deception, duress, mutual mistake or unilateral mistake caused by the opposing party, a Compromise and Release Agreement cannot be set aside. 
James Hymms v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (WCAB), 281 A.3d 375 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)

The Commonwealth Court rejected the claimant’s argument that there was a mistake of fact relative to the settlement amount of his hearing loss claim since it was not based on the actual value of the percentage of his hearing loss, which was higher than the court-approved settlement the claimant agreed to accept. 

7.    Failure by a claimant to complete and return a required Wage and Benefit Reporting Form (LIBC-760) is not proper grounds for an employer to withhold payment of benefits ordered by a Workers’ Compensation Judge. 
Essix Holdings LLC v. Michael Dengel (WCAB), 276 A.3d 830 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) 

The employer’s refusal to pay benefits to the claimant following a Workers’ Compensation Judge’s decision approving a stipulation for a claim petition, on the basis that the claimant had not returned form LIBC-760, was a violation of the Act, and penalties were warranted. 

8.    A claimant cannot rely on prior Utilization Review Determinations, which established prescription medications were reasonable and necessary, in order to show in a later penalty petition that these medications were causally related to injury and payable. 
Theresa Skay v. Borjeson & Maizel, LLC (WCAB), 280 A3d. 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). 

Although the medications at issue were previously found to be reasonable and necessary via the Utilization Review process, the employer’s subsequent denial of payment for them on the basis they were unrelated to the work injury did not violate the Act, as the claimant had the burden of proving causal relationship. 

9.    Commonwealth Court holds that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board exceeded its statutory authority in ordering an employer to contribute to the cost of a new home purchased by the claimant. 
Ralph Martin Construction and Lackawanna American Insurance Company v. Castaneda-Escobar, 280 A.3d 1089 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)

The Commonwealth Court held that, although a one-time modification to a claimant’s home following a catastrophic injury was compensable under Section 306 of the Act, the purchase of a new home extends the phrase “orthopedic appliances” in Section 306 of the Act beyond a reasonable construction. 

10.    Where employer issues a Medical Only NCP after a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable, the issuance of a Notice of Denial and Notice of Stopping Temporary Compensation is not required and employer is not prevented from seeking a termination of benefits as of a date that precedes the date the Medical Only NCP was issued. 
Wolfe v. Martellas Pharmacy (WCAB), 281 A.3d 1129, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) 

The Medical Only NCP issued by the employer to recognize that an injury occurred, described the injury and indicated that medical treatment for the injury would be paid. The Medical Only NCP did not admit that the Claimant remained disabled as of the date it was issued and thus the opinion of full recovery was not inconsistent with it. 
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.