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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN FLORIDA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2022

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Linda Wagner Farrell

1.    Rita Noa v. City of Aventura and Florida League of Cities, DCA#: 21-0549; Decision date: January 26, 2022 

The claimant argued that an annual merit bonus should be included in her average weekly wage. The First District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the lower court opinion denying inclusion. The court held that the claimant’s merit bonus was analogous to profits or commissions at issue in prior cases and indicated it should be treated in a like manner. They held that the claimant’s average weekly wage should include a pro rata share of her annual performance bonus.

2.    Silberberg v. Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Bd., (47 Fla. L. Weekly D461); February 2022
 
A companion opinion to the Soya case below, the First District Court of Appeal attempted to clarify compensability in trip and fall cases following the 2019 Valcourt-Williams decision, which they described as “a narrow, trip and fall/comfort break accident case.” The court noted in Silberberg that compensability always turns on whether the employment led to the risk of the injury. If an accident occurs and does not involve a comfort break, only the presence of an idiopathic condition would trigger the “increased hazard” test.

3.    Soya v. Health First, Inc., (47 Fla. L. Weekly D 489); February 2022

In this compassion case to Silberberg, the court clarified that in cases where the claimant is injured while engaged in work activities and there are no pre-existing conditions, or competing causes of an injury, then work is the major contributing cause of the injury. Under the premises rule, injuries at the workplace are compensable if the injury occurred while performing activities, incidental to their job, such as going into work, or leaving work.

4.    Kelly Air Systems, LLC, Amtrust North America and Technology Ins. Co. v. Dorinda Kohlun, as claimant for Aaron Kohlun, Injured Employee, DCA# 21-0976; Decision date: March 16, 2022

This case involved the going and coming rule. The First District Court of Appeal felt that this case presented an opportunity to analyze the application of the statutory language as prior decisions did not offer substantive guidance on the definition or interpretation of “exclusive personal use.” An employee is not in travel status when he is traveling to or from work, which means that an injury suffered while traveling to and from work, even where the employee regularly works in a travel status, are not compensable. The claimant in this case was traveling in an employer-provided vehicle available for his exclusive personal use for travel to and from work, and he was not compensated for his travel. Therefore, the injury was not compensable.

5.    Joseph Guerrera v. Becton Dickinson & Co. and Sedgwick CMS, DCA#: 21-1788; Decision date: May 4, 2022

The First District Court of Appeal overruled the lower court judge and held that the average weekly wage can be increased even if the resulting compensation rate remains at the maximum. They also found that fee entitlement was still owed even though the increase in the average weekly wage was less than what the claimant had requested. The law does not require an exact match between the claim and the award. They disagreed with the judge who ruled that “no actual real benefit was secured.”

6.    LFI Ft. Pierce and ESIS WC Claims v. Dewayne Holmes, Blue Goose Growers LLC/FFVA Mutual Insurance Company, DCA#: No. 1D18-5243; Decision date: May 6, 2022

The claimant chose to ride home with a co-worker, who fainted at the wheel, causing a serious motor vehicle accident. Both employees were leased employees. The client company asserted immunity and the special hazard exception to the going and coming rule in a civil action. The leasing company was dismissed from that claim. In the worker’s compensation claim, the leasing company argued there was no exception and that the claim was barred by the going and coming rule. The Judge of Compensation Claims ruled that the leasing company was estopped from asserting their arguments because the client company had argued to the contrary in the circuit court matter. The judge also said that the leasing company benefited from the client company’s argument by being dismissed and held that two employers shared a special relationship. The judge further found that the going and coming rule did not apply because the co-worker’s fainting was a “special hazard.” The judge also held that the fainting experienced by the co-worker arose directly out of the employment. The leasing company challenged all of the judge’s rationales and holdings, and the First District Court of Appeal found merit in all. 

The appellate court held that neither estoppel, nor the special hazard doctrine, applied because the claimant did not establish the required elements. Further, estoppel did not apply because the two employers have adverse interests in a workers’ compensation setting. Further, an injury might be compensable when the employer sets its cause in motion, within the course and scope of employment, of the injured worker. That may apply to the co-worker who fainted, but it does not extend to the claimant because it was not foreseeable. The claimant’s decision to ride with a co-worker does not result in finding that the accident arose out of the course and scope of his employment.

7.    Sophia Sandifort v. Akers Custom Homes, Inc. and Amerisure Insurance, DCA#: 20-1892; Decision date: July 13, 2022

This case involved a minor who died on his first day of his very first job. The mother sought death benefits. The employer accepted compensability of the workplace death and paid medical and funeral costs but denied death benefits. The employer asserted that the mother and her other children were not dependent on her son. The mother had been supporting herself and her children with SSI benefits her deceased son received because of a learning disability. The First District Court of Appeal held that SSI benefits did not constitute dependency for the purpose of death benefits.

8.    Kelly Girardin v. AN Fort Myers Imports, LLC d/b/a AutoNation Toyota Fort Myers/Gallagher Bassett, No. 1D21-3405; Decision date: August 10, 2022    

This case involved yet another issue of attendant care where a judge and carrier attempted to adhere to the strict language of the statute. The First District Court of Appeal held that the statute requires a written prescription with certain information, but said that same does not relieve an employer/carrier of its obligation to “monitor a claimant’s injuries and provide needed benefits“ or excuse any “attempt to hide behind a wall of Will for willful ignorance.“

9.    Ismael Tiburcio v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office/Commercial Risk Management, No. 1D21-1330; Decision date: August 17, 2022

This case involved the heart/lung presumption. The employer/carrier argued that the officer departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of his personal physician. Because the claimant was seeking compensability for heart disease and his alleged noncompliance with his personal physician’s recommendations were for conditions other than heart disease, the First District Court of Appeal held that the judge erred by applying the reverse presumption provision and the case was remanded and reversed.

10.    Eddy Junior Bonhomme v. Staff Team Hotels, Corp. and Frank Winston Crum Insurance, Inc., No. 1D21-881; Decision date: October 12, 2022

This case involved a claimant working as a laundry attendant at a hotel and was very factually intensive. The claimant testified about a very specific incident that occurred on May 22, 2019. He did not report the injury and treated at the emergency room on June 3, June 9, and June 25. When he returned for treatment on July 17, that was the first mention of any neck or back pain. He then filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Judge of Compensation Claims held that the claimant did not know about his injury until July 17, when the diagnosis was first mentioned in the medical records. The First District Court of Appeal disagreed and held the diagnosis from the emergency room does not necessarily start the clock and pointed out that the claimant was very clear that he knew at the moment in May that his pain began and never went away.

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 12, December 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.