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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN FLORIDA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2021

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 25, No. 12, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Linda Wagner Farrell

1.    Prior final compensation order did not predict that permanent total disability benefits would flow from the award as the claimant intended, but did not, undergo a surgery to alleviate the work-related injury.
PraXair, Inc. and Broadspire Services, Inc. v. Celentano, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D20-927, Decision date Nov. 16, 2020 

The claimant argued that the PTD benefits flowed from her attorney successfully defeating a prior misrepresentation defense to temporary disability benefits. The First District Court of Appeals agreed with the judge and found that the prior Final Compensation Order did not predict that PTD benefits would flow from the award and, therefore, there was no entitlement to penalties, interest, fees or costs.

2.    No competent or substantial evidence to support that employer/carrier only accepted the aggravation; thus, they waived the ability to deny compensability. Hence, the apportionment defense also fails, and full permanent impairment benefits are owed.
Joe Sullivan v. NuC02, LLC/Broadspire, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D19-3275, Decision date Dec. 9, 2020

The First District Court of Appeals reversed the judge’s finding that the employer/carrier had only accepted an aggravation, which meant that they had waived the ability to deny compensability and assert an apportionment defense. The court further held that the employer/carrier acquiesced to 18% PIR by listing same on the Pre-Trial Stipulation. Also, the employer/carrier’s unilateral de-authorization of the treating provider, due to opinion that no further care was related, did not bar the judge from awarding continued care when the causation defense failed.

3.    The court finds that the judge erred by not ruling based on the notice that should have been provided within 52 weeks of the qualifying event versus when the symptoms manifested.
Palm Beach County Fire Rescue and Preferred Governmental Claims Solutions v. Andrew Wilkes, First District Court of Appeals, No. 20-1615, Decision date Dec. 14, 2020

The Judge of Compensation Claims held that a first responder’s PTSD (due to a drowning event) was compensable when analyzed from the date of its manifestation versus the date of the event. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals held that the judge erred by not ruling based on the notice that should have been provided within 52 weeks of the qualifying event, rather than when the symptoms manifested. The case was reversed and denied due to untimely notice.

4.    Cancellation of the workers’ compensation insurance policy was not valid because a condition precedent had not been met. Promissory estoppel applied because the employer relied on the certificate of insurance.
Scott v. Jones Construction Co. v. Central Florida Siding Pros, NorGuard Ins. Co., Southeast Personnel Leasing, Inc. Lion Insurance Co., Packard Claims, Nobles American Services, LLC, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D20–689, Decision date Mar. 16, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals rejected the arguments contending that the workers’ compensation insurance policy cancellation was not valid because a condition precedent had not been met and that promissory estoppel applied because Jones, the general contractor, had relied on the certificate of insurance produced by Central Florida Siding Pros.

5.    Applying the 1989 version of the workers’ compensation statute of limitations law for the right to remedial care relating to insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device.
DECA Manufacturing and Southern Owners Ins./Auto-owners v. Faye O. Beckett, First District Court of Appeals, No. 19-3441, Decision date Apr. 8, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals held that, although continued use of a prosthetic would toll the current version of the statute of limitations, it does not toll the 1989 version given its inapplicability to remedial treatment “relating to” the prosthesis. Here the claimant had screws and rods in her cervical spine but requested pain management and a mechanical bed. The First District Court of Appeals pointed out that the fact that she may have a prosthetic device is not, standing alone, sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from accruing. The claimant failed to prove that either request had anything to do with the screws and rod in her spine. They also agreed with the lower court judge that mistaken payments do not toll the statute of limitations. 

6.    Medical marijuana still illegal and not reimbursable under Florida’s workers’ compensation statute.
Patrick Shawn Jones v. Grace Healthcare, First District Court of Appeals, No. 19-1684, Decision date Jun. 30, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals noted that under Florida law, marijuana is not reimbursable under the workers’ compensation statute. Moreover, federal law—which they pointed out they are “oath-bound” to follow—characterizes marijuana as having no accepted medical use and makes all possession and use of it illegal throughout the United States. They went on to say that a referral to a physician authorized to prescribe medical marijuana, including even just an evaluation of whether the employee is a good candidate for marijuana treatment, could not be, under any circumstances, “medically necessary” as defined and used in section 440.13, Florida Statutes.

7.    Since unemployment compensation is primary, therefore, it is not technically an “offset” to temporary partial disability benefits.
N. Hannoush Jewelers, Inc. and Massachusetts Bay Ins. c/o Hanover Ins. Group v. Patrick Bly, First District Court of Appeals, No. 20-2439, Decision date Jun. 30, 2021

The First District Court of Appeals only wrote to address the effect of the claimant’s receipt of unemployment compensation benefits on the amount of temporary partial disability benefits awarded. The employer/carrier then asserted that the claimant’s unemployment compensation benefits had to be offset and asked the judge to credit same against any TPD due. The claimant replied that any offset argument would be an affirmative defense and was not pled in the pre-trial stipulation; therefore, the employer/carrier had waived that defense. The court held that unemployment compensation is primary and, therefore, not technically an “offset” to TPD benefits.

8.    Because claimant’s mental injury manifested itself within six months of reaching physical maximum medical improvement and she was not receiving impairment benefits for the physical injury after reaching that point, the statutory cap in Section 440.093(3) does not apply.
Le’tavia Jones v. State of Florida, Department of Corrections/Division of Risk Management, First District Court of Appeals, No. 20-1741, Decision date Jul. 29, 2021

At issue in this case was whether the claimant was entitled to more than six months of temporary benefits while treating for psychiatric injury. The First District Court of Appeals reversed the judge who denied indemnity past six calendar months from the date of physical maximum medical improvement. They held that the six-month limit did not apply in this case because the claimant had not received any impairment benefits. Pointing to W.G. Roe & Sons v. Razo-Guevara, 999 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), which held the statutory cap in section 440.093(3) does not apply to a claimant not being paid impairment benefits. 

9.    Judge erred in not considering employer/carrier’s request for expert medical adviser once claimant’s one-time change choice of physician was decreed an authorized treating provider, thereby creating a conflict with the prior physician.
ABM Industries, Inc. and ACE/ESIS v. Maritza Valencia, First District Court of Appeals, No. 1D20-2027, Decision date Sep. 29, 2021

The Judge of Compensation Claims erred in not considering the employer/carrier’s request for an expert medical adviser (EMA) once the claimant’s one-time change choice of physician was rendered an authorized treating provider, thereby creating a conflict with the prior physician. The judge’s order was reversed with regard to the portion awarding indemnity and medical benefits and remanded for the appointment of an EMA and further proceedings.

10.    In other news…
For those wondering what the impact of COVID-19 was on Florida workers’ compensation, from March 2020 to July 2021, there were 46,505 claims and $114 million in benefits paid. 

Good news for 2022…
NCCI has proposed a 4.9% workers’ compensation premium decreased, which if approved would have an effective date of January 1, 2022. NCCI also proposed establishing a workers’ compensation insurance catastrophe fund that would provide for an assessment on employers’ premiums. The assessment would generate revenue to cover workers’ compensation costs in the event of a catastrophic event (like another pandemic). Overall, Florida’s workers’ compensation is performing well as a result of   better risk management practices and safer workplaces. 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.