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Case Law Alerts

Three Recent Third Circuit Decisions Underline Validity of Regular Use Exclusion and Household Vehicle Exclusion—under the Appropriate Circumstances—in UM/UIM Policies.

Eberly v. LM Gen. Ins. Co., No. 21-2995 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2024); Burton v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., No. 23-1574 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2024); and Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Werley, No. 23-1822 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2024)

October 1, 2024

by Christopher W. Woodward

In Eberly v. LM Gen. Ins. Co., the Third Circuit determined that the regular use exclusion in the UIM policy at issue did not act as a de facto waiver of stacked coverage and, therefore, did not violate Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The Third Circuit noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., upholding regular use exclusions, had limited its decision to whether these exclusions violated Section 1731 of the MVFRL but did not directly address the Section 1738 argument. 

Finding that the insureds could access stacked coverage on their cars, and on any cars they drive, provided they do not fit within any applicable exclusions to coverage and the exclusion only applies where the insured was operating a vehicle which he did not own but was provided for his regular use, the Third Circuit determined that the regular use exclusion does not violate Section 1738 of the MVFRL and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer.

Similarly, in Burton v. Progressive Adv. Ins. Co., the Third Circuit upheld a regular use exclusion where the insured was operating her brother’s vehicle, which was not insured under the insured’s UIM policy, while her own listed vehicle was being repaired. The Third Circuit found immaterial the fact that the insured had planned to stop using her brother’s vehicle once her own vehicle was repaired and that her use of her brother’s vehicle qualified as “regular use.”

Finally, wading into the choppy waters left in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Gallagher decision—which determined that the household vehicle exclusion, under certain circumstances, acts a de facto stacking waiver and violated Section 1738 of the MVFRL—the Third Circuit, in its precedential decision in Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Werley, No. 23-1822 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2024), determined that application of the household vehicle exclusion did not violate Section 1738 in that there was no reasonable expectation of UIM coverage where the insured was injured while operating an uninsured dirt bike.

Considering these three cases, and other recent appellate cases from Pennsylvania’s state and federal courts, there is a very real trend ongoing in the courts of upholding exclusions in UM/UIM policies alongside a continued narrowing of the Gallagher line of cases which were once thought to be expansive and all-inclusive.  


 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.