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Case Law Alerts

The U.S. Constitution does not require law enforcement officers to give a verbal warning to fleeing suspect before using a police dog under 42 USC section 1983.

Jarvela v. Washtenaw County, et al., 40 F.4th 761 (6th Circuit; July 22, 2022)

October 1, 2022

While tracking a fleeing suspect with a leashed police dog, the officer chose not to shout a verbal canine warning to the suspect. The police dog bit the suspect and continued on-bite while the suspect resisted arrest. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said, “If [the suspect] had wanted to surrender, he should not have fled on foot.” The Sixth Circuit stated that the officer did not utilize excessive force against the suspect under 42 USC Section 1983 by not giving a verbal warning about the police dog while the officer was tracking the fleeing suspect as a matter of law. Also, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity as to the continued force utilized by the dog after the suspect had been put on-bite because the suspect failed to comply with commands and continued to resist arrest even after the dog went on-bite. In short, the Sixth Circuit held that the use of the police dog without a verbal warning to the fleeing suspect did not constitute a constitutional violation. Also, the use of continued force by the police dog after the initial bite was protected by qualified immunity as the suspect continued to resist arrest after the dog went on-bite, and the use of force did cease once the suspect stopped resisting arrest and complied with the officer’s commands.

 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.