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Defense Digest

The “Innocent Plaintiff” Fair Share Argument Gains Momentum

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Edward J. Tuite

Key Points:

  • The federal court recently addressed the issue of the amount of credit due an underinsured motorist carrier. As part of its analysis, the court, in dicta, referenced a novel argument raised under the Fair Share Act.
  • The good news is that the UIM carrier was entitled to a full credit of all underlying liability coverage irrespective of the Fair Share Act.
  • The bad news is that the court predicted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will hold, especially in third-party liability cases, that the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act only applies where the plaintiffs’ negligence is in question.

In Anderson v. Motorist Mutual Insurance Company, 2022 WL 2238955 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2022), the plaintiffs sued third-party tortfeasors and settled all of their claims. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a claim for UIM benefits. That carrier denied the claim on the basis that the value of the claim did not exceed the combined $5.1 million liability limits of the various third-party tortfeasors.

In this claim, the plaintiffs’ decedent was an “innocent plaintiff”—a passenger in a motor vehicle accident. The vehicles involved had aggregate policy limits of $5.1 million.

The court noted that the carrier’s UIM endorsement stated that the carrier would only pay the UIM benefits if the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury or coverage policies had been exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements. The carrier contended that it should receive a credit of $5.1 million.

The plaintiffs’ theory in Anderson was a novel one. They attempted to argue that, unless the carrier could prove that one of the defendants’ percentage of fault equaled or exceeded 60%, the carrier should only be entitled to a credit equal to the amount that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to recover from the joint tortfeasors, or $650,000, which was the sum of the amounts actually paid in the settlement. The plaintiffs based their argument on the applicability of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act and its effect upon UIM coverage and joint and severability in Pennsylvania.

The Anderson court found that there is no controlling Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent on the issue of the enforcement of exhausting clauses related to UIM benefits. However, it did indicate that several Pennsylvania Superior Court cases have held that a UIM carrier was entitled to the full amount of any liability limits that were available from the third-party tortfeasor.

The plaintiffs in Anderson attempted to make the argument that those decisions were no longer applicable due to the passage of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act.

The court in its decision stated that, even if the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act altered the effect of these prior decisions, the plaintiffs’ argument still failed since the decedent’s negligence was not in question. Therefore, the applicability of the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act would not apply. It cited other prior Pennsylvania cases which suggest that a plaintiff’s negligence must be at issue in a case for the Fair Share Act to apply.

As a result, this Western District of Pennsylvania Federal case predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the Fair Share Act does not apply in cases where a plaintiff’s negligence is not at issue and, as such, predicted that the Supreme Court would hold that traditional principles of joint and several liability, which existed before the Fair Share Act, would control .

That is the bad news for carriers. The good news is that the court held that the language of the policy’s exhaustion clause in this case mandated that the UIM carrier was entitled to a credit for the full amount of liability limits available in the underlying third-party case, totaling $5.1 million.

In conclusion, as per Anderson, any insurance carrier in Pennsylvania should evaluate whether or not there is any possible proof of negligence on the part of the plaintiff before it utilizes the Fair Share Act and its protections when evaluating such claims, in third-party liability cases and in UIM claims.

*Ed is a senior counsel in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 610.354.8483 or ejtuite@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.