.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The IAB concludes that regenerative medicine procedures, including orthobiologic injections, do not constitute “reasonable” or “necessary” treatment for a compensable lumbar spine condition.

Delfi v. State of Delaware, IAB No. 1481481 (Feb. 27, 2023)

April 1, 2023

by Benjamin K. Durstein

The claimant injured her lumbar spine in a compensable work accident on January 7, 2019, while working as a bus driver for the State of Delaware. She came under the care of Dr. B. Rudin, an orthopaedic spine surgeon, and after she did not improve from therapy, medications or steroid injections, Dr. Rudin believed the only options for improvement were an expensive, two-level fusion surgery or the less costly/invasive options afforded by regenerative medicine/orthobiologic treatment. The claimant proceeded with the orthobiologic treatment procedures beginning in early 2020. The employer denied the treatment as not reasonable, necessary or causally related to the work accident based on the opinions of Dr. S. Rushton. The claimant filed a petition for payment with the Industrial Accident Board.

The Board concluded that the work accident aggravated the claimant’s preexisting, asymptomatic low back issues and that the condition remained causally related to the work accident. The Board felt that ongoing treatment of some kind was necessary, however, the option chosen did not satisfy either of the required “reasonableness” or “necessity” prongs for compensability. Dr. Rudin’s opinions were rejected for several reasons, including: (1) he testified in 2020 that orthobiologic/regenerative medicine/stem cell treatment for the spine was approved and waiting finalization to be included in the Delaware Practice Guidelines, but now conceded it was not approved or even under consideration at this time; (2) the “study” relied upon by Dr. Rudin to support his methodology was his own, involved 100 patients and was not subject to peer review; (3) he provided no information about the methodology of his “study”; (4) he was an owner of Spine Care DE, where the orthobiologics procedures took place; (5) he does not perform surgeries anymore, which was the other option for the claimant; and (6) it was just as likely that the claimant’s sudden and significant weight loss improved her symptomatology as her treatment.

The Board accepted Dr. Rushton’s opinions that there was a lack of scientific support for the methodology used by Dr. Rudin. Moreover, the Board emphasized that there were strong indications of bias from the claimant’s expert, commenting: “Dr. Rudin’s experience and the close nature of his relationship, financially and otherwise, to acceptance of this methodology cannot be ignored.” The treatment was not reasonable in the context of the claimant’s injuries, and the petition was denied.


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 4, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.