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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Delaware Superior Court affirms Industrial Accident Board’s decision setting aside a workers’ compensation agreement pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) due to fraud on the part of the claimant.

Mendoza v. Talarico Building Servs., 2023 WL 2726923 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2023)

May 1, 2023

by Benjamin K. Durstein

Mr. Mendoza, a non-English speaker, fell at work while cleaning and buffing floors on July 16, 2018. The event was witnessed by a supervisor. The employer acknowledged soft tissue injuries to the neck and back and paid workers’ compensation benefits, including medical expenses. He was involved in a subsequent motor vehicle accident in August 2018 and taken by ambulance to the hospital for neck pain. The claimant later underwent a three-level cervical fusion surgery performed by Dr. Zaslavsky, which the employer denied as reasonable, necessary or causally related to the work accident. In response, Mr. Mendoza filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due and sought compensability of the surgery and total disability benefits. The employer filed a petition for review that sought to set aside the original agreement on the basis of fraud and to bar the claimant from future filings against the employer. The petitions were consolidated.

At the hearing, evidence was provided that showed Mr. Mendoza had a 20-year history of medical treatment for the cervical spine and that he failed to disclose that history to his employer at the time of hire, to the employer/carrier at the time of his accident, to the defense medical expert doctor and to Dr. Zaslavsky. The Board concluded that the claimant failed to meet his burden to establish compensability of the cervical spine surgery and found the testimony of Dr. Gelman, the employer’s expert, more persuasive than Dr. Zaslavsky’s. Further, the Board determined that the claimant had committed fraud due to his failure to disclose his extensive medical history. The underlying agreement was struck, but because there was a witnessed event and little evidence was before the Board regarding the accepted lumbar spine injury, the claimant was permitted 60 days to file a new petition to attempt to establish compensability of the work accident as it pertained to other issues.

The claimant appealed, contending that there was not substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusions and that the Board erred in its application of Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) because it did not establish the reliance or damages prongs necessary to find fraud. The court found there was substantial evidence to deny the petition based on Dr. Gelman’s testimony.

For the fraud finding, the court determined that the Board properly applied Rule 60(b) in this scenario. There was detrimental reliance established because the employer presented evidence that it would not have hired him or accepted the claim if he had been truthful about his prior medical history. Moreover, the Board did consider damages when it specifically referenced a credit attributable to all the past benefits paid. The court went a step further and advised that this set of facts also qualified to re-open the agreement and set it aside on the basis of Rule 60(b)(3) due to Mr. Mendoza’s “misrepresentation and misconduct.” The claimant admitted to dishonesty at the hearing and his misrepresentations were not the result of the language barrier, as they were made in response to both English and Spanish inquiries. The decision of the Board was affirmed.
 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 5, May 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.