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Defense Digest

Taking a Break May Not Break Your Workers’ Compensation Claim

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022

April 1, 2022

by Andrea Cicero Rock

Key Points:

  • If an employee is furthering the business interests of the employer when injured, even an injury sustained off the employer’s property can be considered compensable.
  • The burden of proving that an injury was sustained in the course and scope of employment is very fact specific. 
  • Cases where the employee was injured off the employer’s property should only be accepted if convinced that the employee was in the course and scope of employment.

Determining whether an injured worker was within the scope and course of employment at the time of an injury is often a difficult decision to make. These cases are based on the specific set of facts involved. However, a case recently issued by the Commonwealth Court does provide additional explanation of what activities may be considered within the course and scope of employment. 

In the setting of a claim petition, the claimant must meet his burden of proof that the injury occurred in the course and scope of his employment, which, at the most basic level, means that the claimant must be furthering the interests of the employer at the time the injury occurred. However, the court, through case law, has developed an exception called the Personal Comfort Doctrine, which permits employees to take brief intervals of time for leisure within the regular hours of the work day without departing from being engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer. 

In Henderson v. WP Ventures, Inc. (Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), 2022 WL 126853 (Pa. Cmwlth. Jan. 14, 2022), the claimant took a break from his job duties and went outside for a cigarette. While outside, he decided to grab a sandwich from a nearby store and was injured when he fell as he was walking to the store. As a result, he filed a claim petition. 

During the litigation, the claimant testified that, if requested, his employer would give him permission to take smoke breaks, or, if his supervisor was unavailable, he would simply take breaks on his own. On the date of injury, a supervisor was not available, so the claimant took the break on his own. While he was outside, he decided to get a sandwich from a nearby store and fell, injuring his head. The Workers’ Compensation Judge granted the claim petition, finding, “Claimant was taking a cigarette break when he slipped and fell on the walkway outside of the building in which he was working, and this was a minor deviation from employment that would fall under the Personal Comfort Doctrine.” 

The employer filed an appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. The Board reversed this decision, specifying that, since the claimant was tending to “personal needs” and “not directly furthering the employer’s business,” he had left the course and scope of his employment and was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for this injury. The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed the Board. The court concluded that the claimant’s actions were simply “personal comforts” that did not take him out of the course and scope of his employment.

Here, the court seemed to be persuaded by the fact that this was not a formal or scheduled break and that the claimant was coming right back with his sandwich, in case he was needed for work. As the court noted:

Remaining aware that this is a case-by-case inquiry and that each matter will depend on its evidence, the foregoing cases suggest that the Personal Comfort Doctrine may apply when the claimant’s time away from the work premises is informal in nature, purely devoted to personal comfort of a physical nature, such as a cigarette break or to procure food, and brief enough that the course of employment is not broken. The doctrine may not apply, however, if the worker is on a formalized break or lunch period during which an employee is likely to enjoy a degree of autonomy, however brief, and may engage in other activities in addition to immediate personal needs.

It would be interesting to see what the court would have decided had the supervisor been present that day and had the claimant received “official permission” to take his smoke break. However, that issue is for another day. 

The ruling by the court does provide guidance to carriers and employers in that a thorough review and investigation must be undertaken when a claim is reported. Furthermore, since these cases are driven by their specific facts, it is frequently the best practice to deny the claim and force the claimant to meet his burden of proving that the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment. 

*Andrea is a shareholder and works in our Philadelphia office. She can be reached at acrock@mdwcg.com or 215.575.2756.
 

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.