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Andrea Cicero Rock

Portrait of Andrea Cicero Rock

Andrea is a member of the Workers' Compensation Department and concentrates her practice in the defense of employers and self-insureds in all manner of workers' compensation matters. She represents employers in many industries, including retail services, banking, construction and manufacturing, in addition to assisted living facilities and religious organizations. 

In 1999, Andrea earned her Bachelor of Arts degree from American University. Following her time in Washington, Andrea returned to the Philadelphia area and received her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law in 2002. Andrea is licensed to practice in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the U.S. District of New Jersey. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2002)
    • American University (B.A., 1999)
    • New Jersey, 2002
    • Pennsylvania, 2002
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2002
    • American Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section Co-Chair (2017-2018) and Co-Chair Elect (2016); Marketing and Communications Committee member
    • Got Pain? How to Recognize and Assess Pain Including the Identification of Pain Generators in Work Injuries and Novel Treatment Options, Philadelphia Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section webinar, May 17, 2024
    • Navigating the Medicare Maze in Workers’ Compensation, Philadelphia Bar Association Workers’ Comp Compliance Crusher 2023, webinar, August 18, 2023
    • Alternative Treatments in Chronic Pain Management: Ethically Treating Outside of Opioids – panelist, Philadelphia Bar Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 9, 2019
    • Opioids: Balancing Real Pain Needs vs. Addiction, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 25, 2018
    • Alternative Treatments in Chronic Pain Management: Treating Outside of Opioids, Philadephia Bar Association's Bench Bar 2018 Conference, Philadelphia, PA, October 13, 2018
    • Legal Remedies for Workers with Disabilities, Philadelphia Bar Association, Philadelphia, PA, June 9, 2017
    • Understanding Medical Records, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2016
    • Sidelined: Traumatic Brain Injuries, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 22, 2015
    • Social Media Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 30, 2014
    • Valley of the Dolls: Drugs, Drugs, Drugs, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2011
    • Catch Me If You Can: A Social Media Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, Philadelphia, PA, November 30, 2012
    • WLF Work/Life Panel Discussion presented by the Temple Women's Law Caucus and OUTLAW, Philadelphia, PA, April 12, 2012
    • “No Fixed Place of Work: An Exception for Your Workers’ Compensation Claim,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024
    • "When Filing a Petition Can Result in an Award of Attorney Fees," The Legal Intelligencer, October 6, 2022 
    • Contributing author, Philadelphia Bar Reporter, April 2017, June 2017
    • "Litigation: Deposing Adjusters Without a Basis," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, April 19, 2016
    • "The Disregarded Diagnosis--How to Litigate the Termination Petition Without an Unreasonable Contest," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2013, co-author
    • "Compelling Social Media Issues in Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2013, co-author
    • Successfully defeated a claim petition for an alleged work-related heart attack.
    • Defeated a claim petition for psychological injuries involving an employee who also had a discrimination matter pending in federal court. 
    • Defeated a review petition which alleged that the description of injury should be amended to include depression and post-traumatic stress disorder when the claimant had been out of work for a physical injury since 1989. 
    • Obtained successful decision in a funded employment case for a long-time 1992 cognitive dysfunction injury. Proved that a position created for claimant through a different employer, but for which the salary was going to be funded by the employer, was within claimant's restrictions as set by an independent medical evaluator. Able to discredit on cross examination claimant's long-time treating psychiatrist. The Workers' Compensation Judge granted our modification petition based on salary that claimant would have received had he accepted the position. 
    • Defeated a claim petition for benefits filed in Pennsylvania, despite the employer being headquartered there, persuading the judge that there weren't enough significant contacts to bring it into Pennsylvania jurisdiction.

Results

The Commonwealth Court Stands Firm on Employer Credit/Retroactivity

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court ruled in favor of our employer client, holding that it was error to “erase” the 500-week employer credit provided by Act 111 for partial disability benefits paid beginning in 2008, and that the claimant’s 2019 reinstatement to total disability status did not retroactively convert those prior partial disability benefits into total disability benefits.  The claimant’s work injury, a contusion to the low back, occurred in 2006. Based on the results of a 2008 IRE that assigned a zero percent impairment rating, the claimant’s benefits were modified from total to partial. The employer filed a Notice of Change of Workers’ Compensation Disability Status, which was not challenged by the claimant. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Protz, however, the claimant filed a modification petition in 2018, seeking reinstatement of his total disability benefits. The petition was granted, and it was noted at the time that the claimant had not exhausted his 500 weeks of partial disability.  The employer filed a petition for modification, based on the results of a December 2019 IRE performed on the claimant, that was granted by the Workers’ Compensation Judge. The IRE was performed pursuant to Act 111. The parties cross-appealed, and the claimant took the position that Act 111 cannot be applied retroactively to injuries sustained prior to Act 111’s October 24, 2018, effective date and that Act 111 constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. The employer cross-appealed the judge’s failure to award a 500-week credit and to suspend the claimant’s benefits.  Citing prior cases that consistently held that Act 111 applies retroactively with respect to a calculation of a claimant’s weeks of partial disability paid prior to the effective date of the Act, the claimant’s appeal was dismissed.  The employer prevailed on its cross-appeal and the Appeal Board’s order was reversed to the extent that it denied a credit for the previously paid weeks of partial disability.   

Defense limits liability to 14 months of benefits.

The claimant filed a claim petition alleging that she sustained a contusion to the back of her head, a concussion, bilateral shoulder pain and neck pain. The judge found the claimant credible and that an incident did occur in the course and scope of her employment. However, the judge also found the employer’s medical expert credible. The employer’s medical expert found that the claimant was fully recovered as of the date of the Independent Medical Examination. This limited the receipt of indemnity and medical to fourteen months, rather than an ongoing claim.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

No Fixed Place of Work: An Exception for Your Workers’ Compensation Claim

December 1, 2024

Key Points: If an employee is furthering the business interests of the employer, even an injury sustained off the employer’s property can be considered compensable. The burden of proving that an injury was sustained in the course and scope of employment is very fact specific.  Cases where the claimant was injured off the employer’s property should only be accepted if convinced the claimant was in the course and scope of his employment. Determining whether an injured worker was within the scope and course of his employment at the time of an injury is often a difficult decision to make, as these cases are based on the specific set of facts involved. On August 9, 2024, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review a Commonwealth Court decision which found there was no exception to the coming and going rule as it applied to the claimant when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving home from work. While we wait for the Supreme Court’s final decision, it is worth reviewing the legal conclusions made by the Commonwealth Court. Injuries sustained during an employee’s commute are not compensable because the employee is neither on the employer’s premises nor engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s affairs. Peer v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (B & W Construction), 503 A.2d 1096, 1098 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). However, there are exceptions to this rule. An injury sustained during an employee’s commute to or from work can be compensable where any of the following apply:  the employment contract included transportation to and from work;  the employee had no fixed place of work;  the employee was on a special assignment for the employer; or  special circumstances are such that the employee was furthering the business of the employer.  Bensing v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (James D. Morrissey, Inc.), 830 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Bradshaw v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bell Hearing Aid Center), 641 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). In Jorje Martinez v. Lewis Tree Service (WCAB), 310 A.3d 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024), the Commonwealth Court affirmed the workers’ compensation judge’s decision denying the Claim Petition, finding the claimant’s injuries were sustained while commuting and, thus, were not compensable.  The claimant worked as a crew leader in the employer’s tree-trimming business. While driving home in his personal vehicle at the end of his workday, he was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained injuries. He filed a Claim Petition, asserting he was a traveling employee with no fixed place of business and that his injuries were compensable, despite not occurring on the employer’s premises.  The claimant explained, every morning he left his house, drove his personal vehicle to the yard where the employer’s trucks were parked, got into one of the work trucks, and then drove to various work sites. At the end of the day, he returned to the yard and picked up his personal vehicle for the drive home. He explained that the employer did not have a fixed and permanent yard since it changed several times per year, depending upon the circuit the company was working. The employer presented fact witness testimony to explain that it does not compensate employees for their commuting time or expenses, it does not own the yards where they are headquartered for any particular period, and on the day of the accident, the claimant was assigned the job of moving the employer’s trucks and equipment from one yard to a new yard.  The workers’ compensation judge denied the Claim Petition, concluding the claimant was not in the course and scope of employment. In that decision, the judge credited the testimony of the claimant and the employer’s fact witness, noting they were in agreement on every critical point of the analysis. The judge found that the facts placed the claimant outside of the course and scope of employment when the accident occurred because he was commuting from work.  The claimant appealed, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the judge’s decision. They found that the claimant’s evidence did not establish any of the exceptions to the coming and going rule. To the contrary, the claimant reported to work at a fixed location.  The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, arguing that he established he was a traveling employee and was entitled to a presumption that he was in the course and scope of employment while driving home from work. The Commonwealth Court focused on the fact that the claimant’s evidence did not establish that he was a traveling employee without a fixed place of employment. Most importantly, the claimant was not furthering the business of his employer while commuting home in his own vehicle from the yard where he began his workday. The court found the claimant reported to the yard, where the truck and equipment needed to trim trees were stored. He then traveled to the location of the tree trimming job. He drove his personal vehicle, not the employer’s vehicle, to and from his home, and his workday started at the employer’s yard, not at his home. Further, the claimant was not reimbursed for travel expenses and did not store equipment at his home. The claimant had a fixed place of work, albeit one of short duration. Thus, a job that takes place in more than one location during a workday does not make one a traveling employee.  The claimant took a further appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which is now awaiting a decision on the merits.  The ruling by the Commonwealth Court provides guidance to carriers that a thorough investigation must be undertaken when a claim is reported. Furthermore, since these cases are driven by the specific facts, it is often times the best practice to deny the claim and force the claimant to meet his burden of proving that the injury occurred in the course and scope of employment.  *Andrea, a member of our Workers’ Compensation Department, is a shareholder and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

When Filing a Petition Can Result in an Award of Attorney Fees

October 6, 2022

It is important to examine the portions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (act) that influenced the court’s decision and what attorneys on both sides can do to protect their clients. It is also important to look at how the decision of the court could potentially be expanded.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.