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Defense Digest

Slip and Fall Summary Judgment Equation: Transitory Foreign Substance + Footprints, Prior Track Marks or Drying of Liquid = No Summary Judgment for Premises Owner

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

Key Points:

  • Under Florida’s Transitory Foreign Substance Statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1), constructive notice may be inferred from either the amount of time a substance has been on the floor or the fact that the condition occurred with such frequency that the owner should have known of its existence. 
  • Florida courts have held that plaintiff’s testimony accompanied by a “plus” in the form of additional facts from which a jury can establish constructive knowledge is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 
  • Testimony regarding footprints or track marks are sufficient “plus” factors. 

In July 2010, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida’s Transitory Foreign Substance Statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.0755, which requires that a plaintiff “prove the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it.” One of the ways a plaintiff can establish constructive notice is to show that “the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment should have known of the condition.” To this end, numerous appellate courts, as well as federal courts, have established and acknowledged the “plus” factor test. In the “plus” factor test, the plaintiff’s testimony of a substance on the ground, plus some additional facts from which a jury can reasonably conclude that the substance was on the floor long enough to constitute constructive knowledge, is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 

In Valdes v. Verona at Deering Bay Condo. Ass’n, Inc., et al., 2024 WL 3049788 (Fla. 3d DCA June 19, 2024), the Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final judgment entered in favor of Verona at Deering Bay. In this case, Valdes was helping a friend who lived at Verona return Christmas decorations to his friend’s storage unit. While in the storage unit, Valdes slipped and fell on a puddle right below a storage locker. While Valdes did not know how long the water was on the floor, he testified that the puddle appeared green, dirty, large, and dried up in certain areas. There were also smudge marks and footprints on the floor near the puddle but he acknowledged that they could have been his. Verona moved for summary judgment, arguing that the mere presence of the puddle did not establish constructive notice. The trial court granted its motion and entered final summary judgment in its favor. 

In its analysis, the district court indicated, “In trying to assess how long a substance has been sitting on a floor, courts look to several factors, including ‘evidence of footprints, prior track marks, changes in consistency, [or] drying of the liquid,’” citing Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278–1279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). In Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores, E., LP, 64 F. 4th 1166, 1170 (11th Cir. 2023), the court stated, “Florida’s appellate courts have found constructive notice when the offending liquid was dirty, scuffed, or had grocery-cart track marks running through it, or if there was other evidence such as footprints, prior track mars, changes in consistency, or drying of the liquid.”

While the court agreed with Verona that the mere presence of the puddle was not sufficient to establish constructive notice, the trial court should have considered the “plus” factors in the plaintiff’s testimony and denied Verona’s motion for summary judgment. Here, Valdes established more than just the presence of a puddle. Rather, his testimony that the puddle was green, dirty, large, and dried up in certain areas satisfied the “plus” factor that the courts have established and acknowledged. 

However, where there is evidence supporting that the transitory foreign substance was not present long enough for constructive notice to be established, the “plus” factors will not be taken into consideration. In Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Safonte, 2024 WL 3057561 (Fla. 4th DCA June 20, 2024), an invitee completed a delivery for a contractor who was performing repairs on Publix’s premises and then began shopping in his personal capacity. While shopping, a yogurt container fell out of his shopping cart and spilled onto the floor. The container made a faint sound when it hit the ground. A Publix employee was nearby stocking shelves but had his back to the invitee and the area where the yogurt spilled. The employee did not turn around or take any action that indicated he was aware of the spill. Approximately two minutes later, Safonte slipped and fell on the yogurt. The employee stopped stocking the shelf and assisted the plaintiff. A trail of yogurt was seen starting at the location where it was spilled and running through the dairy department. Safonte sued Publix for his injuries.

At trial, a jury found both Publix and the plaintiff negligent, apportioning 40% of the fault to Publix and 60% to the invitee, and awarding the plaintiff total compensatory damages of $241,460.00. Publix moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there was not sufficient evidence to establish actual or constructive notice, which the trial court denied. 

The District Court of Appeal reversed. It held that, despite there having been a trail of yogurt from the plaintiff’s shopping cart, the yogurt was only on the ground for two minutes and, thus, was not on the floor long enough to impute constructive knowledge on Publix. 

All in all, courts look to “plus” factors in a plaintiff’s testimony to determine if they have established constructive knowledge. If there is evidence showing the substance was not there long enough to constitute constructive knowledge, the “plus” factors will not be considered. 

Alicia is an associate in our Fort Lauderdale, Florida, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.