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Defense Digest

Slip and Fall Summary Judgment Equation: Transitory Foreign Substance + Footprints, Prior Track Marks or Drying of Liquid = No Summary Judgment for Premises Owner

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

Key Points:

  • Under Florida’s Transitory Foreign Substance Statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1), constructive notice may be inferred from either the amount of time a substance has been on the floor or the fact that the condition occurred with such frequency that the owner should have known of its existence. 
  • Florida courts have held that plaintiff’s testimony accompanied by a “plus” in the form of additional facts from which a jury can establish constructive knowledge is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 
  • Testimony regarding footprints or track marks are sufficient “plus” factors. 

In July 2010, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida’s Transitory Foreign Substance Statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.0755, which requires that a plaintiff “prove the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it.” One of the ways a plaintiff can establish constructive notice is to show that “the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment should have known of the condition.” To this end, numerous appellate courts, as well as federal courts, have established and acknowledged the “plus” factor test. In the “plus” factor test, the plaintiff’s testimony of a substance on the ground, plus some additional facts from which a jury can reasonably conclude that the substance was on the floor long enough to constitute constructive knowledge, is enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 

In Valdes v. Verona at Deering Bay Condo. Ass’n, Inc., et al., 2024 WL 3049788 (Fla. 3d DCA June 19, 2024), the Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final judgment entered in favor of Verona at Deering Bay. In this case, Valdes was helping a friend who lived at Verona return Christmas decorations to his friend’s storage unit. While in the storage unit, Valdes slipped and fell on a puddle right below a storage locker. While Valdes did not know how long the water was on the floor, he testified that the puddle appeared green, dirty, large, and dried up in certain areas. There were also smudge marks and footprints on the floor near the puddle but he acknowledged that they could have been his. Verona moved for summary judgment, arguing that the mere presence of the puddle did not establish constructive notice. The trial court granted its motion and entered final summary judgment in its favor. 

In its analysis, the district court indicated, “In trying to assess how long a substance has been sitting on a floor, courts look to several factors, including ‘evidence of footprints, prior track marks, changes in consistency, [or] drying of the liquid,’” citing Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278–1279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023). In Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores, E., LP, 64 F. 4th 1166, 1170 (11th Cir. 2023), the court stated, “Florida’s appellate courts have found constructive notice when the offending liquid was dirty, scuffed, or had grocery-cart track marks running through it, or if there was other evidence such as footprints, prior track mars, changes in consistency, or drying of the liquid.”

While the court agreed with Verona that the mere presence of the puddle was not sufficient to establish constructive notice, the trial court should have considered the “plus” factors in the plaintiff’s testimony and denied Verona’s motion for summary judgment. Here, Valdes established more than just the presence of a puddle. Rather, his testimony that the puddle was green, dirty, large, and dried up in certain areas satisfied the “plus” factor that the courts have established and acknowledged. 

However, where there is evidence supporting that the transitory foreign substance was not present long enough for constructive notice to be established, the “plus” factors will not be taken into consideration. In Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Safonte, 2024 WL 3057561 (Fla. 4th DCA June 20, 2024), an invitee completed a delivery for a contractor who was performing repairs on Publix’s premises and then began shopping in his personal capacity. While shopping, a yogurt container fell out of his shopping cart and spilled onto the floor. The container made a faint sound when it hit the ground. A Publix employee was nearby stocking shelves but had his back to the invitee and the area where the yogurt spilled. The employee did not turn around or take any action that indicated he was aware of the spill. Approximately two minutes later, Safonte slipped and fell on the yogurt. The employee stopped stocking the shelf and assisted the plaintiff. A trail of yogurt was seen starting at the location where it was spilled and running through the dairy department. Safonte sued Publix for his injuries.

At trial, a jury found both Publix and the plaintiff negligent, apportioning 40% of the fault to Publix and 60% to the invitee, and awarding the plaintiff total compensatory damages of $241,460.00. Publix moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there was not sufficient evidence to establish actual or constructive notice, which the trial court denied. 

The District Court of Appeal reversed. It held that, despite there having been a trail of yogurt from the plaintiff’s shopping cart, the yogurt was only on the ground for two minutes and, thus, was not on the floor long enough to impute constructive knowledge on Publix. 

All in all, courts look to “plus” factors in a plaintiff’s testimony to determine if they have established constructive knowledge. If there is evidence showing the substance was not there long enough to constitute constructive knowledge, the “plus” factors will not be considered. 

Alicia is an associate in our Fort Lauderdale, Florida, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.