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Defense Digest

Reimbursement of Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Lien Is Found Not Automatic by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Daniel W. Deitrick

Key Points:

  • No formal liability for payment of work-related medical expenses is triggered on the part of the employer/insurer until such expenses are properly submitted in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act and the Medical Cost Containment Regulations. 
  • The terms of the Workers’ Compensation Act place the burden on the claimant and their health care providers to produce and submit proper billing forms and related medical records to employers/insurers when seeking payment for medical expenses for compensable work injuries, even where the injured worker is a Medicaid recipient and a lien is asserted.

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has addressed the circumstances under which a defendant’s liability to reimburse expenses incurred for medical treatment, including a Department of Human Services (DHS) lien, is formally triggered. In its precedential holding in Dura-Bond Coating, Inc. v. Ryan Marshall and PI&I Motor Express (WCAB), 328 A.3d 559 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024), the court held that any obligation on the part of the defendant to pay for medical expenses, including a DHS lien, is not formally established until proper submission of same by the health care provider in accordance with the Medical Cost Containment Regulations and Reduction Provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. In summary fashion, the court held the insurer was not required to pay any such medical expenses “unless and until the bills in question are submitted to them.”

Procedurally, the facts giving rise to the claim were not in dispute. Ryan Marshall, the claimant, sustained an injury while in the course of his employment on June 27, 2014, which resulted in amputation of both of his lower extremities, as well as related injuries. Litigation ensued, involving issues that included the proper employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, culminating in a decision and order of the workers’ compensation judge deeming Dura-Bond and PI&I to be the claimant’s statutory employers. The former entity was ordered to pay the full amount of workers’ compensation benefits with entitlement to indemnification from the latter. Consequently, Dura-Bond reimbursed a health lien asserted by DHS for medical expenses paid on the claimant’s behalf up until that date. 

Thereafter, the claimant’s treating health care providers continued to remit medical expenses to DHS. DHS, in turn, continued to pay the claimant’s medical expenses, including both medical treatment causally connected to the work injury and treatment not formally deemed to have been work-related. Dura-Bond was ultimately notified by DHS of its lien, which eventually reached a figure exceeding $153,000. 

A review petition was ultimately filed by PI&I, which Dura-Bond joined, due to the aforementioned DHS lien. The petition averred the claimant failed to ensure that the health care provider(s) formally submitted all medical expenses in accordance with Section 306(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, governing the payment process for medical expenses that are or have been deemed causally connected to the work injury. 

The workers’ compensation judge granted the review petition, finding that the health care providers—and DHS—were, or should have been, aware the employer was liable for the claimant’s medical expenses but continued to submit medical expenses directly to DHS. The judge, while recognizing the employer’s statutory duty to reimburse the lien asserted by DHS under Section 1409 of the Fraud and Abuse Control Act (FACA), specifically concluded that employers “are not obligated to reimburse the DHS lien…unless and until the bills in question are submitted to them for review, payment, denial, and/or utilization review in accordance with the…Act.” 

On the claimant’s appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the Board reversed, finding the erroneous submission of the claimant’s medical expenses to DHS did not invalidate DHS’s entitlement to repayment. Thereafter, the employers appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

The court, noting this issue was one of first impression, reviewed the employer’s obligation to pay for reasonable and necessary medical expenses that are causally related to treatment for a compensable work injury under Section 306(f.1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The employers contended that, until they receive proper documentation commencing their statutory obligation to pay the expenses embodied in the DHS lien, any such obligation on their part is not formally established. Put another way, they argued that FACA and DHS regulations did not supersede their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Conversely, the claimant submitted that the documentation requirements under the Act pertained only to providers, not lien holders—in this case, DHS. 

With respect to an employer’s liability for payment of medical expenses, the court noted that Section 306(f.1)(5) sets forth that the employer/insurer “shall make payment and providers shall submit bills and records in accordance with provisions of this section.” This has been interpreted to establish that an employer’s liability to pay providers for particular medical expenses for treatment incurred does not trigger until they receive and are afforded the opportunity to review medical reports and make an informed determination as to whether the treatments are causally connected to the work injury and are reasonable and necessary. 

However, the court also referenced pertinent provisions of the Medicaid Act, as well as DHS regulations, which prohibit Medicaid from being the primary insurance when a third party is legally liable for the expenses incurred for medical treatment, wherein DHS must “vigorously seek reimbursement from third parties liable for causing injuries to Medicaid recipients,” citing Miller v. Lankenau Hosp., 618 A.2d 1197, 1198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). The court further maintained that DHS regulations require DHS to identify and use third-party liability sources to the fullest extent possible before making payment. Such third-party liability sources include employers and their workers’ compensation insurers. 

The court found that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board erred in interpreting FACA to supersede the Worker’s Compensation Act, which would result in employers being unable to challenge causality or reasonableness or necessity of the medical services for which DHS paid. The court further found that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar a valid DHS lien from being asserted but, rather, specifies when an employer/insurer must pay same. Specifically, an employer/insurer is responsible for reimbursing a DHS lien, but only when it receives the proper billing forms and related medical reports. 

Furthermore, the court noted the substantial evidence of record supported the workers’ compensation judge’s original finding, that the claimant’s health care providers circumvented Section 306(f)(1) of the Act and DHS paid the provider’s bills despite the workers’ compensation judge’s adjudication regarding the compensability of the work injury itself. Insofar as neither DHS nor the claimant’s providers had offered the employers the statutorily mandated billing forms and medical reports, the employers were deprived of the opportunity to review, reprice, deny, and/or seek utilization review of said expenses. Consequently, it can be asserted that the Act places the onus on the injured worker and his provider(s) to produce proper billing forms and related medical reports, and to formally submit same to the culpable employer once the work injury is deemed compensable. It was noted that, insofar as the claimant’s providers were paid by DHS for all medical treatments, notwithstanding any causal connection, or lack thereof, to the work injury itself, the providers were in possession of no incentive to submit proper billing and medical reports to the proper party, i.e., the employer/insurer. 

Other than the claimant obtaining the billing reports and related medical records from the providers, or having the providers send them directly to the employer/insurer, the court theorized that the parties could alternatively seek a “mutually agreeable solution” that satisfies both Section 306(f)(1) of the Act and Section 1409 of the FACA. As such, the court remanded the matter to the Appeal Board for further remand to the workers’ compensation judge to determine the best way to accomplish this.

Importantly, the court did not issue a specific directive or prospective resolution for proper submission of the medical expenses. One may theorize that the court’s holding places an obligation on the health care provider to properly submit expenses incurred for treatment to the appropriate and liable party, i.e., the employer/insurer. Regardless, the ruling can reasonably be construed to mean that no formal liability is triggered on the part of the employer/insurer until such medical expenses are properly submitted in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and Medical Cost Containment regulations. 

*Dan, who works in our Pittsburgh office, is a member of our Workers’ Compensation Department. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.