.

Daniel W. Deitrick

Portrait of Daniel W. Deitrick

Daniel is the managing attorney for the Workers' Compensation Department in the firm's Pittsburgh office. He devotes his practice to the defense of workers' compensation and federal black lung matters. Daniel represents sports manufacturing companies, trucking companies, hospitals, nursing homes, school districts, vehicle manufacturers, hotels, restaurants, electronics manufacturers, construction companies, public transportation entities, grocery/retail stores and mines.

Daniel successfully defended a workers' compensation fatal claim involving a motor vehicle accident by demonstrating that the decedent claimant was not an employee of his client for the purposes of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, while also establishing that the decedent claimant was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the fatal accident. Daniel also successfully defended against a claimant's allegations of entitlement to the maximum temporary total disability rate for a compensable injury by proving that the time-of-injury average weekly wage was properly calculated pursuant to Section 309 (d.1) of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Collier v. WCAB (PRS/Engles Trucking), 805 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

Daniel graduated from Villanova University with a bachelor's degree in political science. He then attended Duquesne University School of Law and was awarded his juris doctor. Since beginning his practice, Daniel has focused on the litigation of insurance defense, workers' compensation and federal black lung cases.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 1993)
    • Villanova University (B.A., cum laude, 1990)
    • Pennsylvania, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1993
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, "Lawyer of the Year," Pittsburgh, Workers’ Compensation Law – Employers (2024)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Workers’ Compensation Law – Employers (2020-2027)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section
    • American Bar Association, Law Practice Management Section
    • Barnes v. WCAB (Midland-Ross. Corp.), 684 A.2d 1107 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996) 
    • Collier v. WCAB (PRS/Engles Trucking), 805 A.2d 1267 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) (app. denied, 818 A.2d 505 (Pa. 2003)) 
    • Where are We Now: How the Lorino and Neves Decisions Have Impacted the Defense of Workers’ Compensation Cases, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania (CCAP) Seminar, October 5, 2023
    • Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 18, 2018
    • Bad Eggs: Defending Injuries Stemming from Violence in the Workplace, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Understanding Medical Records, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2016
    • Local Government Pension Management Best Practices and Updates, October 10, 2014
    • “Reimbursement of Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Lien Is Found Not Automatic by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court,” Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025
    • “Employer’s Future Subrogation Rights Under Section 319 of the Workers’ Compensation Act Limited by Pennsylvania Supreme Court,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2019

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Reimbursement of Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Lien Is Found Not Automatic by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

March 1, 2025

Key Points: No formal liability for payment of work-related medical expenses is triggered on the part of the employer/insurer until such expenses are properly submitted in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act and the Medical Cost Containment Regulations.  The terms of the Workers’ Compensation Act place the burden on the claimant and their health care providers to produce and submit proper billing forms and related medical records to employers/insurers when seeking payment for medical expenses for compensable work injuries, even where the injured worker is a Medicaid recipient and a lien is asserted. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has addressed the circumstances under which a defendant’s liability to reimburse expenses incurred for medical treatment, including a Department of Human Services (DHS) lien, is formally triggered. In its precedential holding in Dura-Bond Coating, Inc. v. Ryan Marshall and PI&I Motor Express (WCAB), 328 A.3d 559 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024), the court held that any obligation on the part of the defendant to pay for medical expenses, including a DHS lien, is not formally established until proper submission of same by the health care provider in accordance with the Medical Cost Containment Regulations and Reduction Provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. In summary fashion, the court held the insurer was not required to pay any such medical expenses “unless and until the bills in question are submitted to them.” Procedurally, the facts giving rise to the claim were not in dispute. Ryan Marshall, the claimant, sustained an injury while in the course of his employment on June 27, 2014, which resulted in amputation of both of his lower extremities, as well as related injuries. Litigation ensued, involving issues that included the proper employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, culminating in a decision and order of the workers’ compensation judge deeming Dura-Bond and PI&I to be the claimant’s statutory employers. The former entity was ordered to pay the full amount of workers’ compensation benefits with entitlement to indemnification from the latter. Consequently, Dura-Bond reimbursed a health lien asserted by DHS for medical expenses paid on the claimant’s behalf up until that date.  Thereafter, the claimant’s treating health care providers continued to remit medical expenses to DHS. DHS, in turn, continued to pay the claimant’s medical expenses, including both medical treatment causally connected to the work injury and treatment not formally deemed to have been work-related. Dura-Bond was ultimately notified by DHS of its lien, which eventually reached a figure exceeding $153,000.  A review petition was ultimately filed by PI&I, which Dura-Bond joined, due to the aforementioned DHS lien. The petition averred the claimant failed to ensure that the health care provider(s) formally submitted all medical expenses in accordance with Section 306(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, governing the payment process for medical expenses that are or have been deemed causally connected to the work injury.  The workers’ compensation judge granted the review petition, finding that the health care providers—and DHS—were, or should have been, aware the employer was liable for the claimant’s medical expenses but continued to submit medical expenses directly to DHS. The judge, while recognizing the employer’s statutory duty to reimburse the lien asserted by DHS under Section 1409 of the Fraud and Abuse Control Act (FACA), specifically concluded that employers “are not obligated to reimburse the DHS lien…unless and until the bills in question are submitted to them for review, payment, denial, and/or utilization review in accordance with the…Act.”  On the claimant’s appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the Board reversed, finding the erroneous submission of the claimant’s medical expenses to DHS did not invalidate DHS’s entitlement to repayment. Thereafter, the employers appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court, noting this issue was one of first impression, reviewed the employer’s obligation to pay for reasonable and necessary medical expenses that are causally related to treatment for a compensable work injury under Section 306(f.1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The employers contended that, until they receive proper documentation commencing their statutory obligation to pay the expenses embodied in the DHS lien, any such obligation on their part is not formally established. Put another way, they argued that FACA and DHS regulations did not supersede their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Conversely, the claimant submitted that the documentation requirements under the Act pertained only to providers, not lien holders—in this case, DHS.  With respect to an employer’s liability for payment of medical expenses, the court noted that Section 306(f.1)(5) sets forth that the employer/insurer “shall make payment and providers shall submit bills and records in accordance with provisions of this section.” This has been interpreted to establish that an employer’s liability to pay providers for particular medical expenses for treatment incurred does not trigger until they receive and are afforded the opportunity to review medical reports and make an informed determination as to whether the treatments are causally connected to the work injury and are reasonable and necessary.  However, the court also referenced pertinent provisions of the Medicaid Act, as well as DHS regulations, which prohibit Medicaid from being the primary insurance when a third party is legally liable for the expenses incurred for medical treatment, wherein DHS must “vigorously seek reimbursement from third parties liable for causing injuries to Medicaid recipients,” citing Miller v. Lankenau Hosp., 618 A.2d 1197, 1198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). The court further maintained that DHS regulations require DHS to identify and use third-party liability sources to the fullest extent possible before making payment. Such third-party liability sources include employers and their workers’ compensation insurers.  The court found that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board erred in interpreting FACA to supersede the Worker’s Compensation Act, which would result in employers being unable to challenge causality or reasonableness or necessity of the medical services for which DHS paid. The court further found that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar a valid DHS lien from being asserted but, rather, specifies when an employer/insurer must pay same. Specifically, an employer/insurer is responsible for reimbursing a DHS lien, but only when it receives the proper billing forms and related medical reports.  Furthermore, the court noted the substantial evidence of record supported the workers’ compensation judge’s original finding, that the claimant’s health care providers circumvented Section 306(f)(1) of the Act and DHS paid the provider’s bills despite the workers’ compensation judge’s adjudication regarding the compensability of the work injury itself. Insofar as neither DHS nor the claimant’s providers had offered the employers the statutorily mandated billing forms and medical reports, the employers were deprived of the opportunity to review, reprice, deny, and/or seek utilization review of said expenses. Consequently, it can be asserted that the Act places the onus on the injured worker and his provider(s) to produce proper billing forms and related medical reports, and to formally submit same to the culpable employer once the work injury is deemed compensable. It was noted that, insofar as the claimant’s providers were paid by DHS for all medical treatments, notwithstanding any causal connection, or lack thereof, to the work injury itself, the providers were in possession of no incentive to submit proper billing and medical reports to the proper party, i.e., the employer/insurer.  Other than the claimant obtaining the billing reports and related medical records from the providers, or having the providers send them directly to the employer/insurer, the court theorized that the parties could alternatively seek a “mutually agreeable solution” that satisfies both Section 306(f)(1) of the Act and Section 1409 of the FACA. As such, the court remanded the matter to the Appeal Board for further remand to the workers’ compensation judge to determine the best way to accomplish this. Importantly, the court did not issue a specific directive or prospective resolution for proper submission of the medical expenses. One may theorize that the court’s holding places an obligation on the health care provider to properly submit expenses incurred for treatment to the appropriate and liable party, i.e., the employer/insurer. Regardless, the ruling can reasonably be construed to mean that no formal liability is triggered on the part of the employer/insurer until such medical expenses are properly submitted in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and Medical Cost Containment regulations.  *Dan, who works in our Pittsburgh office, is a member of our Workers’ Compensation Department.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.