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Daniel W. Deitrick

Portrait of Daniel W. Deitrick

Daniel is the managing attorney for the Workers' Compensation Department in the firm's Pittsburgh office. He devotes his practice to the defense of workers' compensation and federal black lung matters. Daniel represents sports manufacturing companies, trucking companies, hospitals, nursing homes, school districts, vehicle manufacturers, hotels, restaurants, electronics manufacturers, construction companies, public transportation entities, grocery/retail stores and mines.

Daniel successfully defended a workers' compensation fatal claim involving a motor vehicle accident by demonstrating that the decedent claimant was not an employee of his client for the purposes of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, while also establishing that the decedent claimant was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the fatal accident. Daniel also successfully defended against a claimant's allegations of entitlement to the maximum temporary total disability rate for a compensable injury by proving that the time-of-injury average weekly wage was properly calculated pursuant to Section 309 (d.1) of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Collier v. WCAB (PRS/Engles Trucking), 805 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

Daniel graduated from Villanova University with a bachelor's degree in political science. He then attended Duquesne University School of Law and was awarded his juris doctor. Since beginning his practice, Daniel has focused on the litigation of insurance defense, workers' compensation and federal black lung cases.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 1993)
    • Villanova University (B.A., cum laude, 1990)
    • Pennsylvania, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 1993
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, "Lawyer of the Year," Pittsburgh, Workers’ Compensation Law – Employers (2024)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Workers’ Compensation Law – Employers (2020-2027)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section
    • American Bar Association, Law Practice Management Section
    • Barnes v. WCAB (Midland-Ross. Corp.), 684 A.2d 1107 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996) 
    • Collier v. WCAB (PRS/Engles Trucking), 805 A.2d 1267 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002) (app. denied, 818 A.2d 505 (Pa. 2003)) 
    • Where are We Now: How the Lorino and Neves Decisions Have Impacted the Defense of Workers’ Compensation Cases, County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania (CCAP) Seminar, October 5, 2023
    • Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 18, 2018
    • Bad Eggs: Defending Injuries Stemming from Violence in the Workplace, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Understanding Medical Records, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2016
    • Local Government Pension Management Best Practices and Updates, October 10, 2014
    • “Reimbursement of Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Lien Is Found Not Automatic by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court,” Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025
    • “Employer’s Future Subrogation Rights Under Section 319 of the Workers’ Compensation Act Limited by Pennsylvania Supreme Court,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2019

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Reimbursement of Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Lien Is Found Not Automatic by Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

March 1, 2025

Key Points: No formal liability for payment of work-related medical expenses is triggered on the part of the employer/insurer until such expenses are properly submitted in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act and the Medical Cost Containment Regulations.  The terms of the Workers’ Compensation Act place the burden on the claimant and their health care providers to produce and submit proper billing forms and related medical records to employers/insurers when seeking payment for medical expenses for compensable work injuries, even where the injured worker is a Medicaid recipient and a lien is asserted. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has addressed the circumstances under which a defendant’s liability to reimburse expenses incurred for medical treatment, including a Department of Human Services (DHS) lien, is formally triggered. In its precedential holding in Dura-Bond Coating, Inc. v. Ryan Marshall and PI&I Motor Express (WCAB), 328 A.3d 559 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024), the court held that any obligation on the part of the defendant to pay for medical expenses, including a DHS lien, is not formally established until proper submission of same by the health care provider in accordance with the Medical Cost Containment Regulations and Reduction Provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. In summary fashion, the court held the insurer was not required to pay any such medical expenses “unless and until the bills in question are submitted to them.” Procedurally, the facts giving rise to the claim were not in dispute. Ryan Marshall, the claimant, sustained an injury while in the course of his employment on June 27, 2014, which resulted in amputation of both of his lower extremities, as well as related injuries. Litigation ensued, involving issues that included the proper employer for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, culminating in a decision and order of the workers’ compensation judge deeming Dura-Bond and PI&I to be the claimant’s statutory employers. The former entity was ordered to pay the full amount of workers’ compensation benefits with entitlement to indemnification from the latter. Consequently, Dura-Bond reimbursed a health lien asserted by DHS for medical expenses paid on the claimant’s behalf up until that date.  Thereafter, the claimant’s treating health care providers continued to remit medical expenses to DHS. DHS, in turn, continued to pay the claimant’s medical expenses, including both medical treatment causally connected to the work injury and treatment not formally deemed to have been work-related. Dura-Bond was ultimately notified by DHS of its lien, which eventually reached a figure exceeding $153,000.  A review petition was ultimately filed by PI&I, which Dura-Bond joined, due to the aforementioned DHS lien. The petition averred the claimant failed to ensure that the health care provider(s) formally submitted all medical expenses in accordance with Section 306(f)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, governing the payment process for medical expenses that are or have been deemed causally connected to the work injury.  The workers’ compensation judge granted the review petition, finding that the health care providers—and DHS—were, or should have been, aware the employer was liable for the claimant’s medical expenses but continued to submit medical expenses directly to DHS. The judge, while recognizing the employer’s statutory duty to reimburse the lien asserted by DHS under Section 1409 of the Fraud and Abuse Control Act (FACA), specifically concluded that employers “are not obligated to reimburse the DHS lien…unless and until the bills in question are submitted to them for review, payment, denial, and/or utilization review in accordance with the…Act.”  On the claimant’s appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, the Board reversed, finding the erroneous submission of the claimant’s medical expenses to DHS did not invalidate DHS’s entitlement to repayment. Thereafter, the employers appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court, noting this issue was one of first impression, reviewed the employer’s obligation to pay for reasonable and necessary medical expenses that are causally related to treatment for a compensable work injury under Section 306(f.1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The employers contended that, until they receive proper documentation commencing their statutory obligation to pay the expenses embodied in the DHS lien, any such obligation on their part is not formally established. Put another way, they argued that FACA and DHS regulations did not supersede their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Conversely, the claimant submitted that the documentation requirements under the Act pertained only to providers, not lien holders—in this case, DHS.  With respect to an employer’s liability for payment of medical expenses, the court noted that Section 306(f.1)(5) sets forth that the employer/insurer “shall make payment and providers shall submit bills and records in accordance with provisions of this section.” This has been interpreted to establish that an employer’s liability to pay providers for particular medical expenses for treatment incurred does not trigger until they receive and are afforded the opportunity to review medical reports and make an informed determination as to whether the treatments are causally connected to the work injury and are reasonable and necessary.  However, the court also referenced pertinent provisions of the Medicaid Act, as well as DHS regulations, which prohibit Medicaid from being the primary insurance when a third party is legally liable for the expenses incurred for medical treatment, wherein DHS must “vigorously seek reimbursement from third parties liable for causing injuries to Medicaid recipients,” citing Miller v. Lankenau Hosp., 618 A.2d 1197, 1198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). The court further maintained that DHS regulations require DHS to identify and use third-party liability sources to the fullest extent possible before making payment. Such third-party liability sources include employers and their workers’ compensation insurers.  The court found that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board erred in interpreting FACA to supersede the Worker’s Compensation Act, which would result in employers being unable to challenge causality or reasonableness or necessity of the medical services for which DHS paid. The court further found that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar a valid DHS lien from being asserted but, rather, specifies when an employer/insurer must pay same. Specifically, an employer/insurer is responsible for reimbursing a DHS lien, but only when it receives the proper billing forms and related medical reports.  Furthermore, the court noted the substantial evidence of record supported the workers’ compensation judge’s original finding, that the claimant’s health care providers circumvented Section 306(f)(1) of the Act and DHS paid the provider’s bills despite the workers’ compensation judge’s adjudication regarding the compensability of the work injury itself. Insofar as neither DHS nor the claimant’s providers had offered the employers the statutorily mandated billing forms and medical reports, the employers were deprived of the opportunity to review, reprice, deny, and/or seek utilization review of said expenses. Consequently, it can be asserted that the Act places the onus on the injured worker and his provider(s) to produce proper billing forms and related medical reports, and to formally submit same to the culpable employer once the work injury is deemed compensable. It was noted that, insofar as the claimant’s providers were paid by DHS for all medical treatments, notwithstanding any causal connection, or lack thereof, to the work injury itself, the providers were in possession of no incentive to submit proper billing and medical reports to the proper party, i.e., the employer/insurer.  Other than the claimant obtaining the billing reports and related medical records from the providers, or having the providers send them directly to the employer/insurer, the court theorized that the parties could alternatively seek a “mutually agreeable solution” that satisfies both Section 306(f)(1) of the Act and Section 1409 of the FACA. As such, the court remanded the matter to the Appeal Board for further remand to the workers’ compensation judge to determine the best way to accomplish this. Importantly, the court did not issue a specific directive or prospective resolution for proper submission of the medical expenses. One may theorize that the court’s holding places an obligation on the health care provider to properly submit expenses incurred for treatment to the appropriate and liable party, i.e., the employer/insurer. Regardless, the ruling can reasonably be construed to mean that no formal liability is triggered on the part of the employer/insurer until such medical expenses are properly submitted in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and Medical Cost Containment regulations.  *Dan, who works in our Pittsburgh office, is a member of our Workers’ Compensation Department.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.