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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Cannabinoid Oil as Covered Medical Supply Under Workers’ Compensation Act

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp – Special PA Alert – March 24, 2025

March 24, 2025

by Francis X. Wickersham

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ruled that any item included in a health care provider’s treatment plan for a claimant’s work-related injury—such as cannabinoid oil—qualifies as “medicines and supplies” under Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court further clarified that the cost containment provisions of the Act and its regulations apply only to health care providers, not to claimants. This decision reinforces the rights of injured workers to access prescribed treatments without being burdened by cost restrictions intended for medical providers.

In Mark R. Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, P.C. (WCAB), No. 32 MAP. 2024, decided March 20, 2025, by Justice Brobson, the claimant, a workers’ compensation attorney, sustained a work injury in the nature of an aggravation of pre-existing degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1 with radiculopathy while loading files into a trial bag. The claimant was resistant to pain medication. Ultimately, the claimant’s treating physician prescribed cannabinoid (CBD) oil, which the claimant purchased over the counter from a specialty store. The CBD oil was effective. The claimant provided his purchase receipts to the employer for reimbursement. The employer refused on the basis that CBD oil was not a pharmaceutical drug. The claimant then filed a Penalty Petition against the employer, alleging they were in violation of the Act by refusing to reimburse his out-of-pocket expenses.

The judge granted the petition and ordered the employer to make reimbursement, but he did not order penalties. The judge concluded that the CBD oil was a “supply” under Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) of the Act. The judge also concluded that, because the claimant was not a health care provider, the Cost Containment Regulations did not apply and that the employer was responsible for reimbursing all of the claimant’s out-of-pocket costs for the CBD oil.

The employer appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which reversed the judge, holding, in part, that CBD oil cannot be a “supply” under the Act as the FDA has concluded that it has not been proven safe or effective. The Board also reversed on the basis that the claimant did not submit the necessary bills and records for payment, as required by Section 306(f.1)(5) of the Act.

Later, the Commonwealth Court reversed the Board, concluding that the Board expressly declined to address the central issue of whether CBD oil is a medicine or supply within the meaning of Section 306(f.1)(1) of the Act. The court held that CBD oil constituted both a medicine and a supply under the Act and held that the Act and the Regulations mandated that providers, not employees, submit bills on specified forms for a bill to be paid.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. In doing so, the court interpreted Section 306(f.1)(1)(i) to mean that the term “medicines and supplies” as any item that is part of a health care provider’s treatment plan for a work-related injury, including CBD. The court rejected the employer’s assertions that reimbursement was not permissible because CBD was unregulated and that the FDA has determined it to be unsafe. The court pointed out that there is nothing in the Act that requires “medicines and supplies” to be regulated by the FDA and that there was no showing by the employer that the CBD oil purchased by the claimant was illegal. 

The court further held that because the claimant was not a provider, he was under no obligation to comply with the Cost Containment provisions of the Act and the Department Regulations and was, therefore, entitled to full reimbursement for his out-of-pocket expenses by the employer. 

Please contact any of our Pennsylvania workers' compensation attorneys if you have any questions. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp – Special PA Alert – March 24, 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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