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Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Court Reiterates that Single Vehicle Policies Can Be Stacked and Stacking Can Provide Benefit to Insured

Higgins v. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of America, --- A.3d ---, 2024 WL 5218546, 2024 PA Super 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2024)

January 1, 2025

by Christopher W. Woodward

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Nationwide by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in this purported class action litigation. 

Higgins alleged she purchased insurance from Nationwide, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, despite having identified that she owned a single vehicle without any other drivers, vehicles or policies in her household. Higgins sought a return of premiums paid for the stacked coverage, alleging there is no stacking benefit under a single-vehicle policy where there are no other policies in the household. She also sought declaratory relief on behalf of herself and others similarly situated. She further alleged Nationwide violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. 

The trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment, and Higgins appealed.

The Superior Court noted the trial court had relied upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Craley v. State Farm Fire and Cas., 895 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2006), where it was determined that stacking of a single-vehicle policy could provide a benefit to an insured where the individual is injured in a vehicle other than their own insured vehicle. The Superior Court further noted the trial court concluded that Higgins did not state a claim for unjust enrichment because stacking on the single-vehicle policy could provide a benefit and because she had entered into a binding contract with Nationwide. Likewise, the trial court determined Higgins did not a state a claim for fraud. Finally, the trial court found no merit in Higgin’s UTPCPL claim.

Ultimately, the Superior Court determined the trial court’s ruling had no error and affirmed. It bolstered its affirmation by pointing to a recent Third Circuit opinion, Berardi v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 2023 WL 4418219 (3d Cir. 2023), where the Third Circuit similarly held that single-vehicle owners with no other household vehicles can, nonetheless, derive benefits from stacked UM/UIM coverage.

The Superior Court, therefore, reiterated that, despite having only a single vehicle listed on an auto policy, and without any other household vehicles or policies, an insured may still be able to derive benefits from stacking the UM/UIM coverage. As such, premiums paid for stacking coverage by such insureds are valid and are not subject to disgorgement by the insurers. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

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