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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Bar Association Formal Opinion 2025-100 Reinforces Written Fee Agreements as Essential for Compliance and Risk Management

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026

January 1, 2026

by Scott R. Eberle

In Formal Opinion 2025-100, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility emphasizes the importance of written fee arrangements. The recent Opinion clarifies the minimum requirements of Rule 1.5 (Fees) and discusses recommended best practices to reduce disciplinary and malpractice risk.

Rule 1.5(b) requires that when a lawyer has not regularly represented a client, the basis or rate of the fee must be communicated to the client in writing before or within a reasonable time after commencement of the representation. A written communication of fees is mandatory in nearly all engagements.

The only exception applies when a lawyer has regularly represented the client. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct do not define “regularly,” comment [1] to the Rule explains that the exception applies where the client has an evolved understanding of the fees to be charged.

The Opinion underscores that contingent fee arrangements are treated differently. Under Rule 1.5(c), a written fee agreement is always required for a contingent fee, regardless of the lawyer’s prior relationship with the client. The written contingent fee agreement must specify how the fee and expenses will be calculated. Additionally, at the conclusion of a contingent fee matter, a written closing statement showing the outcome of the matter, the remittance to the client, and the method of the determination of the fee is also required.

Although the Rules of Professional Conduct only require a written statement of the basis or rate of the fee, the Committee strongly recommends a more comprehensive written fee agreement, countersigned by the client, as a best practice to avoid malpractice claims and disciplinary complaints. Fee agreements that go beyond the minimum requirements of Rule 1.5 protect the rights and interests of both the lawyer and the client, prevent misunderstandings, and ensure the lawyer’s compliance with their communication obligations under Rule 1.4. The Committee suggests that a written fee agreement can be used to clarify, among other things, the identity of the client, the scope of the representation, and the expectations and obligations of both lawyer and client.

The Opinion also reminds lawyers that the writing required by Rule 1.5 must be retained for at least five years after termination of the attorney-client relationship pursuant to Rule 1.15(c).

Formal Opinion 2025-100 ultimately reinforces that written fee communications protect both clients and lawyers and are an essential part the lawyer-client relationship.

Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact MEDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. 

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.