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Defense Digest

Overcoming the Daubert Challenge With Your Billing and Coding Expert

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

by Frank L. Madia and Thomas J. Slogar

Key Points:

  • The Florida Standard Jury Instructions pertaining to plaintiff’s medical expenses instruct the jury to consider and award damages for the reasonable value or expense of medical care and treatment necessarily or reasonably obtained by plaintiff in the past or future. 
  • It is plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove the reasonableness of his or her medical expenses. Once he or she testifies to the amount of the medical bills and introduces them into evidence, it is a jury question whether the bills and charges represent reasonable and necessary medical expenses. 
  • If scientific technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

In a recent slip and fall case we handled in Broward County, Florida, the plaintiff moved to strike a retail store’s billing and coding expert under Daubert from testifying at trial as to the usual, customary, and reasonable charges of the plaintiff’s medical-related expenses. Among other things, the plaintiff alleged the billing and coding expert relied on incomplete, unverifiable information, including her own opinion testimony, which the plaintiff averred would only confuse the jury.

In opposition, we argued the billing and coding expert had sufficient specialized knowledge, experience, and training and was adequately qualified to express her expert opinions regarding the plaintiff’s medical bills and how those bills compare to the prevailing and customary rates charged in the medical community and specific geographical location where the services were performed and that such testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence related to those reasonable charges for the alleged treatment provided to the plaintiff. 

The plaintiff’s position would make it impossible for a defendant to contest whether the charges claimed are usual, customary, and reasonable. It would also be contrary to Florida law, which acknowledges a defendant’s right in personal injury litigation to argue to a jury that a plaintiff’s medical bills are unreasonable. See e.g., Katzman v. Rediron Fabrication, Inc., 76 So. 3d 1060, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (sufficiently explained below why certain hospital billing information was necessary as part of determining whether a treating doctor billed non-litigation patients at a lower rate for the same medical services is “admissible evidence regarding the reasonableness of medical expenses”); Giacalone v. Helen Ellis Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 8 So. 3d 1232, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (stating that reasonableness of bills can be determined by looking at: (1) the relevant market for services, including the rates charged by other similarly situated providers for similar services; (2) the usual and customary rate the provider charges and receives for its services; and (3) the provider's internal cost structure). 

The plaintiff in our case also argued that the medical and billing coding expert did not employ a sufficiently reliable scientific methodology in forming the basis for her expert opinion. In pertinent part, the plaintiff cited testimony from the expert that, as part of her methodology, she would input data from the medical billing charges (CPT coding) into a nationally recognized data base in order to obtain what the usual, customary, and reasonable charges were, in her expert opinion, for the plaintiff’s medical treatment. This method, according to the plaintiff, was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert and was, therefore, inadmissible. Simply inputting data into a database, according to the plaintiff, does not survive Daubert.

In response, we cited Cordero v. Target Corporation, 2019 WL 13080580 (2019), where the federal court had already spoken on the same legal challenge under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as it relates to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony from a medical and billing coding expert. 

The Cordero court held that the medical billing and coding expert who specifically utilized the Context 4 Healthcare UCR database—the exact same database used by the billing and coding expert in our case—was qualified to render expert opinions on the reasonableness of the medical charges based on, among other things, the expert’s nine years of experience in reviewing the reasonableness of medical charges and nearly thirteen years of experience in establishing and reviewing “fee schedules using standards such as UCR databases and negotiating out-of-network reimbursement amounts (based on UCR data and commercial insurance allowable fees.” Id. at 23-24.

In applying Cordero and Daubert to our case, we referred the court to the testimony of our billing and coding expert, who testified at length as to the methodology utilized to determine the reasonable value of past medical bills uniformly employed by medical billing professionals based on proper CPT coding for the medical services performed, together with the sources and data obtained, which, in her expert opinion, were not arbitrary. It was further argued that our expert utilized the same methodology throughout her 30 years in the medical billing and coding industry. 

Our expert relied on nationally recognized medical billing and coding standards, federal regulations, and geographically specific modifiers based on the particular categories of medical care. The expert’s methodology was “based on billing rules and coding standards that dictate how medical services are billing in the United States, which are federally regulated, and the application of pricing databases specific to the category of care, community and year in which the service was provided.” As part of her methodology, as indicated above, the billing and coding expert utilized the nationally recognized and generally accepted UCR database (Context 4 Health Care) to review, analyze, and determine what the UCR charges should have been for the medical treatment and services provided to the plaintiff.
 
Additionally, our expert testified that she reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records and billing, including a review and verification of the CPT codes inputted by the providers, to determine if the providers listed and billed the services under the correct CPT codes. In essence, the methodology employed in our case was the same methodology utilized by thousands of medical providers throughout the United States inasmuch as those same or similar databases were used to establish and implement their fee schedules. 

Overall, we were able to successfully establish that our medical and billing coding expert relied on sufficient and reliable data, the testimony was based on reliable and verifiable methods, and the expert applied those nationally recognized scientific methods to the facts of our case. 

As a consequence, the Circuit Court denied the plaintiff’s motion in its entirety and ruled that our medical and billing coding expert was permitted to testify at trial and to provide expert opinion testimony on what the usual, reasonable, and customary charges should be for the plaintiff’s medical treatment and related expenses. The court’s decision led to a favorable settlement of the litigation shortly thereafter. 

Frank and Tom are both members of our Casualty Department and work in our Orlando, Florida, office.  


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Order Striking Defenses and Ordering Treatment

Kneezel v. Lambertville House, No. A-2729-24 (June 1, 2026) In Kneezel v. Lambertville House, Lambertville House appealed from a workers’ compensation order to strike its defenses and directing it to authorize knee replacement surgery. By way of background, the petitioner worked as a property manager for Lambertville and injured his back and knee in December 2019. A workers’ compensation claim was filed and the petitioner treated at Rothman Institute. He underwent four injections to his low back and was recommended for surgery. The day before, Lambertville canceled and set up a second opinion exam with Dr. Lawrence Barr. The petitioner filed a motion for medical and temporary benefits (MMT), which was ultimately granted by the workers’ compensation judge. As such, he received authorized treatment for his back. The petitioner was then referred for his left knee pain and treatment was provided by Lambertville. He was recommended for a knee replacement, but the petitioner declined at that time. Approximately two years later, he sought additional treatment, which was denied. After obtaining a report from Dr. Dhimant Balar, the petitioner filed another MMT. In response, Lambertville submitted Dr. Zachwieja’s report and surveillance reports. Dr. Balar opined the left knee injury was related to the work accident, whereas Dr. Zachwieja believed it was due to his advanced degeneration as there was no evidence of acute trauma. A hearing on the MMT began in November 2024, with the petitioner testifying his knee pain never went away and he had a lot of trouble walking, especially for more than five to ten minutes. The surveillance investigators were scheduled to testify after, but had to be rescheduled a couple of times. During a conference in early February 2025, prior to when the investigators were to testify, it was discovered that Lambertville did not provide discovery to the petitioner, including the investigators’ information and surveillance footage. The petitioner moved to strike Lambertville’s defenses and sought an order to authorize the left knee treatment. Petitioner’s counsel pointed to Lambertville’s unreasonable delay in providing the necessary information and Lambertville did not file an opposition. In March 2025, the investigators’ testimonies were set for mid-March. On March 14, 2025, petitioner’s counsel advised she was still waiting for discovery and the judge directed Lambertville’s counsel to provide any missing information by March 17, 2025. Lambertville provided video clips after the petitioner had testified so the judge indicated that if everything was not provided to petitioner’s counsel by the end of March 19, 2025, the judge would sign the order granting the MMT. The next day, the judge entered the order striking Lambertville’s defenses and ordering left knee treatment. Lambertville moved for reconsideration of stay of the order pending appeal. Following oral arguments, the judge denied Lambertville’s motion, citing N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11 (a)(4)(i) that Lambertville was required to provide surveillance after the petitioner’s testimony and that it had failed to do so even after he testified in November 2024. The judge also noted the investigators’ testimonies were rescheduled multiple times and Lambertville had more than enough time to provide the requested information and failed to do so. The judge also noted Lambertville failed to file a response to the petitioner’s motion to strike. In addition, the judge pointed to the petitioner’s testimony, finding him to be credible and observing him to have to stand and move multiple times during testimony. Lambertville appealed, arguing its due process rights were violated as there was no opportunity to be heard and the order was procedurally and factually defective. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, noting Lambertville had sufficient notice and many opportunities to be heard. It was noted Lambertville’s failure to comply with the judge’s requests led to the order. As for the motion to strike, the Appellate Division indicated Lambertville failed to oppose the motion, which provided the judge with the ability to decide without a hearing for an uncontested motion. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judge’s rulings and order.

Thought Leadership

Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment

Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998.  For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer.  In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability.  The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline.  Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter.  The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant.  The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing.  The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations.  As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer.  The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements.  Therefore,  the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).  Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements.  For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.