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Defense Digest

New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit – Pitfalls and Practice Pointers

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021

September 1, 2021

by Adam E. Levy

Key Points:

  • New Jersey Appellate Division grapples with construction of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.
  • Court holds that, regardless of pleadings, the statute requires that an Affidavit of Merit be served within 60 days (extendable for good cause to a maximum of 120 days) of a licensed professional’s answer.
  • Court allowed for two exceptions to the AOM time limits: (1) substantial compliance and (2) extraordinary circumstances.

           New Jersey Statute N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 requires:

[i]n any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. The court may grant no more than one additional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause.

In the recent case of Yagnik v. Premium Outlet Partners, LP and Pennoni Associates, Inc., 249 A.3d 221 (N.J. Sup App. Div. 2021), the New Jersey Appellate Division grappled with the meaning of the statute in light of an Affidavit of Merit (AOM) filing that took place nine months after the case had been dismissed—a full 16 months after the defendant, an engineering firm, first filed its answer to the original complaint. Under normal circumstances, an AOM supporting the claims against a licensed professional must be served within 60 days of the date that the professional first files a responsive pleading. That time frame, per the statute’s language, can be extended for good cause to 120 days, regardless of whether the pleadings are subsequently amended to name other defendants or assert additional claims.

In Yagnik, the Pennoni Associates’ counsel made certain representations to plaintiff’s counsel about his client’s lack of liability. In addition, Pennoni provided a certification attesting that he was not involved in the construction phase of the project and, in particular, the construction of the staircase on which the plaintiff fell. Based on these representations and the certification, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against Pennoni. At that time, the plaintiff had not filed an AOM against Pennoni.

Subsequent discovery in the case revealed that, contrary to his certification, Pennoni had been involved in the construction and design of the stairs. As such, the plaintiff moved to reinstate the complaint. Pennoni cross-moved to dismiss based on lack of an AOM, which it had affirmatively pleaded as a defense in it original pleading. The trial court reinstated the complaint, ruling that, based on an analysis of several federal cases, “the affidavit of merit does not come into play until the pleadings are [all] settled.” Here, the trial court reasoned that all pleadings were not settled because Pennoni had not yet answered the most recent amended complaint. As such, the trial court granted the motion to reinstate on that basis. Pennoni appealed, and the Appellate Division granted leave for the appeal.

The Appellate Division upheld the lower court’s ruling, but on a different basis. First, the Appellate Division reasoned that the statute “was designed as a tort reform measure and requires a plaintiff in a malpractice case to make a threshold showing that the claims asserted are meritorious…,” and that “[the AOM Statue] is designed to weed out frivolous lawsuits at an early stage and to allow meritorious cases to go forward.” More insightfully, the jurists noted:

Waiting until the very end of the pleadings stage for an AOM means that, in the interim, the licensed professional will have a possibly meritless lawsuit hanging over its head. During that often-protracted time frame it may have its malpractice insurance premiums raised or have to expend substantial funds on counsel fees out of its policy deductible for participating in the litigation. This is especially of concern in a construction accident case, in which months of discovery typically occur before all subcontractors and other potentially liable parties are identified and the pleadings are repeatedly amended on an ongoing basis. The public policies that underlie the AOM statute call for prompt verification that the malpractice claims have been deemed by an expert in the field to have merit.

            With that backdrop, the judges held that, regardless of pleadings that may be amended after initial pleadings to name other defendants or assert additional claims, the AOM statute requires the affidavit to be served within 60 days (extendable for good cause to a maximum of 120 days) of the licensed professional’s answer. However, that deadline is not draconian. It is subject to exceptions for substantial compliance and extraordinary circumstances.

            In Yagnik, the Appellate Division held that extraordinary circumstances existed. They consisted of the representations of Pennoni’s counsel, the certification provided by Pennoni and the newly discovered evidence of Pennoni’s role, which contradicted both of the aforementioned items.

            The takeaway from this decision, from a defense perspective, is that knowing your client’s involvement is key. The information learned after the dismissal in Yagnik was likely readily discernable beforehand. The costs associated with the appellate practice likely undermined the goal of the AOM statute—to save the professional time and money.

            Also note that the same applies in cases in which we, as design professionals’ counsel, have to third-party other professionals into litigation. In those instances, it is best to retain an expert early in the case on the AOM issue, have them author the AOM and then file it regardless. The overall cost of doing so is relatively minimal compared to the use of an expert in litigation proper. If a dismissal is later warranted, for whatever reason, it can be given. Filing the AOM in those situations protects not only the client, but the legal professional as well.

*Adam is special counsel in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at 856.414.6015 or aelevy@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.