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Adam is a member of the firm's Architectural, Engineering & Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group. He concentrates his practice in complex construction defect matters, which include the defense of contractors, architects, engineers, surveyors and other professionals. He also defends claims of bodily injury, property damage, delay damages and other claims related to the construction industry.

In complex multiparty litigation, Adam has developed significant experience. He has successfully represented clients in matters involving wrongful death, school construction defects, condominium construction defects, public entity construction projects, and geotechnical engineering, including inaccurate surveying claims, improper dynamic compaction claims, and various other claims of deviations from architectural and engineering standards of care.

Adam earned his Bachelor of Arts Degree from Stockton State College and his juris doctor from The Thomas M. Cooley Law School. 

    • Cooley Law School (J.D., 1996)
    • Stockton University (B.A., 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1997
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • Pennsylvania, 1996
    • Successfully defended client through a two and a half month trial, with a no cause of action verdict against a products defect claim which allegedly resulted in burns to over 58% of plaintiff's body.  The case involved claims against a major U.S. car manufacturer as well as an internationally recognized automotive organization.  On the eve of closing arguments, the other parties settled without notice to Adam or his client.  The last demand on Adam’s client was for tender of its $10 Million Policy.
    • Obtained a jury verdict on behalf of insurer in favor of carrier on an insurance fraud claim.  Plaintiff in this matter fraudulently accepted payment from both a tortfeasor’s automotive carrier and his own carrier, effectively “double-dipping” to receive duplicative recoveries.  Adam successfully obtained a verdict recovering for the carrier its payment with treble damages for the defendant’s violation of the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Act.
    • Successfully represented major amusement park owner through trial in defense of a juvenile death case.  Representation included Supreme Court submissions and appearances prior to trial.  Results included seminal Supreme Court decision on the allocation of liability on behalf of the client as against a sovereign entity that was dismissed from the case due to the plaintiff’s failure to add the sovereign as a direct defendant prior to the expiration of the notice provisions of the torts claim act.  Based on our representation, the jury would be instructed to allocate liability for the sovereign’s negligence thus offsetting any potential negligence against the client.
    • Obtained summary judgment for a national engineering firm against claims of personal injury to a construction worker injured on a job site.  Issues related Affidavit of Merit Statute and its applicability to client’s field representative’s scope of work during the construction of a multi-million dollar U.S. Coast Guard facility.
    • Obtained summary judgement for a major national residential home developer against claims of personal injury by a construction worker injured on a job site.  Issues related to the scope of client’s involvement in the construction of a planned urban development. 
    • Obtained dismissal of claims against a major national residential home developer arising out of alleged defects in the construction of a multi-million dollar home.  Also recouped all costs and fees related to the client’s defense based on contractual indemnifications from co-defendant.
    • Obtained summary judgement for a major regional residential homebuilder against claims of construction defect arising out of damages to multi-million dollar beachfront home caused during Hurricane Sandy.
    • Obtained summary judgment for a developer and general contractor in a construction defect case. The plaintiff, a homeowners association, sued multiple parties seeking $2.5 million in damages related to water infiltration due to the allegedly negligent installation of roofing, exterior cladding, windows, doors, railings and decks. We also represented several previous developer/association board members who were sued individually. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiff filed a claim with the state of New Jersey under the Home Owners Warranty program.
    • Obtained dismissal of all claims against major energy company related to death claim. Deceased’s estate alleged that client was implicated in an alleged failure to provide safety on the roof of a construction site which resulted in the deceased falling through roof to his death.

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

The Lack of a Retainage Payment to General Contractor Did Not Bar Payment to the General Contractor's Subcontractors, Regardless of a Condition Precedent Requiring that the General Contract be Paid Before the Subcontractors

July 1, 2023

As addressed in the unreported case of J &M Interiors, Inc. v. Centerton Square Owners, LLC, (A-2536-19, 2021 WL 1976648 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 18, 2021), the lack of a retainage payment to a general contractor (GC) did not bar payment to the GC’s subcontractors, regardless of a condition precedent requiring that the GC be paid before the subcontractors. This “condition precedent” has been dubbed a “pay-if-paid” provision. Seeing such a provision as a matter of first impression in this case, the court has confirmed that “pay-if-paid” provisions in construction contracts are enforceable “as long as the contract on its face contains clear and unequivocal language that unambiguously sets forth the parties’ intention and agreement that owner payment is a condition precedent to the general contractor's obligation to pay the subcontractor.” Thus, the risk of payment is shifted to the subcontractors, unless the GC has “prevented or hindered” the owner’s payment, which would shift the onus back to the GC. Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

New Jersey Extends the Statute of Limitations in Construction Cases Involving Planned Real Estate Development Associations

July 1, 2022

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 has been amended to add a new subsection. The addition provides that the timing of a claim filed by a planned real estate development association is tolled “until an election is held and the owners comprise a majority of the board.” This extends the prior statute of limitations for a construction defect claim (not arising from an unsafe condition) which was calculated at six years from the date of substantial completion of the planned real estate development project. The new law tolls the time for an association “acting through, on behalf of, or at the behest of the developer,” but it does not expressly toll it for claims against subcontractors.  In a practical sense, the expiration of the statute of limitations for claims against a general contractor and/or its subcontractors can thereby occur before accrual of an association’s claims. Regardless, a developer would not be able to take advantage of the tolling of time to bring related claims (contractual and/or tort) against its own contractors if the association does not sue the contractor/subs directly.   Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.