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Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

New Jersey Appellate Division Strikes Down $117M Verdict in Talc/Asbestos Case Because Trial Court Did Not Properly Assess Plaintiffs’ Expert Opinions

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – April 30, 2021

April 30, 2021

by Paul C. Johnson

In April 2018, a Middlesex County jury returned a verdict against Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. and Imerys Talc America, Inc., finding that the plaintiff, Stephen Lanzo, was exposed to asbestos from Johnson’s baby powder and Shower to Shower powder and that this exposure caused his mesothelioma. The jury awarded $30 million in compensatory damages to Stephen Lanzo, $7 million to Kendra Lanzo for loss of consortium, and subsequently entered punitive damages awards of $55 million against Johnson & Johnson and $25 million against Imerys, for a total verdict of $117 million.

Both defendants appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting unreliable expert testimony. Johnson & Johnson also appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to sever the plaintiffs’ claims against them from the claims against Imerys based on an adverse inference jury charge against Imerys. The Appellate Division agreed with the defendants, reversing the trial court judgment and remanding the matter to the Law Division for a new trial. On the adverse inference issue, the Appellate Division held that the new trials should be conducted separately in order to avoid any potential prejudice to Johnson & Johnson caused by the adverse inference charge against Imerys.

Expert – Gatekeeper Role

Both defendants challenged the expert opinions expressed by two of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Dr. Jacqueline Moline and Dr. James Webber, that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments from certain minerals could cause mesothelioma. The trial judge denied the defendants’ request for a Rule 104 hearing. The defendants contended that by permitting these experts to testify, the trial judge misapplied the well-established gatekeeping procedures required to be handled by the trial court and as required by In re Accutane Litigation (Accutane), 234 N.J. 340, 388 (2018). The Appellate Division noted that the Supreme Court decision in Accutane essentially reconciled New Jersey Rules of Evidence with the longstanding Federal evidence standard expressed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

An expert’s opinion on causation may be admitted when it is “based on sound, adequately founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.” Accutane, at 349-350. The trial court is required to assess the soundness of the preferred methodology and the underlying data used to formulate the opinion in evaluating the qualifications of the expert and the conclusions. When a proponent fails to demonstrate “the soundness of a methodology, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data, from the perspective of others within the relevant scientific community, the gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is unreliable.” Lanzo v. Johnson & Johnson, (slip op. p. 34-35).

Here, both Drs. Moline and Webber testified that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments can cause mesothelioma. The trial judge only noted that “the issue of cleavage fragments was an area that’s highly contested between plaintiff’s experts and defense experts,” but the judge did not evaluate the issues in context. Lanzo, (slip op. p. 41). The trial judge also denied the defendants’ motion for a Rule 104 hearing on the experts’ opinions on this issue.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court did not assess the methodology or the underlying data used by these experts, noting that Dr. Webber had not conducted any studies and was not aware of any studies showing that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments could cause mesothelioma. Dr. Moline had previously testified that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments could not cause mesothelioma. At trial in this case, she testified that she had changed her opinion on this issue over time. However, she did not express any scientific basis for the change in her opinion.

The Appellate Division determined that the trial judge did not perform the required gatekeeping function by failing to evaluate the methodology or the data and information that formed the basis for the expert conclusions put forth by Drs. Webber and Moline. The Appellate Division also determined that those errors were clearly capable of producing an unjust result, which required a new trial.

Adverse Inference

In their discovery responses, Imerys certified that it did not have and was not aware of any historical talc samples or testing documents. At trial, however, Imerys’ representative confirmed that Imerys had, at one time, been in possession of historical talc samples and testing documents, but they had discarded the talc samples and documents.

The trial court determined that discarding these items was not intentional, however, recognized that spoliation does not require intent. The court noted that the purpose of an adverse inference charge is to level the playing field where evidence has been hidden or destroyed. To accomplish this levelling, the trial court included a jury charge that stated, “You may infer that the missing evidence may have been helpful to the plaintiffs’ case to the detriment of defendant Imerys.” The trial court also specifically charged that Johnson & Johnson was not involved in the spoliation conduct and that the adverse inference should not be drawn as to any other defendant in the case.

The Appellate Division noted that New Jersey court rules permit separate trials in order to prevent prejudice. R. 4:29-2 & R. 4:38-2(a). Severance may be appropriate “where a significant portion of the evidence to be adduced at trial is admissible only as to one defendant thereby causing prejudice to other defendants.” State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 53 (App. Div. 1997).

The Appellate Division found that, once the jury was permitted to draw an adverse inference that Imerys’ talc was contaminated with asbestos, it would likely be impossible for the jury to make a different finding as to Johnson & Johnson. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in failing to sever the claims against Imerys from the claims against Johnson & Johnson and remanded the matter to the trial court for separate trials against each defendant.

 

 

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – April 30, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tdrau@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.