Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Vacates Summary Judgment Due to Procedural Error in Response Time
Jordan v. Lynde, 330 A.3d 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024)

The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant the appellants the 30-day response period required under Pa. R.Civ.P. 1035.5(a) before granting summary judgment in favor of a defendant-podiatrist. The court vacated the order as to the podiatrist, reasoning that the appellants may have had distinct legal arguments or factual disputes separate from those against the hematology defendants. By prematurely granting the motion, the trial court denied the appellants their procedural right to fully contest the claims. The case was remanded to allow the appellants to respond within the mandated timeframe.

A motion for summary judgment was filed by the hematology defendants on October 26, 2023. The appellants did not file a response opposing their motion. On December 5, 2023, the defendant-podiatrist filed a joinder in the hematology defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Eight days later, the trial court granted both motions for summary judgment. 

Vacating the order as to the defendant-podiatrist, the Superior Court reasoned that there may be facts and legal arguments against the defendant-podiatrist that do not apply to the hematology defendants’ motion. The only way to be certain that such facts and arguments do not exist is to give the appellants 30 days to assert them, as permitted by Rule 1035.5(a). 

The trial court abused its discretion by prematurely granting the defendant-podiatrist’s motion, effectively denying the appellants the full and fair opportunity to respond to the motion which the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide. The case was remanded for the appellants to file a response to the defendant-podiatrist’s motion within 30 days of remand.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Dismissal of Medical Negligence Claims Due to Insufficient Evidence
Vandever v. Stair, 2025 WL 523863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025)

The Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the dismissal of a medical negligence claim against a physician, finding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. The plaintiff’s expert’s report mentioned the physician only in her supervisory role and lacked substantive allegations of direct negligence. With no evidence produced during discovery to support claims against the physician, the trial court granted summary judgment. As a result, the plaintiff’s claims against the hospital defendants, which relied on a theory of ostensible agency, also failed, as they were contingent on the physician’s alleged negligence.

The plaintiff submitted an expert report which only identified the defendant physician by name once and referred to her solely in her capacity as a supervisor of other medical providers working for the hospital defendants. 

However, the plaintiff’s claim that the physician failed to properly oversee the other physicians under her responsibility as the director was dismissed via preliminary objection. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to identify any evidence produced during discovery that would support his allegations that would impute culpability to the defendant physician. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court granted no relief because the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie case.

As to the hospital defendants, the Superior Court recognized that the claims resting upon a theory of ostensible agency could not succeed without a surviving claim of negligence against the defendant physician. Effectively, the plaintiff’s claims against the hospital defendants failed at the time the trial court granted the defendant physician’s motion for summary judgment.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reverses Expert Disqualification Based on Board Certification Alone
McAleer v. Geisenger Med. Ctr., 2025 WL

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and remanded a trial court opinion, holding that the trial court committed an error by disqualifying an expert based solely on his board certification, where a gastroenterologist was offered to present standard of care opinions pertaining to a colorectal surgeon. 

The Superior Court reiterated that Section 512 must be considered in its entirety, via taking evidence directly from the expert, rather than relying on his CV, before ruling on the issue of qualifications. 

^{The Quarterly Dose – May 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.}