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Defense Digest

Just Because You Expunge a Record Does Not Mean Internal Affairs Records Are Not Subject to an Open Public Records Act Request

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Matthew J. Behr

Key Points: 

  • New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:52-1(a) protects records of expunged criminal charges from disclosure. 
  • In States Newsroom, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, determined how far an expungement order reaches when a separate, independent, Internal Affairs investigation has occurred.
  • The Appellate Division held that the trial court should have analyzed the facts of the case to determine if there was common law right of access to the records, suggesting that the public would have an interest in disclosure and transparency.

New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:52-1(a) protects records of expunged criminal charges from disclosure, namely: “[r]ecords on file within any court, detention or correctional facility, law enforcement or criminal justice agency concerning a person’s detection, apprehension, arrest, detention, trial or disposition of an offense within the criminal justice system.” The question recently presented in States Newsroom, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 2024 WL 4296597 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2024), was how far an expungement order reaches when a separate, independent Internal Affairs investigation has occurred. The Appellate Division concluded the expungement statute does not unequivocally exclude Internal Affairs documents from release pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right to access. 

In August 2019, a lieutenant with the Jersey City Police Department hosted a barbeque for friends and family at his home. At the end of the party, there was an argument about what to do with leftovers. The fight escalated when the lieutenant retrieved his shotgun from a locked safe inside his home and then discharged the weapon. 

State Police responded to the house and found the lieutenant’s girlfriend and her son restraining him. The State Police incident report noted the lieutenant appeared to be under the influence. Police charged the lieutenant with making terroristic threats and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The lieutenant pled guilty to a lesser charge and completed pre-trial intervention.
 
Afterwards, he sent notice to all relevant agencies to expunge their records of his criminal matter pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:52-1. Separately, the Jersey City Police Department conducted an Internal Affairs investigation into the incident. The Internal Affairs report concluded the lieutenant had negligently used a firearm while under the influence. Consequently, the Jersey City Police Department suspended the lieutenant for 90 days. 

In Rivera v. Union County Prosecutor’s Office, 250 N.J. 124, 135 (2022), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Internal Affairs reports can be accessed pursuant to a common law right of access. 

Based on Rivera, the plaintiff submitted an OPRA request for a copy of the Internal Affairs report from the defendants, who denied the request. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit seeking the Internal Affairs documents pursuant to OPRA and the common law right to access. The trial judge denied the request. Relying upon the expungement statute, the trial judge found Rivera inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

The common law right of access requires courts to consider the following: 

  1. the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discouraging citizens from providing information to the government; 
  2. the effect disclosure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance that their identities would not be disclosed; 
  3. the extent to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decision making will be chilled by disclosure; 
  4. the degree to which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers; 
  5. whether any findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by remedial measures instituted by the investigative agency; and 
  6. whether any agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings have arisen that may circumscribe the individual’s asserted need for the materials. 

Rivera, 250 N.J. at 144 (quoting Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986)).

Generally, the public has an interest in the disclosure of Internal Affairs reports in order to hold officers accountable and deter misconduct. Other reasons are to ensure the Internal Affairs process is working properly and to foster public trust in law enforcement. 

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded this case, holding that the trial court should have analyzed the facts of the case by applying Rivera and Loigman. While the Appellate Division did not decide the ultimate issue of whether the Internal Affairs records would be discoverable, the court did strongly suggest that it would appear that the lieutenant’s position, the misconduct he engaged in outside the scope of his work, the charges he faced, the subsequent guilty plea to a different offense and pre-trial intervention, and the Internal Affairs investigation generated in the aftermath, point to the fact the public would have an interest in disclosure and transparency. The court further required the trial judge to review the Internal Affairs report in camera and, if a determination is made for disclosure, the appropriate redactions to protect legitimate confidential information should be made.

While New Jersey generally favors disclosure of public documents, case law has made it clear that the courts must carefully review all of the factors set forth in Rivera and Loigman to determine whether Internal Affairs documents are subject to disclosure, whether an expungement order has been entered or not. As a result, whether disclosure will ultimately be ordered will be highly fact sensitive, and lawyers must be careful not to overreach in arguments, but provide the courts with practical reasons for non-disclosure. 

*Matt, a shareholder, is a member of our Professional Liability Department and works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.