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Defense Digest

Including Settled Defendants on a Verdict Sheet: A Reminder that No Assumptions Are Allowed

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023

December 1, 2023

by Kristen L. Worley

Key Points:

  • Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act permits the inclusion of a defendant or other non-party who has entered into a release with a plaintiff to be included on the verdict sheet and, thus, subject to apportionment of liability “… upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” 
  • Employers who are granted immunity from liability and suit under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet. 
  • Trial of any case necessarily comes at the conclusion of months, and, in many instances, years, of discovery. Practitioners carefully weigh their strategy when propounding and answering written discovery, asserting objections during depositions, and serving expert reports. During this phase, it is easy to push the notion of trial and all of its practical considerations to the side, acknowledging the oft-cited statistic that only 1% of cases will reach the trial stage. Nevertheless, when those few cases we encounter in our practice reach the trial stage, we find ourselves preparing in earnest for testimony, crafting arguments for the admission or exclusion of evidence, as the case may be, and finally, preparing a litany of pretrial submissions. It is this latter subset of considerations, and specifically the verdict sheet, that are ultimately submitted to a jury which is the focus herein.

A jury verdict sheet is the sum of every case expressed in its simplest form and, quite arguably, the most important document in any trial. The verdict sheet outlines for a jury the decisions that must be rendered once all the evidence has been placed before it. The form can take any number of versions, but in the traditional case, it directs a jury to determine liability, causation, and damages. But who goes on the verdict sheet? We expect that parties to a lawsuit will be placed on a verdict sheet, but what about settled defendants and non-parties? A defendant has a significant interest in providing a jury with the opportunity to apportion fault to as many entities as possible, thereby reducing its overall exposure. 

Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, directs practitioners as to those instances in which settled defendants and non-parties may be included on a verdict sheet for purposes of apportionment of liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)(2) provides as follows:

Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect.--For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

Note the key phrase in the foregoing citation, “…any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” (Emphasis added.) Significantly, Pennsylvania courts have determined that there is no absolute right to the inclusion of a settled defendant on a verdict sheet. Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc,. 978 A.2d 961, 969-970 (Pa. Super. 2009). Rather, a jury must be presented with proofs sufficient to find the settled defendant or other person liable, and the trial court functions as the gate keeper to determine whether that evidential burden has been satisfied.

Ultimately, a trial court’s determination of whether sufficient evidence has been adduced that supports a prima facie case against a settled defendant and, thus, its inclusion on a verdict sheet is a decision that is subject to review for an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Rose v. Annabi, 934 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the trial court represents “not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. In discussing this standard of review, practitioners must take note that the decision of the trial court concerning the inclusion of a settled defendant or other person on a verdict sheet will be, for better or worse, a difficult ruling to challenge on appeal, and one should prepare their trial proofs accordingly. 

In converse to settled defendants that may be placed on a verdict sheet following the submission of sufficient evidence of fault, employers who are granted immunity under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet. The exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, set forth at 77 P.S. § 481, provides that the “liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees … entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death … .” Acknowledging the Act’s limitation of suit, or exclusivity provision, the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act similarly bars the apportionment of any liability to an employer immunized from liability or suit under the Act.

In sum, practitioners should not presume that defendants or non-parties who have entered into a release with the plaintiff will automatically be included on the verdict sheet. Rather, they should prepare their cases for trial with special attention paid to expert discovery and advance theories of liability against a settled entity. In this manner, practitioners can ensure that they are capable of presenting sufficient proofs from which the trial court can conclude that a prima facie case of liability has been advanced against a settled entity and, thereby, order the inclusion of said entity on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability apportionment. 

*Kristen, a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office, is Co-Chair of our firm’s Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group. She can be reached at 215.575.2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.