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The Quarterly Dose

Highlights in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Law: Expansion of Liability, Nuclear Verdicts, and Emerging Litigation Trends

The Quarterly Dose – August 2026

August 26, 2026

by John J. Hare and Holli K. Archer

Pennsylvania’s medical malpractice landscape has undergone significant changes. In the last two years, courts, litigants, insurers, and health care providers have faced a dramatic rise in nuclear verdicts, evolving juror attitudes, aggressive plaintiff advertising, third-party litigation funding, and increasingly complex procedural challenges. These developments have not only reshaped medical malpractice litigation, but have also intensified concerns about health care access, insurance costs, and Pennsylvania’s legal climate.

The Expansion of Liability and the Rise of Nuclear Verdicts

One of the most significant trends in medical malpractice litigation is the expansion of liability and the rise of so-called “nuclear verdicts” (generally speaking, personal injury verdicts in excess of $10 million). Nationally, 2025 set the all-time record with 140 nuclear verdicts, including 30 thermonuclear verdicts (above $100 million) and five verdicts exceeding $1 billion. This continued a steady upward trend from 108 nuclear verdicts in 2024 and 91 in 2023.

Pennsylvania has exceeded the national trend. From June 2021 to May 2026, the Commonwealth had 42 nuclear verdicts, with 29 occurring in Philadelphia alone. Medical malpractice cases account for 17 of those 42 verdicts. Philadelphia remains the epicenter of large medical malpractice awards, producing 11 of the state’s 17 medical malpractice nuclear verdictss. Other excessive malpractice verdicts have occurred in York, Beaver, Chester, Delaware, and Luzerne counties.

Although appellate courts have occasionally reduced excessive awards, the overall trend is concerning. Only five of Pennsylvania’s 42 nuclear verdicts have been reversed or reduced. In medical malpractice cases, notable examples include:

  • Newlin v. Vita Healthcare Group – $19 million verdict overturned.
  • Dawson v. Bayada Home Health Care – $14 million verdict remitted to $8 million.

What Is Driving Large Verdicts?

Legal analysts increasingly point to the COVID-19 pandemic as a catalyst for changing juror perspectives and expanded liability. The pandemic created what many describe as twin sensitivities: a heightened concern for safety and risk prevention, and increased skepticism toward corporations and institutions. These attitudes align closely with the plaintiff-oriented “reptile” litigation strategy, which aims to generate juror anger by framing a corporate defendant’s alleged actions as a threat to community safety.

Another factor frequently cited in discussions about large verdicts is a growing skepticism toward institutions and large organizations. In many cases, jurors may view corporations, hospitals, insurers, and other well-resourced entities as being in a better position to prevent harm and protect the public. As a result, they may hold these organizations to particularly high (and in many cases unrealistic) standards of conduct and accountability.

The Impact of Changing Jury Demographics

Demographic changes are also influencing litigation outcomes. Millennials represent the largest cohort and may comprise up to 40% of many jury pools. Studies suggest they are the most likely to award large verdicts as they are highly safety-conscious due to experiences such as 9/11, school shootings, and COVID-19, and generally less trusting of large institutions, corporations, and established systems.

Equally important is the emergence of what jury consultants describe as “vulnerable jurors” – individuals who have recently experienced significant financial, medical, or personal hardship. The economic and health-related disruptions of the pandemic have expanded this segment of the population.

Notably, political affiliation has become a less reliable predictor of defense-oriented verdicts. Jurors at both political extremes may be receptive to plaintiffs’ arguments, particularly when they perceive corporate defendants as part of a powerful establishment.

Lawyer Advertising and the Litigation Economy

Philadelphia has become one of the most heavily advertised legal markets in the country. According to the 2025-2026 Judicial Hellholes report, plaintiffs’ firms reportedly spent $76.6 million on more than 634,000 advertisements in the region. Billboard, television, radio, and digital marketing campaigns have become nearly unavoidable throughout the metropolitan area.

Critics argue that extensive advertising creates a self-reinforcing cycle by:

  • Encouraging potential plaintiffs to pursue claims.
  • Increasing settlement demands.
  • Raising expectations regarding verdict values.
  • Expanding public awareness of litigation opportunities.

Consequences for Insurance and Health Care

The rise in nuclear verdicts has had substantial financial consequences. As verdict severity rises, liability insurance becomes both more expensive and more difficult to obtain. Insurers increasingly report reduced capacity, higher premiums, and more restrictive underwriting practices. For health care providers already facing workforce shortages, reimbursement pressures and rising operational costs, increased malpractice exposure creates additional strain. The result may ultimately affect patient access to care, particularly in underserved or rural communities.

The Legal Marketplace: Workforce Challenges

Although the number of lawyers increased dramatically throughout the 20th century, growth has slowed considerably since 2000. Am Law 200 firms have experienced a net loss of litigators in recent years, and trends suggest that demand for experienced trial attorneys may increasingly outpace supply, particularly in high-exposure litigation areas such as medical malpractice defense.

Looking Ahead

Pennsylvania’s medical malpractice environment is undergoing a profound transformation. Rising nuclear verdicts, evolving juror attitudes, aggressive advertising, and procedural complexities are reshaping the risk landscape for health care providers, insurers, and defense counsel. As courts, legislators, and industry stakeholders consider potential reforms, medical malpractice practitioners must remain vigilant. Success increasingly depends not only on the merits of a case, but also on understanding changing jury behavior, preserving appellate issues, and navigating a legal environment that continues to expand the boundaries of liability.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.