Holli is a member of the Health Care Department, concentrating her practice on the defense of health care practitioners and medical providers against all manner of medical malpractice suits. Her clients include physicians, dentists, oral surgeons, podiatrists, chiropractors, cardiologists, and their practice groups. Her experience also includes representing hospitals in cases involving complex issues of medical malpractice, in addition to slip and fall suits.
Holli handles licensure matters before State Boards of Medicine, Dentistry, and Nursing. In addition, she has argued numerous pleadings and motions on behalf of her clients.
While attending law school at Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, Holli held various leadership positions for the Association of Women Law Students, including social chair and vice president. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Holli worked for a regional defense litigation law firm where she was selected to serve as a member of the Committee for Diversity and Inclusion.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Health Care Liability
Precedential Opinion: Superior Court of Pennsylvania Upholds the Enforceability of a Venue-Selection Clause in the Context of a Medical Malpractice Case
August 5, 2025
Hospitals may once again be able to control where a patient brings a medical malpractice claim through a venue-selection agreement entered into with their patients. Background The plaintiffs, Saramari Somerlot and Ryan Dufresne, brought this medical malpractice lawsuit (Somerlot v. Jung, M.D., J-A16016-25, PA Super 166 (Kunselman, J.)) against multiple medical providers in Philadelphia County, arising from alleged injuries sustained by Ms. Somerlot as a result of an unsuccessful surgical procedure. The plaintiff Somerlot signed a pre-surgery consent contract, which contained a venue-selection clause, stating that any legal claims, including a claim for medical malpractice, could be brought only in the Bucks County, where Ms. Somerlot underwent the surgery. The defendants, Soon Jung, M.D. and S.E. PA Pain Management and Pain Management Centers of America, LLC, preliminarily objected to venue in Philadelphia County pursuant to the venue-selection agreement. The trial court sustained the defendants’ preliminary objections. The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s order sustaining the defendants’ preliminary objections and transferring the case to Bucks County from Philadelphia County. The Superior Court held that the pre-surgery contract, containing the venue-selection clause, was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the venue-selection clause stated: NOTICE: Any legal claims or civil actions, including, but not limited to, a claim for medical malpractice in any way related to this admission/procedure, and medical services provided by [Pain Management] or its employees, shall be brought solely in the Courts of Bucks County, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs argued that one of the defendants, Boston Scientific Corporation, had previously stipulated with the plaintiffs that venue was proper in Philadelphia because it regularly conducted business there. Therefore, the plaintiffs asserted that pursuant to Pa. R.Civ.P. 1006(c)1, venue was proper as to all defendants and the plaintiffs were, therefore, excused from their contractual obligations because of the procedural rules of venue. The Superior Court ruled that the venue-selection clause supersedes Rule 1006(c). While the Superior Court agreed that Philadelphia County is, in fact, a proper venue for the case to be litigated, it noted that the Rule does not require that the case be litigated there, especially when a plaintiff has contracted to litigate in a different, but also proper, venue. The Superior Court found that Bucks County was also a proper venue in which to litigate against all defendants because that is where the surgery in question was performed and where the cause of action purportedly arose. As such, the Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the plaintiffs may breach their contract containing the venue-selection agreement because of Rule 1006(c). The Superior Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the pre-surgery contract was unconscionable. The court found that the language contained in the venue selection-clause was clear and unambiguous. Key Takeaways This is an important decision for individual health care providers, practice groups and hospitals, especially in the wake of the elimination of the medical malpractice venue-carve out rule, which had provided that “a medical professional liability action may be brought against a health care provider for a medical professional liability claim only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” Pa. R.Civ.P. 1006(a.1) (emphasis added). Now, a medical malpractice suit may be filed in any county where a defendant could be served, where the cause of action arose or where the corporate defendant regularly conducts business. See Pa. R.C.P. 1006(a). Therefore, the takeaway from this seminal opinion is that health care professionals, practice groups and hospitals may once again be able to control where a patient brings a medical malpractice claim through a venue-selection agreement entered into with their patients. That means the providers may be able to avoid venues that are perceived to be “plaintiff-friendly” and curtail forum shopping on behalf of plaintiffs. The ultimate takeaway: have a clear, unambiguous venue agreement signed by your patients mirroring the language used by Dr. Jung and Pain Management in their pre-surgery contract. _______________________ 1 Pa. R.C.P. 1006(c) states that an action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants, may be brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants. Legal Updates for Health Care Liability - August 5, 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.
Case Law Alerts
PA Superior Court holds that expert testimony is needed to prosecute claim of medical negligence.
January 3, 2022
The plaintiff brought claim for medical malpractice, among several other claims, against Dr. Schmalenberger and West Shore Anesthesia Associates. After the plaintiff underwent hip replacement surgery and when she awoke from the surgery, she had looked at her phone to find that someone had sent her a photo of herself, taken before her surgery, of her in her hospital bed. She later found out this photo was sent by Dr. Schmalenberger, who was assisting with her surgery. The plaintiff claims that Dr. Schmalenberger breached the standard of care owed to her. She did not file a certificate of merit, but rather a certificate stating that expert testimony of a licensed professional is not needed to prosecute her claim. She claimed injuries as a result of receiving the photo and had an extensive medical history for which she was previously treated for depression. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s medical negligence claim and all other claims, arguing that multiple federal courts have held that HIPAA does not create a private cause of action, which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that Dr. Schmalenberger’s conduct “‘was so far outside the standard of care that her testimony would be sufficient to establish each and every element of negligence,’” and that her own testimony could establish a causal link between the picture sent to her and the emotional injuries she suffered, and continues to suffer, as a result of the doctor’s action or inaction. The court stated that “in all but the most self-evident medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff must provide a medical expert who will testify as to elements of duty, breach and causation,” except for in circumstances when the negligence is so obvious that a lay person could recognize negligence just as well as an expert. In these circumstances, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “allows a fact-finder to infer from the circumstances surrounding the injury that the harm suffered was caused by the negligence of the defendant.” The plaintiff argued that res ipsa loquitur precluded the need for expert testimony. The Superior Court disagreed, stating that a lay juror would not be able to determine that Dr. Schmalenberger’s conduct established negligence without expert opinion. Further, the court stated that the plaintiff’s damages, including physical pain, distress and emotional damages, accompanying an extensive medical history, required that an expert testify to the cause of each of her diagnoses. While a non-precedential decision, this case highlights the continuing need for a plaintiff to bring forth expert testimony in pursuing a medical malpractice claim, even in unconventional scenarios such as in Schweigart. Thus, defense attorneys can prevail in having claims dismissed against their clients for a plaintiff’s failure to supply expert testimony when bringing a claim for medical negligence. Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
