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Legal Updates for Health Care Liability

Precedential Opinion: Superior Court of Pennsylvania Upholds the Enforceability of a Venue-Selection Clause in the Context of a Medical Malpractice Case

Legal Update for Health Care Liability - August 5, 2025

August 5, 2025

by Holli K. Archer

Hospitals may once again be able to control where a patient brings a medical malpractice claim through a venue-selection agreement entered into with their patients.

 

Background

The plaintiffs, Saramari Somerlot and Ryan Dufresne, brought this medical malpractice lawsuit (Somerlot v. Jung, M.D., J-A16016-25, PA Super 166 (Kunselman, J.)) against multiple medical providers in Philadelphia County, arising from alleged injuries sustained by Ms. Somerlot as a result of an unsuccessful surgical procedure. The plaintiff Somerlot signed a pre-surgery consent contract, which contained a venue-selection clause, stating that any legal claims, including a claim for medical malpractice, could be brought only in the Bucks County, where Ms. Somerlot underwent the surgery. 

The defendants, Soon Jung, M.D. and S.E. PA Pain Management and Pain Management Centers of America, LLC, preliminarily objected to venue in Philadelphia County pursuant to the venue-selection agreement. The trial court sustained the defendants’ preliminary objections. The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s order sustaining the defendants’ preliminary objections and transferring the case to Bucks County from Philadelphia County.

The Superior Court held that the pre-surgery contract, containing the venue-selection clause, was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the venue-selection clause stated:

NOTICE: Any legal claims or civil actions, including, but not limited to, a claim for medical malpractice in any way related to this admission/procedure, and medical services provided by [Pain Management] or its employees, shall be brought solely in the Courts of Bucks County, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The plaintiffs argued that one of the defendants, Boston Scientific Corporation, had previously stipulated with the plaintiffs that venue was proper in Philadelphia because it regularly conducted business there. Therefore, the plaintiffs asserted that pursuant to Pa. R.Civ.P. 1006(c)1, venue was proper as to all defendants and the plaintiffs were, therefore, excused from their contractual obligations because of the procedural rules of venue. The Superior Court ruled that the venue-selection clause supersedes Rule 1006(c). While the Superior Court agreed that Philadelphia County is, in fact, a proper venue for the case to be litigated, it noted that the Rule does not require that the case be litigated there, especially when a plaintiff has contracted to litigate in a different, but also proper, venue. The Superior Court found that Bucks County was also a proper venue in which to litigate against all defendants because that is where the surgery in question was performed and where the cause of action purportedly arose. As such, the Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the plaintiffs may breach their contract containing the venue-selection agreement because of Rule 1006(c). 

The Superior Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the pre-surgery contract was unconscionable. The court found that the language contained in the venue selection-clause was clear and unambiguous. 

Key Takeaways

This is an important decision for individual health care providers, practice groups and hospitals, especially in the wake of the elimination of the medical malpractice venue-carve out rule, which had provided that “a medical professional liability action may be brought against a health care provider for a medical professional liability claim only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” Pa. R.Civ.P. 1006(a.1) (emphasis added). Now, a medical malpractice suit may be filed in any county where a defendant could be served, where the cause of action arose or where the corporate defendant regularly conducts business. See Pa. R.C.P. 1006(a). 

Therefore, the takeaway from this seminal opinion is that health care professionals, practice groups and hospitals may once again be able to control where a patient brings a medical malpractice claim through a venue-selection agreement entered into with their patients. That means the providers may be able to avoid venues that are perceived to be “plaintiff-friendly” and curtail forum shopping on behalf of plaintiffs.

The ultimate takeaway: have a clear, unambiguous venue agreement signed by your patients mirroring the language used by Dr. Jung and Pain Management in their pre-surgery contract. 

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1 Pa. R.C.P. 1006(c) states that an action to enforce a joint or joint and several liability against two or more defendants, may be brought against all defendants in any county in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants. 


 

Legal Updates for Health Care Liability - August 5, 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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