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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Has the Board Misread Gilliard‑Belfast for 25 Years?

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 2026

April 1, 2026

by Linda L. Wilson

In the August 2025 What’s Hot publication, I wrote about a decision in UPS v. Smith. Smith was injured at work on February 3, 2022, and, as a result, began receiving total disability benefits.  After a period of treatment, including surgery, the employer filed a petition for review, seeking to terminate the claimant’s ongoing total disability benefits. At the April 18, 2024, hearing on that petition, the employer’s expert testified that the claimant was able to return to full duty work as of December 1, 2023. Although the treating doctor testified that claimant was still totally disabled, the board granted employer’s petition for review, holding that the claimant was no longer totally disabled as of December 31, 2023.

Following receipt of the board’s decision on the petition for review, the claimant filed a motion for clarification on two issues: (1) how the board determined that the claimant's disability period ended on December 31, 2023; and (2) how the employer met its burden of proof to show total disability benefits had terminated without producing a labor market survey. In response to the motion, the board issued a clarification order on September 27, 2024.

In its clarification order, the board acknowledged that, in deciding that the claimant was no longer totally disabled as of December 31, 2023, it relied more on the medical witness presented by the employer than the physician who treated the claimant. Next, the board emphasized that, as of the date of the hearing, the claimant had been instructed by her treating physician not to return to work. The board then held that, under Delaware law, specifically the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilliard-Belfast v. Wendy’s Inc., the claimant could remain totally disabled until her doctor stated otherwise.

After the employer appealed, the Superior Court affirmed the board, holding that its interpretation of Gilliard-Belfast was free from legal error. Since 2000, when the Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision in Gilliard-Belfast, the board had interpreted that decision to mean that claimants could rely on their treating doctor’s total disability order until the board heard and determined the matter. The clarification order by the board and the Superior Court decision affirming that order appear to be quite a departure from how Gilliard-Belfast has been interpreted.

UPS appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, arguing the interpretation followed by the board for 25 years: a claimant is entitled to rely on a treating doctor’s prohibition on working until the board decides the issue of disability. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the employer’s interpretation and affirmed the Superior Court decision. This appears to mean that, as long as a treating doctor has a claimant on total disability status, an employer will no longer be able to obtain an order from the board terminating the claimant’s ongoing total disability benefits. It will be interesting to see what will result from future litigation in this area.   

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.