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Case Law Alerts

“Furnish” Under FCRA Describes "Active Transmission of Information to a Third-Party Rather Than a Failure to Safeguard the Data" - Information Stolen from Defendant is Not Furnished Within Meaning of FCRA

In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 2021 WL 6049549

April 1, 2022

by Jeremy J. Zacharias RPLU

The New Jersey District Court’s recent opinion in this case involved a motion filed by Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. to dismiss the amended putative class action complaint filed by the plaintiffs. In a comprehensive opinion, the court granted the motion to dismiss. 

The defendant is a New Jersey-based company that provides health insurance products and maintains its members’ personal and medical information. In November 2013, an unknown thief stole two password-protected laptop computers—containing information of more than 839,000 members—from the defendant’s New Jersey headquarters. The defendant reported the incident to the police on November 4, 2013, and subsequently notified potentially affected members of the theft via letter and press release. As a result of the breach, the defendant offered potentially affected members one year of credit monitoring and identity theft protection services. 

On December 11, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action complaint alleging allegations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), among other things. They argued, in part, that the defendant violated the FCRA by either improperly disclosing (§ 1681b(g)) or furnishing (§ 1681e) consumer information. 

In deciding the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead a violation of § 1681b(g) because the defendant did not “disclose” information to the thieves. Courts interpreting data privacy laws have held that defendants whose information was stolen did not “disclose” that stolen information. Likewise, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant “furnished” information to the thieves and posited that courts routinely interpret “furnish” under FCRA to describe the “active transmission of information to a third-party rather than a failure to safeguard the data.” Courts have concluded that information stolen from a defendant is not furnished within the meaning of FCRA. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.